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I – Instruments 
A – FOLLOW-UP TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRISIS FRAMEWORK FOR 
STATE-AID 
1. CRISIS-RELATED SUPPORT FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
1. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, the 
Commission has issued four Communications which provided detailed guidance on 
the criteria for the compatibility with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) of temporary crisis-related support for financial institutions1. The first 
three of these Communications set out the criteria for compatibility of State support 
in the form of State guarantees, recapitalisations and asset relief measures. The 
fourth addressed the follow-up to such support measures. Through the application of 
State aid rules, the Commission ensured that distortions of competition within the 
internal market were limited to a minimum despite the important amounts of State 
aid and that beneficiary banks were restructured when necessary.  
2. As a result of policy intervention, the severe shortage of bank funding that occurred 
in autumn 2008 was overcome relatively quickly. However, the sovereign crisis 
which struck in the first half of 2010 clearly showed that, although the level of stress 
in financial markets had fallen significantly from its peak in late 2008, there was still 
a need for crisis-related support in 2010. 
3. During the crisis, the availability of government guarantees proved to be an 
appropriate and effective tool to improve access to funding for banks and to restore 
market confidence. However, a review by the Commission of the use of guarantees 
showed that by the early months of 2010, the more solid financial institutions were 
no longer significant issuers of guaranteed debt. The conditions of compatibility of 
guarantee schemes were therefore reviewed and tightened with effect from 1 July 
20102. 
4. Twelve Member States extended their guarantee schemes, on these new conditions, 
until 31 December 20103. A further seven Member States which previously had 
                                                 
1 Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8) ("Banking 
Communication"), Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current 
financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of 
competition (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2) ("Recapitalisation Communication"); Communication from the 
Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, 
p. 1) ("Impaired Assets Communication"); Communication on the return to viability and the assessment 
of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rule (OJ C 195, 
19.8.2009, p. 9) ("Restructuring Communication") 
2 The application of state aid rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be issued 
after 30 June 2010, DG Competition Staff Working Document, 20.4.2010 
3 Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden. In addition, Lithuania's guarantee scheme, which was approved after 1 July 2010, 
was subject to the revised conditions. 
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guarantee schemes in place terminated these schemes or allowed them to expire4. 
Despite the continuance of a significant number of guarantee schemes, their use has 
been diminishing. The monthly average volume of guaranteed bond issuance under 
schemes, which in 2009 was EUR 37.2 billion, was EUR 2.8 billion for the first eight 
months of 2010. 
5. Of the 15 Member States which have at some time introduced a recapitalisation 
scheme, six still had such a scheme in force as of 31 December 20105. However, the 
use of such schemes during 2010 was limited; as for ad hoc interventions, these 
continued to take place during 2010. However, the overall situation showed a 
reduction in the use of State capital injections in 2010 compared to 2009.  
6. The restructuring of a number of European banks was among the main challenges of 
2010. The restructuring process of banks is based on the crisis-related State aid rules 
as laid down in the Restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009. The 
Communication provides guidance on the conditions under which restructuring aid 
for banks in need of financial assistance beyond an emergency rescue can be 
authorised. It is based on the three principles of return to long-term viability without 
State aid, burden sharing between the bank and its stakeholders and the State and 
limitation of competition distortions, usually through structural (divestment) and 
behavioural measures (acquisition bans or limitations on aggressive commercial 
behaviour). The Commission approved in 2010 restructuring or liquidation plans for 
14 banks and adopted one negative decision (see Section II.A.2.3., points 176 to 206 
for detailed description of restructuring cases).  
7. Between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2010, the Commission took more than 200 
decisions on State aid measures to the financial sector aiming to remedy a serious 
disturbance in Member States' economies. These decisions authorised, amended or 
prolonged more than 40 schemes and addressed with individual decisions the 
situation of more than 40 financial institutions in 22 Member States6. The maximum 
volume of Commission-approved measures until 1 October 2010 amounted to EUR 
4 588.9 billion, of which the greatest bulk was approved as guarantees (76% of the 
maximum volume). Not all the approved aid was used by Member States. In 2009, 
the nominal amount of aid used by Member States constituted EUR 1 106.65 billion 
or 9.3% of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the figure for 2008 was 
EUR 1 236 billion7. 
2. APPLICATION OF THE TEMPORARY FRAMEWORK 
8. In 2008, the Commission adopted the Temporary Framework (TF)8 which was due to 
expire on 31 December 2010 and had as its main objective to facilitate companies' 
                                                 
4 Cyprus, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and the United Kingdom 
5 Austria, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal; the schemes adopted in Denmark, Germany, 
France, Finland, Italy, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom expired. 
6 Member States that did not grant aid to financial institutions are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Malta and Romania. 
7 State aid scoreboard – Autumn 2010 Update (COM(2010)701) 
8 Temporary framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and 
economic crisis (consolidated version) (OJ C 83, 7.4.2009, p. 1) 
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access to finance. The Commission collected information on the use and impact of 
the Framework via a questionnaire sent to the Member States on 17 March 2010. 
Third parties had also the opportunity to submit comments. The additional 
possibilities to grant State aid provided by the TF were generally very well received 
by the Member States and stakeholders.  
9. Between its introduction and 1 October 2010, the Commission approved 73 schemes 
and four ad-hoc aid measures under the TF. The volume of aid approved in 2009 was 
EUR 82.5 billion (0.7% of EU GDP). Member States tried to fix aid envelopes of a 
sufficient size to reassure the markets; however, the amount taken up was much 
lower. Both the availability of market funding for some companies on one hand, and 
budgetary constraints on the other, contributed to smaller actual use of the TF 
measures. 
10. The main measures used were the compatible limited amount of aid (the so called 
"500k" – EUR 500 000 – measure), the subsidised guarantees and the subsidised 
loans. The relaxation of the conditions for exceptional acceptance of government 
export credit insurance within the Community were also largely used and contributed 
to effectively sustain trade. 
11. The risk capital adaptation was positively perceived by the Member States as an 
important signal for private investors. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom made use of this possibility. 
12. The fact that Member States originally planned higher budgets than the amount 
effectively granted is evidence of a cautious budgetary approach given the 
uncertainties as to the depth and duration of the crisis and the need to send the 
markets a clear signal of public authorities' availability to meet potential demand. 
Moreover, Member States appear to have applied the conditions for granting the aid 
strictly, largely in view of budgetary constraints, which in turn is likely to have kept 
the number of beneficiaries small. 
3. EXIT STRATEGY 
13. An appropriate and timely "exit strategy" from the exceptional crisis measures 
constitutes a key element of the European recovery. The exit process should, for the 
financial sector as well as for the real economy, lead to viable solutions that do not 
discriminate between Member States while promoting a return to normal market 
functioning. 
14. The Commission collected information on the use of the TF as well as on the state of 
credit supply to creditworthy companies and the use of exceptional crisis-related 
support by banks in order to adopt an informed decision on the exit process for both 
the financial sector and the real economy. On the one hand, there were encouraging 
signs of stabilisation in financial markets and of a recovery in Member States' 
economies. On the other hand, the recent sovereign crisis and the perception of the 
risk of a double-dip recession illustrated the fragility of the recovery process and the 
risk of serious setbacks. 
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15. In view of this objective, the main elements that the Commission took into account 
when deciding on the phasing-out of the TF was the evolution of access to finance to 
creditworthy companies and its usefulness as a credit support tool beyond 2010. It 
was considered premature to let it expire in its entirety at the end of 2010 because of 
the fragility of the recovery. However, considering that the market situation was far 
from being as dramatic as it was at the turn of 2008/2009, a full prolongation was not 
an option either. In a forward-looking perspective, it was necessary to be mindful of 
the usefulness of the TF as an instrument to promote the economic recovery in the 
longer term as well as a progressive return to normal State aid rules while sustaining 
Member States' efforts towards fiscal consolidation and higher effectiveness of 
public spending. 
16. A progressive phasing-out of the TF was thus considered the most suitable response 
to the current market situation. On this basis, the Commission approved a limited 
prolongation of the TF9 until the end of 2011 with a special focus on SMEs and a 
limited spectrum of measures: 
– Maintenance of measures that address outstanding market failures: in particular 
the remaining problems on access to finance, notably for SMEs; 
– Tightening of conditions: the measures prolonged during 2011 would be 
subject to tighter conditions to reflect a gradual transition into the normal State 
aid regime; 
– Encouraging long term recovery in line with the Europe 2020 priorities10: 
measures that contribute to the Europe 2020 objectives should be encouraged 
(e.g. prolongation of subsidised loans for the production of green products). 
17. This approach was also in line with the initiatives adopted for the financial sector. 
The first step in the exit process for financial institutions was the modification of the 
regime applying to guarantee schemes, which took place with effect from 1 July 
201011. A review by the Commission of the use of government guarantees concluded 
that the more solid and unquestionably sound institutions were no longer significant 
issuers of guaranteed debt. On this basis, the conditions for use of government 
guarantees were tightened by applying an increased guarantee fee and requiring a 
viability plan for beneficiaries having recourse to new guarantees and exceeding 
certain thresholds. These criteria were aimed at sending a clear signal that financial 
institutions need to prepare to secure their financing without State support. 
18. A similar approach, of extending the validity of crisis-related rules while bringing 
those rules closer to the normal State aid regime, was also adopted for other support 
to financial institutions. On 1 December 2010, the Commission adopted a 
Communication extending the validity of the crisis-related measures for the financial 
                                                 
9 Temporary Union framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial 
and economic crisis (OJ C 6, 11.1.2011, p. 5) 
10 Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (COM(2010)2020 final) 
11 The application of State aid rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be issued 
after 30 June 2010, DG Competition Staff Working Document, 20.4.2010 
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sector until the end of 201112. However, given the evidence that banks were facing 
fewer difficulties in raising capital on the markets at the time of adoption of the 
Communication, the Commission no longer considered it appropriate to distinguish 
between distressed banks, from which a restructuring plan had previously been 
required in connection with any recapitalisation, and their fundamentally sound 
counterparts, from which only a viability review had been needed. Instead, from 
1 January 2011, a restructuring plan will be required from every beneficiary of a 
recapitalisation or an impaired asset measure. 
4. CONTRIBUTION OF COMPETITION POLICY TO THE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 
PROGRAMMES OF GREECE AND IRELAND 
4.1. Greek economic adjustment programme 
19. In 2009, already before the sovereign crisis, Greece had put together a banking 
rescue package, including a Guarantee Scheme, a Bond Loan Scheme and a 
Recapitalisation Scheme, which provided for liquidity and capital support to banks in 
Greece. This support package was used by all major Greek banks; ten banks were 
recapitalised in May and July 2009 and had to present restructuring plans to the 
Commission.  
20. In the course of 2010, Greece found itself in a weak fiscal position. To support the 
Greek government's efforts to get its economy back on track, the Commission, the 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pledged on 
2 May 2010 a three-year economic adjustment programme13 financed by Euro Area 
Member States in bilateral loans totalling EUR 80 billion and supported by the IMF 
with a stand-by arrangement of about EUR 30 billion, bringing the joint commitment 
to a total financing of EUR 110 billion. 
21. The Greek authorities agreed to a multi-annual programme of fiscal consolidation 
and structural reforms in order to put the Greek economy on a sustainable path, to 
restore confidence on sovereign debt markets and to preserve the stability of the Euro 
area. The programme includes a sustainability-enhancing fiscal consolidation 
through measures that generate savings in public sector expenditure and improve the 
government's revenue-raising capacity as well as financial sector policies aiming at 
stabilising the Greek financial system. The programme also includes medium-term 
structural reforms in order to improve the Greek economy's competitiveness through 
the modernization of the public sector, the increase in efficiency and flexibility of 
product and labour markets and the creation of a more open and accessible business 
environment for domestic and foreign investors, including a reduction of the State's 
direct participation in domestic industries. 
22. In order to strengthen the Greek financial system, two important support instruments 
were put into place:  
                                                 
12 Communication on the application, after 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support measures in 
favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (OJ C 329, 7.12.2010, p. 7) 
13 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, European Economy, Occasional Papers 61, May 
2010 
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– Issuance of additional Government guarantees: the main purpose of these 
guarantees is to use them as collateral in order to obtain funding from the ECB. 
An additional amount of EUR 25 billion was authorised by the Commission in 
the summer of 201014. Another extension of the scheme, by EUR 30 billion, is 
planned for the first half of 2011. 
– The establishment of an independent Financial Stability Fund (FSF) as a safety 
net to preserve the solvency of the financial sector, by providing capital 
support to banks. EUR 10 billion were earmarked which have not been used so 
far. The granting of aid was subject to a scheme which was also authorised by 
the Commission in the summer of 201015. 
23. In line with EU State aid rules, on 1 October 2010 Greece submitted to the 
Commission the restructuring plans for six of the recapitalised banks. The 
Commission entered into discussion with Greece in particular regarding the banks in 
which the State holds significant stake such as Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE), 
Hellenic Postbank (TT), Attica Bank and the Consignment Deposit and Loan Fund 
(CDLF). A need for in-depth restructuring of ATE and CDLF was identified and 
restructuring plans are to indicate measures that lead to the restoration of viability of 
the bank in the long-term without State aid, and be accompanied by adequate burden-
sharing and measures to minimise distortions of competition. 
24. As regards structural reforms, competition policy was identified as an important 
pillar to support the increase in efficiency of product markets. Greece thus 
cooperated with the Commission on drafting a new investment law, on reforming the 
Hellenic Competition Authority and on liberalising closed professions. 
4.2. Irish economic adjustment programme 
25. As regards Ireland, the situation became very stressed for both the banks and the 
Sovereign debt in the last quarter of the year. The combination of a severe economic 
crisis and of the huge losses taken by a banking sector several times bigger than the 
Irish economy led to great pressure on the Irish sovereign debt. Ireland and the Irish 
banks faced the drying up of access to wholesale funding, severe deposit outflows, 
the collapse of the Irish property market and a considerable down-turn of the 
economy with a severe fall in GDP in the last years and rising unemployment.  
26. The Irish authorities therefore made an application to the EU/IMF financial stability 
facilities in place on 22 November 2010. On 28 November 2010, a Programme was 
agreed between the Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), the IMF and the 
Irish authorities16. The Programme foresees a loan of EUR 85 billion to Ireland, of 
which EUR 35 billion are available to restore banks' viability. 
27. As part of the Programme, two domestic banks will be wound down (Anglo Irish 
Bank & INBS), while others will be capitalised and restructured in compliance with 
EU State aid rules. This means that all the Irish banks currently under restructuring 
                                                 
14 Case N260/2010 Third prolongation of Greek bank support scheme (OJ C 238, 3.9.2010, p. 3) 
15 Case N328/2010 Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund 
(FSF) (OJ C 316, 20.11.2010, p. 7) 
16 MEMO/10/624 
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will receive extra aid, currently estimated at a total of EUR 10 billion. A new capital 
adequacy review will be undertaken early 2011 by the Financial Regulator together 
with the Commission, ECB and IMF in order to determine whether further capital 
injections would be needed. At the end of 2010, bank recapitalisations totalled more 
the 30% of Irish GDP. 
28. Furthermore, deleveraging targets will be set for each of the viable banks. The 
Programme foresees that the viable banks will submit to the Commission, under EU 
State aid rules, a restructuring plan in the second quarter of 2011 that shows: (i) how 
they will reach these targets, (ii) how they intend to fulfil the other requirements of 
the Commission's Restructuring Communication (return to viability, burden-sharing, 
measures limiting the distortion of competition). EU State aid rules are therefore not 
lifted by the Programme and continue to apply to the rescue and restructuring of the 
Irish banks.  
29. As regards competition-related structural reforms, a number of policy measures will 
be taken to bolster competition in product and energy markets and other network 
industries. This includes introducing legislative changes to remove restrictions to 
trade and competition in sheltered sectors, addressing the current exclusion of certain 
sectors from the scope of the national competition law and improving deterrence of 
anticompetitive behaviour. 
B – ANTITRUST – ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU 
1. SHAPING AND APPLYING THE RULES 
1.1. Shaping the rules: review of Block Exemption Regulations 
1.1.1. Block Exemption Regulation on vertical agreements 
30. On 20 April 2010, the Commission adopted a revised Block Exemption Regulation17 
(BER) and Guidelines18 regarding vertical agreements, i.e. agreements between 
suppliers and buyers operating at different levels of the production and distribution 
chain for the supply and distribution of products and services. The revision was 
carried out in view of the expiry, on 31 May 2010, of the Block Exemption 
Regulation adopted in 199919 and which marked the evolution from an approach 
mainly centred on the form of an agreement to one consisting in assessing its likely 
effects on the market. The basic principle formulated in 1999 was that, absent any 
hardcore restriction of competition, if a supplier only has limited market power, its 
vertical agreements are either unlikely to restrict competition, or that the efficiencies 
that they bring about are likely to prevail over any restrictive effects so that on 
balance the agreements are either neutral or beneficial to the consumers. For that 
                                                 
17 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices (OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, p. 1-7) 
18 Commission notice – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (OJ C 130, 19.5.2010, p. 1-46) 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1215/1999 of 10 June 1999 amending Regulation No 19/65/EEC on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices 
(OJ L 148, 15.6.1999, p. 1-4) 
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reason, under the 1999 Regulation vertical agreements concluded by suppliers with a 
market share not exceeding 30% were exempted "as a block" from the prohibition set 
out in Article 101(1) TFEU. 
31. The basic principle set out in the revised rules remains that, in the presence of limited 
market power, companies are free to decide how their products are distributed, 
provided their agreements do not contain price-fixing or other hardcore restrictions. 
However, the rules were revised to the effect that in order to be block exempted all 
parties to the agreement, i.e. not just the supplier but also the buyer, must have a 
market share not exceeding 30%. This change was motivated by the fact that in the 
light of the increasing concentration of distribution, it cannot be assumed that 
agreements involving powerful buyers are neutral or beneficial for consumers as a 
general rule and that they should therefore be block exempted whenever the 
supplier's market share does not exceed 30%. Cases tackled in particular by some 
National Competition Authorities in the last years have shown that such an 
assumption is indeed not justified. The introduction of a market share threshold that 
takes into account the buyers' potential market power means that a case-by-case 
approach will be applied to vertical agreements where the buyer has a market share 
exceeding 30%, similarly to what is already being applied to agreements involving 
suppliers' market power. There is no presumption of illegality outside the block 
exemption. This revision will allow for instance to tackle more effectively than under 
the previously applicable rules vertical restraints led by powerful distributors that 
may cause prejudice to SMEs and to the final consumers. 
32. The Regulation and accompanying Guidelines were also revised in order to take into 
account the rapid development since the adoption of the previous BER in 1999 of the 
internet as a force for online sales and for cross-border commerce, which increases 
consumer choice and price competition. This part of the revision did not entail any 
change of policy or of the scope of the rules, but rather responded to calls made to 
the Commission to provide more explicit guidance to firms regarding the restrictions 
that may and may not be agreed regarding on-line distribution.  
33. The revised Guidelines make it clear that under the BER, approved distributors must 
be free to sell on the internet without limitation on quantities, customers' location and 
restrictions on prices. At the same time, a supplier and buyer can agree that the latter 
must have a physical point of sales ("brick and mortar shop") and that its on-line 
distribution must comply with certain quality and other requirements that are 
equivalent with the conditions governing the sales from brick and mortar shops. The 
Guidelines also provide examples of restrictions (such as an agreement between the 
supplier and the distributor where the latter limits the proportion of sales made over 
the internet) that are not exempted under the BER and are considered hardcore resale 
restrictions. Through the added clarity and thereby greater predictability of the new 
rules, distributors have a clear basis and incentives to develop online activities to 
reach and be reached by customers throughout the EU and fully take advantage of 
the internal market. This can be expected to contribute to the development of online 
commerce and the digital internal market. 
34. Finally, the third major strand of the revision consisted in clarifying the notion of 
hardcore restriction of competition, whose inclusion in a vertical agreement entails 
that the agreement as a whole cannot benefit from the block exemption. Based on 
case experience, it is presumed that agreements containing one or more hardcore 
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restrictions restrict competition and are unlikely to fulfil the four conditions of 
Article 101(3), i.e. are unlikely to produce outweighing positive effects. The 
Guidelines clarify that this double presumption does not, contrary to a widespread 
perception, amount to considering hardcore restrictions as illegal per se. In line with 
case law, the Guidelines specify that undertakings may demonstrate pro-competitive 
effects, in an individual case, and that the agreement meets all the conditions set out 
in Article 101(3), not least that there is an eventual net benefit for the consumers. 
The Guidelines further provide examples of pro-competitive effects that could, in 
certain circumstances, be associated with hardcore restrictions such as resale price 
maintenance.  
1.1.2. Block Exemption Regulations on horizontal cooperation agreements 
35. On 14 December 2010, the Commission adopted new rules and guidelines for the 
assessment of horizontal cooperation agreements, i.e., agreements concluded 
between companies operating at the same level of the supply chain, such as 
agreements to cooperate on research and development, production, purchasing, 
commercialisation, standardisation, and exchange of information. This new regime 
consists of a set of guidelines, the so-called "Horizontal Guidelines", and two Block 
Exemption Regulations20 (BER) regarding research and development agreements on 
one hand and specialisation and joint production agreements on the other hand. 
36. Horizontal cooperation can lead to substantial economic benefits and allow 
companies to respond to increasing competitive pressures and a changing market 
environment driven by globalisation. However, they can also lead to serious 
competition problems, in particular where they increase the market power of the 
parties to an extent that enables them to increase prices, limit output or reduce 
innovation efforts. The Commission's approach enshrined in the new rules is to leave 
companies maximum freedom to cooperate while at the same time protecting 
competition from such cooperations which are contrary to Article 101 TFEU, e.g. by 
being harmful to consumers. 
37. The Commission published drafts of the revised Guidelines and BERs for public 
consultation in May and June 2010. Almost 120 stakeholders submitted contributions 
during the public consultation. This allowed the Commission to further improve and 
refine the texts prior to adopting the final versions. 
38. The new rules should be seen as an evolution, not a revolution. They aim at giving 
comprehensive guidance and adequate legal certainty for companies wishing to 
cooperate with competitors. Whilst the Commission's view on how competitors can 
cooperate has not fundamentally changed since the previous rules were put in place 
in 2000, the new Horizontal Guidelines21 are more detailed and user-friendly than the 
previous ones. Two key features of the reform include the insertion of a new chapter 
                                                 
20 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to categories of research and development 
agreements (OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 36) and Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 
14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation 
agreements (OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 43) 
21 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to horizontal cooperation agreements (OJ C 11, 14.1.2011, p. 1) (Horizontal Guidelines) 
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on information exchange and a substantial revision of the chapter on standardisation 
agreements.  
39. A well functioning system for standard-setting is vital for the European economy as a 
whole and in particular for the information, communication and telecoms (ICT) 
sector. The objective of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the European 
standardisation has been set out as a priority of the Flagship Initiative of the Europe 
2020 Strategy on "An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era"22. The 
revision of standardisation chapter of the Horizontal Guidelines fits into this context 
by promoting a standard-setting system that is open and transparent and thereby 
increases the visibility of licensing costs for Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) used 
in standards. In doing so it attempts to find a balance between the sometimes 
contradictory interests of companies with different business models (from the pure 
innovator to the pure manufacturer) involved in the standard-setting process. The 
system will thus provide sufficient incentives for further innovation and at the same 
time ensure that the traditional benefits from standardisation are passed on to 
consumers. 
40. Concretely, the chapter on standardisation agreements contains certain criteria, 
which, if fulfilled by standard-setting organisations, provide comfort that the 
Commission will not take issue with a standard-setting agreement (safe harbour). 
These criteria include: (i) that the procedure for adopting the standard is unrestricted 
with participation open to all relevant competitors on the market; (ii) transparency to 
ensure that stakeholders are able to inform themselves of upcoming, on-going and 
finalised work on standards, also for those involving IPR; and (iii) a balanced IPR 
policy with good faith disclosure of those IPRs which are essential for the 
implementation of a standard, and a requirement for all IPR holders that wish to have 
their technology included in the standard to provide an irrevocable commitment to 
license their IPR on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms ("FRAND 
commitment"). However, these criteria are not a "straight jacket": not fulfilling them 
does not mean that a standardisation agreement infringes EU competition rules. 
Consequently, the Commission gives detailed guidance for those standard-setting 
organisations whose rules do not meet the safe harbour criteria, in order to allow 
them to assess whether their agreements are in line with EU competition law. 
41. Certain standard-setting organisations may wish to provide for their members to 
unilaterally disclose, prior to setting a standard, the most restrictive licensing terms 
that they would charge for their IPRs if those were to be included in the standard. 
Such a system could enable a standard-setting organisation and the industry to take 
an informed choice not only on quality but also on price when selecting which 
technology should be included in the standard. The Commission gives comfort to 
standard-setting organisations that such a system would normally not infringe EU 
competition rules. 
42. Information exchange can be pro-competitive when it enables companies to gather 
general market data that allow them to become more efficient and better serve 
customers. It also enables consumers to make better informed choices when deciding 
                                                 
22 An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era: Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at 
Centre State (COM(2010) 614) 
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which product to purchase. However, there are also situations where the exchange of 
market information can be harmful for competition, for instance when companies use 
sensitive information to coordinate their pricing. The new chapter on information 
exchange in the Horizontal Guidelines is the first Commission document to give 
clear and comprehensive guidance on how to assess the compatibility of information 
exchanges with EU competition law and will therefore play a significant practical 
role for businesses and their legal advisors. The chapter sets out the various factors 
relevant for the assessment and their interplay and contains a number of practical 
examples to help businesses assess typical information exchange scenarios. 
43. With a view to facilitating innovation in Europe, the Commission has considerably 
extended the scope of the R&D Block Exemption Regulation, which now not only 
covers R&D activities carried out jointly but also so-called "paid-for research" 
agreements where one party merely finances the R&D activities carried out by the 
other party. In addition, the new Regulation gives parties more scope to jointly 
exploit the R&D results. Moreover, the list of "hardcore restrictions" has been 
streamlined and it has been clarified that restrictions on active sales to territories not 
exclusively allocated to one party are considered hardcore and can therefore not 
benefit from the BER. It has furthermore been clarified that passive sales restrictions 
with regard to customers, and not only those with regard to territories, are also 
considered hardcore restrictions. 
44. The scope of the Specialisation BER has been slightly extended so that its benefit 
applies to specialisation agreements, even where one of the parties to the agreement 
only partly ceases production. This enables a company that has two production plants 
for a certain product to close down one of its plants, outsource the output of the 
closed plant, and still avail of the Specialisation BER. The Specialisation BER also 
provides that, where the products concerned by a specialisation or joint production 
agreement are intermediary products which one or more of the parties use captively 
for the production of certain downstream products which they also sell, the 
exemption is also conditional upon a 20% market share threshold downstream. In 
such a case, merely looking at the parties' market position at the level of the 
intermediary product would ignore the potential risk of closing off inputs for 
competitors at the level of the downstream products. Consequently, such a 
specialisation or joint production agreement will not benefit from the Specialisation 
BER but will be subject to an individual assessment. 
1.1.3. Sectoral Block Exemption Regulations 
45. In the field of insurance, the new Insurance Block Exemption Regulation23 (BER) 
was adopted on 24 March 2010. The previous BER was due to expire on 31st March 
2010. Following a two and a half years review, involving all interested market 
players and National Competition Authorities, the Commission decided not to renew 
two of the four types of cooperation that the previous BER covered, namely 
agreements concerning (i) standard policy conditions (SPCs) and (ii) security devices 
(see Section II.A.2.1.3., points 167 to 172). 
                                                 
23 Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector 
(OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 1) 
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46. On 27 May 2010, the Commission adopted new competition rules for agreements 
between vehicle manufacturers and their authorised dealers, repairers and spare parts 
distributors. Agreements regarding the aftermarkets are subject to the general vertical 
BER of 20 April from 2010 onwards. Agreements regarding the markets for the sale 
of new vehicles will be subject to the same general vertical BER from 2013. In 
addition, the Commission adopted Regulation 461/201024, which sets out three 
supplementary hardcore clauses relating to spare parts distribution, and a detailed set 
of supplementary Guidelines25 for assessing vertical agreements in the sector. The 
new rules broadly align competition policy in the car market to the general regime 
applicable to other sectors (see Section II.G.2.1., points 362 to 370). 
1.2. Private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules 
47. Private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules is an essential complement to a strong 
public enforcement by the Commission and National Competition Authorities 
(NCAs). In its 2008 White Paper on antitrust damages actions26, the Commission 
suggested a number of measures to improve the possibilities for consumers and 
businesses to obtain compensation for harm caused to them by antitrust 
infringements. Collective redress and quantification of damages were among the 
issues addressed in the White Paper. 
48. The Commission's suggestions on collective redress have triggered a broad public 
debate that goes beyond the boundaries of the antitrust field and focuses on the role 
to be played by collective redress more generally in any circumstances where a 
single infringement of EU rules harms large groups of victims. Indeed, collective 
redress may be necessary to ensure effective and efficient access to justice also in 
other areas of EU law. On 12 October 2010, Vice-Presidents Reding and Almunia 
and Commissioner Dalli jointly presented to the College an information note 
"Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps"27, 
discussing horizontal issues such as effective compensation, safeguards against 
abusive litigation, the role of alternative dispute resolution, jurisdictional rules and 
funding. On the basis of the note, the Commission decided to prepare a public 
consultation which should contribute to identify a set of common principles that shall 
guide any future legislative proposals concerning collective redress, including in the 
antitrust field. A Communication presenting such principles has been scheduled for 
adoption in 201128.  
49. As regards quantification of antitrust damages in civil proceedings, the Commission 
announced in the White Paper that it intended to draw up a non-binding 
Communication providing a succinct and easily accessible overview of the methods 
and techniques that can be used by courts and parties to antitrust damages actions 
                                                 
24 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices in the motor vehicle sector (OJ L 129, 28.5.2010, p. 52) 
25 Commission notice – Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and 
repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles (OJ C 138, 28.5.2010, 
p. 16-27) 
26 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (COM(2008) 165 final) 
27 SEC(2010)1192 
28 Commission Work Programme 2011 (COM(2010) 623 final): Annex I, strategic initiative 25 
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when faced with the often complex task of quantifying damages. As part of the 
expertise sought in the preparation of the Communication on quantification of harm, 
a group of economic consultants and lawyers produced for the Commission an 
external study on quantifying antitrust damages29. The Directorate-General for 
Competition also organised on 26 January 2010 a workshop with external economists 
to discuss a range of issues concerning this topic30. A Communication on 
quantification of harm in antitrust damages actions has been scheduled for adoption 
in 201131. 
1.3. Applying Article 101: Cartels and other agreements and concerted practices 
1.3.1. Cartels 
50. In 2010 the Commission adopted seven cartel decisions32 imposing fines totalling 
over EUR 3 billion on 70 undertakings. As the fight against cartels continued to be 
one of its main priorities, the Commission focused on making the process more 
efficient through the application of the settlement procedure, which was applied in 
2010 for the first time in two cases. Moreover, against the background of difficult 
economic conditions, a number of mainly small and medium-sized enterprises were 
granted a fine reduction in application of point 35 of the Fines Guidelines33 (inability 
to pay). 
51. In the Airfreight case34 the Commission fined 11 air cargo carriers almost EUR 
800 million for coordinating surcharges for fuel and security from December 1999 to 
February 2006. Airlines providing airfreight services primarily supply air transport 
services to freight forwarders, who arrange "door to door" carriage of goods 
including associated services and formalities on behalf of shippers. All carriers were 
granted a 50% reduction on sales between the EEA and third countries in order to 
take into account the fact that on these routes part of the harm of the cartel fell 
outside the EEA. All carriers received a reduction of 15% on fines on account of the 
general regulatory environment in the sector which can be seen as encouraging price 
coordination. One carrier received immunity from fines, and ten others fines 
reductions, under the Commission's Leniency policy35 for undertakings that 
cooperate with its investigations. 
52. An important issue in the area of cartels was settled by the Court of Justice in 2010, 
namely the question of scope of Legal Professional Privilege (LPP) protection, raised 
by Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd, one of the parties in the Heat Stabilizers case36. In its 
                                                 
29 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf  
30 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/economist_workshop.html  
31 Commission Work Programme 2011 (COM(2010) 623 final): Annex II, initiatives under consideration 
32 Cases COMP/38511 DRAMs, COMP/39092 Bathroom fittings & fixtures, COMP/38344 Pre-stressing 
steel, COMP/38866 Animal Feed Phosphates, COMP/36212 Carbonless paper (re-adoption for 
Bolloré), COMP/39258 Airfreight and COMP/39309 LCD 
33 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 
(OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, p. 2-5) 
34 Case COMP/39258 Airfreight. See IP/10/1487, 9.11.2010. 
35 Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 298, 8.12.2006, 
p. 17-22) 
36 Case COMP/38589 Heat stabilisers (OJ C 307, 12.11.2010, p. 9-12) 
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judgment of 14 September 201037, the Court of Justice upheld the position of the 
Commission, confirming that correspondence with an in-house lawyer is not covered 
by LPP (see Section I.B.2.4., points 69 and 70).  
Settlements procedure 
53. In 2010 the Commission adopted its two first settlement decisions: a full settlement 
decision in DRAMs case38 and a hybrid settlement decision in Animal Feed 
Phosphates case39. 
54. The DRAMs case constituted a milestone in EU cartel practice, not only because it 
brought the first settlement decision but also because of the characteristics of the 
DRAMs cartel. Ten producers in a high technology setting were involved in a 
network of anticompetitive contacts and secret information sharing, mostly on a 
bilateral basis, through which they coordinated the price levels and price quotations 
for DRAMs (a form of memory chips, the so-called Dynamic Random Access 
Memories – DRAM) sold to major PC and server equipment manufacturers in 
Europe. The settlement of this highly complex cartel comprised all ten undertakings; 
the Commission imposed an almost EUR 330 million fine. The decision was not 
appealed, entailing large cost savings for all concerned. 
55. In the other settlement case, Animal Feed Phosphates, which concerned a cartel 
lasting over 30 years in the animal nutrition sector, one group of undertakings 
discontinued the settlement proceedings (hybrid case). The finalization of this first 
hybrid case proved that the Commission can successfully conclude settlement even 
when one party withdraws from the settlement process. 
Inability to pay 
56. Against the background of the economic crisis, the seven cartel decisions adopted in 
2010 dealt with 32 applications for a fine reduction on grounds of inability to pay, 
nine of which were granted. Point 35 of the Fines Guidelines states that "in 
exceptional cases, the Commission may, upon request, take account of [an] 
undertaking's inability to pay in a specific social and economic context". The purpose 
of this provision is to avoid that the Commission's fines drive financially distressed 
undertakings out of the market and cause adverse social and economic consequences. 
After an intense scrutiny of their individual financial situation, fines were reduced 
because of inability to pay for a total number of nine undertakings in the Bathroom 
Fittings, Pre-stressing Steel and Animal Feed Phosphates cases. 
57. The Bathroom fittings and fixtures cartel case40 concerned an important number of 
relatively small companies. In this case, the Commission received ten applications 
for inability to pay. The Commission carried out a thorough analysis of the financial 
situation of each of the undertakings and assessed the specific social and economic 
context for those undertakings whose financial situation was found to be sufficiently 
                                                 
37 Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010] 
ECR 
38 Case COMP/38511 DRAMs. See IP/10/586 and MEMO/10/201, 19.5.2010. 
39 Case COMP/38866 Animal Feed Phosphates. See IP/10/985, 20.7.2010. 
40 Case COMP/39092 Bathroom fittings & fixtures. See IP/10/790, 23.6.2010. 
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critical. In this context, the impact of the global economic and financial crisis on the 
bathroom fitting sector was taken into account. The Commission concluded for five 
undertakings concerned that the fine would cause their assets to lose significant value 
and reduced their fines. The final decision adopted on 23 June 2010 imposed a fine 
of over EUR 622 million on 17 undertakings. 
1.3.2. Other agreements and concerted practices 
58. In 2010, the Commission took three major decisions regarding agreements and 
concerted practices in addition to the fight against cartels. The Commission put an 
end to a major investigation under Article 101 in the air transport sector by making 
legally binding commitments offered by British Airways, American Airlines and 
Iberia41. This decision will entail significant benefits for European consumers by 
ensuring that sufficient competition on the transatlantic flights, in particular from 
London, is maintained (see Section II.E.2.1.1., points 309 to 312). In the financial 
sector, the Commission made binding Visa Europe's commitments42 on Multilateral 
Interchange Fees for immediate debit cards transactions applicable to cross-border 
transactions in the EEA and to domestic transactions in nine EEA countries43 . The 
decisions brings Visa Europe's MIFs for consumer immediate debit cards 
transactions in line with MasterCard's unilateral undertakings of 1 April 200944 and 
the "merchant-indifference methodology" to modes of payment (see Section 
II.A.2.1.1., points 157 to 160). The Commission also adopted its first antitrust 
decision in the health services market. It imposed a fine of EUR 5 million on the 
French Association of Pharmacists45 condemning its market behaviour in the French 
market for clinical laboratory testing (see Section II.D.2.2.1., points 294 and 295). 
1.4. Applying Article 102 TFEU: Abuse of dominant positions 
59. The Commission continued its enforcement activities of Article 102 TFEU, notably 
in the energy sector, where it took four decisions and in the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) sector, where it opened several proceedings.  
60. In the energy sector, the Commission continued in 2010 its work following its 2007 
energy sector inquiry, adopting four major antitrust decisions under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/200346, whereby the Commission makes binding the commitments 
proposed by undertakings to put an end to a potential infringement. They relate to 
incumbents of France, Germany, Italy and Sweden foreclosing access to their 
domestic markets through various means, such as long-term supply contracts with 
resale restrictions or limiting available transport or export capacities on energy 
networks (see Section II.B.2.1., points 211 to 215). 
                                                 
41 Case COMP/39596 BA/AA/IB. See IP/10/936 and MEMO/10/330, 14.7.2010. 
42 Case COMP/39398 Visa MIF. See IP/10/1684, 8.12.2010. 
43 In those where the domestic MIF rates apply in the absence of other MIFs or are set directly by Visa 
Europe. 
44 Case COMP/34579 MasterCard. See IP/09/515, 1.4.2009. 
45 Case COMP/39510 ONP. See IP/10/1683, 8.12.2010. 
46 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25) 
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61. The Commission was also active in the field of ICT markets to monitor potential 
abuse of dominant position. In spring, the Commission launched two preliminary 
investigations into Apple's business practices relating to the iPhone (the limitation of 
warranty rights to the country of purchase and the imposition of restrictions on 
independent developer tools for iPhone applications), which were both subsequently 
closed after Apple proposed to change these practices47. The Commission opened in 
July proceedings against IBM concerning potential abuses of a dominant position: 
IBM is alleged inter alia to have engaged in illegal tying of its mainframe hardware 
products to its allegedly dominant mainframe operating system48. In November 2010, 
the Commission initiated formal proceedings against Google with a view to further 
investigating allegations that Google has abused a dominant market position in 
online search, online advertising and online advertising intermediation, following 
complaints from several search service providers49 (see Section II.C.2.2.1., points 
253 to 255). 
2. SELECTED COURT CASES  
2.1. Exclusivity agreements 
62. The Tomra Systems and Others v European Commission50 judgment of the General 
Court of 9 September 2010 relates to a Commission decision of 2006 prohibiting 
Tomra's practices consisting of exclusivity agreements, individualised quantity 
commitments and individualised retroactive rebate schemes in the markets for 
reverse vending machines in a series of national markets. The judgment of the 
General Court re-affirms long-standing case law on exclusivity agreements. The 
Court paid particular attention to the fact that the Commission analysed the structure 
and characteristics of the market, the position held by Tomra and its competitors, the 
size of the customers, the terms of the agreement, the development of demand, the 
coverage and duration of the contracts, and the "suction effect" of the rebate 
schemes. The General Court established that the potential foreclosure by a dominant 
undertaking of a substantial part of the market cannot be justified by showing that the 
contestable part of the market is still sufficient to accommodate a limited number of 
competitors, because the customers on the potentially foreclosed part of the market 
should have the opportunity to benefit from whatever degree of competition is 
possible on the market and competitors should be able to compete on the merits for 
the entire market and not just for a part of it, and because it is not the role of the 
dominant undertaking to dictate how many viable competitors will be allowed to 
compete for the remaining contestable portion of demand. 
                                                 
47 See IP/10/1175, 25.9.2010. 
48 Cases COMP/39511 IBM Corporation, COMP/39790 TurboHercules/IBM and COMP/39692 IBM 
Maintenance Services. See IP/10/1006, 26.7.2010. 
49 Cases COMP/39740 Foundem/Google, COMP/39775 Ejustice/Google and COMP/39768 Ciao/Google. 
See IP/10/1624, 30.11.2010. 
50 Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems and Others v European Commission [2010] ECR 
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2.2. Margin squeeze 
63. The Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission of the European Communities51 judgment 
of the Court of Justice of 14 October 2010 dismissed Deutsche Telekom's appeal 
against the General Court's judgment of 200852 which upheld the Commission's 
decision of 2003 finding that Deutsche Telekom (DT) had squeezed its competitors 
out of the market by charging abusive prices to access the local loop (the "last mile" 
connecting the network to end-users). This landmark judgment re-confirms the 
principles for assessing an abuse of a dominant position in the form of a margin 
squeeze under Article 102 that had been set out by the General Court in its judgment 
of 2008. The Court established that margin squeeze is a stand alone abuse in the 
sense that there is no need to demonstrate that wholesale prices or retail prices are, in 
themselves, abusive since the abusive nature of the incumbent's conduct is connected 
with the unfairness of the spread between its prices for wholesale access and its retail 
prices. 
64. The Court upheld the lawfulness of the method used by the Commission to establish 
a margin squeeze, namely the use of the equally efficient competitor test. This test 
establishes whether DT would have been able to offer its retail services to end-users 
otherwise than at a loss if it had first been obliged to pay its own wholesale prices for 
local loop access services. The Court required that in order for a margin squeeze to 
be considered abusive, it must be shown that it is capable of making market entry or 
market penetration of competitors, who are at least as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking, more difficult or impossible. In this regard, the Court noted that since 
the wholesale local loop access services provided by DT are indispensable to its 
competitors' effective penetration of the retail markets for the provision of services to 
end-users, a margin squeeze resulting from the spread between wholesale prices for 
local loop access services and retail prices for end-user access services, in principle, 
hinders the growth of competition in the retail markets in services to end-users, since 
a competitor who is as efficient as the incumbent cannot carry on his business in the 
retail market for end-user access services without incurring losses. The Court of 
Justice underlined that where a dominant undertaking actually implements a pricing 
practice resulting in a margin squeeze of its equally efficient competitors, with the 
purpose of driving them out of the relevant market, the fact that the desired result is 
not ultimately achieved does not alter its categorisation as abuse within the meaning 
of Art. 102 TFEU. 
65. Finally, the margin squeeze at issue was attributable to DT, since the latter had 
sufficient scope to adjust the retail prices charged to its end-users, notwithstanding 
the presence of price regulation. It thus confirms that decisions of national regulators 
(in this case, the approval by the German telecommunications Regulator RegTP of 
DT's wholesale prices) do not shield a dominant company from respecting 
competition rules. The Court held that regardless of the national price regulation, DT 
had sufficient scope to adjust its prices to end the margin squeeze and fulfil its 
obligations under competition law. In other words, decisions of national authorities 
under EU telecommunications law do not in any way affect the Commission's power 
to find infringements of EU competition law. 
                                                 
51 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission of the European Communities [2010] ECR 
52 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2008] ECR II-477 
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2.3. Level of fines 
66. On 19 May 2010, the General Court delivered six judgments53 on the appeals 
launched by several undertakings against the Copper Plumbing Tubes54 
Commission's decision of 3 September 2004, punishing a cartel in the market for 
copper tube manufacturing. The General Court clarified a number of questions 
related to the level of fines. 
67. In KME Germany AG, KME France SAS, KME Italy SpA v Commission, the 
General Court dismissed the appeal of the applicants. On the assessment of the 
gravity of the infringement, the General Court confirmed that the actual impact on 
the market of cartels is irrelevant for their classification as "very serious" 
infringements under the 1998 Fines Guidelines. Therefore, the question to what 
extent a cartel resulted in a market price higher than without the cartel is not a 
decisive factor for determining the level of fines. The assessment of the size of the 
sector affected by the cartel is relevant to determine the basic amount of the fine. The 
applicants claimed that, when assessing the size of the sector affected by the cartel, 
the Commission was wrong in including the price of raw materials (metal) in market 
turnover, since that price is set by daily listings on the London Metal Exchange and 
is therefore outside their control. The General Court rejected that argument, stating 
that despite its approximate nature, turnover is currently considered as an adequate 
criterion in the context of competition law for assessing the size and economic power 
of the undertakings concerned. The General Court also stated that when the 
Commission increases the amount of the fine to take into account the duration of the 
infringement, it is not bound to fix the increase for each year of participation by 
reference to the intensity of the infringement (i.e. frequency of collusive meetings). 
68. In the IMI plc, IMI Kynoch Ltd, Yorkshire Copper Tube case, the General Court 
partially annulled the Commission's decision and reduced the starting amount of the 
fine paid by the applicant because, unlike the other cartelists, the applicant 
participated in only one branch of the cartel. The applicants claimed that they 
suspended their involvement in the cartel for more than 16 months before being 
involved again in the cartel arrangements. Other cartelists were meeting regularly 
during that time. The Commission was not able to provide any evidence that the 
applicants were attending those collusive meetings during the 16 month "break". 
Although the applicants were not disputing that the cartel was a single and 
continuous infringement, the General Court decided to reduce the amount of the fine 
imposed on the applicants in order to take account of their sequential participation in 
the cartel. 
2.4. Legal professional privilege and in-house lawyers 
69. In its judgment of 14 September 201055, dismissing in its entirety the appeal brought 
by Akzo Nobel Chemicals Limited and Akcros Chemicals Limited against the 
                                                 
53 Cases T-11/05, T-18/05, T-19/05, T-20/05, T-21/05 and T-25/05 Wieland-Werke AG and Others, IMI 
plc and Others, Boliden AB and Others, Outokumpu Oyj and Others, Chalkor AE, KME Germany AG 
and Others v Commission 
54 Case COMP/38069 PO/Copper plumbing tubes (OJ L 192, 13.7.2006, p. 21-29) 
55 Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010] 
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Commission, the Court of Justice confirmed the position in the previous case of 
AM&S Europe v Commission56 that internal company communications with in-
house lawyers do not attract legal professional privilege (LPP) in the context of EU 
competition investigations. 
70. The Court of Justice considered that in-house lawyers are in a different position to 
external lawyers, due to the in-house lawyer's relationship of employment with his 
client. In-house lawyers fail to fulfil the two cumulative conditions for legal 
privilege, first set down by the Court in the case of AM & S Europe v Commission. 
These conditions require that: (i) the advice is requested and given for the purposes 
of the client's rights of defence, and (ii) that the advice must emanate from 
"independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by a 
relationship of employment". The in-house lawyer is economically dependent on and 
has "close ties" with his employer, resulting in a different level of professional 
independence from that which is enjoyed by an external lawyer. This is despite any 
professional ethical obligations to which in-house lawyers are subject. Legal 
privilege will only extend to advice from independent external lawyers. Accordingly, 
any communication from in-house lawyers with, or advice they provide to, their 
commercial colleagues on matters that may give rise to competition issues may be 
subject to full review by the Commission in the context of an investigation. This is 
what happened in the present case, which concerned e-mails and notes exchanged 
between the General Manager of Akcros, and a member of the Dutch bar, employed 
as the competition coordinator for Akzo Nobel seized by the Commission in the 
context of a cartel investigation. 
2.5. Misuse of intellectual property rights and regulatory procedures 
71. The judgment of the General Court in AstraZeneca plc v. European Commission57 is 
of particular importance as it largely upheld the first Commission decision on abuse 
of dominance in the pharmaceutical sector and made it clear that misuse of 
regulatory procedure, including the patent system, may constitute an infringement of 
the EU competition rules. The General Court confirmed the Commission's finding 
that Astra Zeneca's submission of misleading information to patent authorities for the 
purpose of obtaining the issue of Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPC), to 
which it was not entitled or to which it was entitled for a shorter period, was a 
practice based exclusively on methods falling outside the scope of competition on the 
merits and was inconsistent with the special responsibility of an undertaking in a 
dominant position. The General Court emphasised that it followed from the objective 
nature of the concept of abuse that the misleading representations made to public 
authorities must be assessed on the basis of objective factors and that the proof of the 
deliberate nature of the conduct and of the bad faith of the dominant undertaking is 
not required for the purpose of identifying an abuse of a dominant position. The 
intention of the dominant undertaking nonetheless can constitute a relevant factor 
which may, should the case arise, be taken into consideration by the Commission.  
72. The General Court also upheld the Commission's conclusion that a key purpose 
underlying AstraZeneca's deregistration of market authorisations for Losec capsules 
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in selected EEA countries was to exclude competition from generic firms and 
parallel traders. The General Court ruled that the purpose of a market authorisation is 
to confer the right to market a pharmaceutical product and not to exclude competitors 
from the market. However, according to the General Court, the Commission failed to 
establish that the deregistration of Losec capsules in two of the three countries was 
capable of restricting parallel imports in those countries and thus annulled the 
Commission decision in this part.  
2.6. Lack of sufficient Union interest 
73. The ruling of the General Gourt in Confédération européenne des associations 
d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v European Commission58 provides a rare 
example of annulment of a Commission rejection decision grounded on insufficient 
Union interest. The Commission rejected the complaint of CEAHR alleging that the 
refusal by several Swiss watch manufacturers to supply spare parts to independent 
watch repairers constituted infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The 
Commission's finding of insufficient Union interest was based essentially on the 
limited impact of the conduct on the functioning of the internal market, the limited 
likelihood of establishing infringement and the fact that national competition 
authorities and courts appeared well placed to address the alleged infringement. 
None of these considerations persuaded the Court.  
74. First, the General Court was not convinced by the Commission's finding that the 
market concerned was of limited size, given that the Commission decision did not 
take into account the territory affected and did not rely on figures or estimates to 
support its finding. The judgment makes it clear that, while there is no rule of law 
obliging the Commission to determine the size of the market in assessing the Union 
interest, it has the duty to give sufficient reason if it decides to rely on the argument 
of limited market size. Secondly, the General Court found flaws in the Commission's 
prima facie assessment of the relevant market, in particular in the fact that the 
primary market was examined together with the aftermarket for spare parts and 
repair services. Those errors undermined the rest of the Commission's analysis and 
its conclusion that there was a low probability of there being infringements. As 
regards the argument that national competition authorities and courts were well place 
to address the infringement, the Court noted that the practice at stake existed in at 
least five Member States and was attributable to undertakings having their head 
offices and place of production outside the European Union. In the General Court's 
view these factors suggested that action at the European level could be more 
effective than various actions at national level. The judgment provides useful 
clarifications on the Commission's duties in relation to the assessment and the 
rejection of complaints for lack of sufficient Union interest. 
2.7. Commitments 
75. In European Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd59, the Court of Justice set aside the 
judgment of the General Court annulling the Commission's commitment decision 
                                                 
58 Case T-427/08 Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v 
European Commission [2010] ECR 
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which had made binding De Beers' commitments to phase out its purchases of rough 
diamonds from Alrosa. The Court of Justice gave a final judgment in the matter, 
upholding the Commission decision. The ruling establishes that the Commission 
enjoys considerable latitude in deciding whether to accept commitments under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 to conclude investigation. It emphasised the specific 
characteristics of the mechanisms provided for in Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation No 
1/2003 and that the means of action available under each of those provisions are 
different. This implies that the obligation on the Commission to ensure that the 
principle of proportionality is observed has a different extent and content, depending 
on whether it is considered in relation to the former or the latter article. The Court of 
Justice pointed out that undertakings which offer commitments on the basis of 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 consciously accept that the concessions they make 
may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose on them in a decision 
adopted under Article 7 of that Regulation after a thorough examination. On the 
other hand, the closure of the infringement proceedings brought against those 
undertakings allows them to avoid a finding of an infringement of competition law 
and a possible fine. The Court of Justice disagreed with the General Court's 
interpretation of Alrosa's right to be heard in the Commission proceedings. Alrosa 
could not be considered an "undertaking concerned" in proceedings under Article 
102 TFEU as it was not the dominant undertaking. The Commission was thus right in 
considering Alrosa an interested third party which enjoyed less extensive rights.  
C – MERGER CONTROL 
1. SHAPING AND APPLYING THE RULES 
76. In 2010 the number of mergers notified remained low due to the economic crisis. In 
total, 274 transactions were notified to the Commission (compared to 259 in 2009 
and 347 in 2008), 16 decisions were submitted to conditions and no prohibition was 
decided. The large majority of the mergers notified were approved without 
conditions both under the normal procedure and the simplified procedure, which 
represented 55% of notifications. 
77. In 2010 the Commission took three decisions following an in-depth analysis in 
second phase investigation for the Oracle / Sun Microsystems60, Monsanto / 
Syngenta61 and Unilever / Sara Lee Body62 mergers.  
78. On 21 January 2010, the Commission cleared the planned acquisition of Sun 
Microsystems, by Oracle Corporation, the leading proprietary database software 
vendor. Following a second phase investigation into the database software market, 
the Commission concluded that the transaction would not lead to a significant 
impediment to effective competition (see Section II.B.2.2.2., point 257).  
79. On 17 November 2010, after an in-depth investigation, the Commission cleared the 
acquisition of the global sunflower seed business of the US company Monsanto by 
                                                 
60 Case COMP/M.5529 Oracle / Sun Microsystems (OJ C 91, 9.4.2010, p. 7) 
61 Case COMP/M.5675 Syngenta / Monsanto's sunflower seed business. See IP/10/1515, 17.11.2010. 
62 Case COMP/M.5658 Unilever / Sara Lee Bodycare. See IP/10/1514, 17.11.2010. 
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Syngenta of Switzerland conditional upon the divestment of Monsanto's sunflower 
hybrids, commercialised or under official trial in Spain and Hungary, as well as the 
parental lines used in the creation of those hybrids or currently under development 
for the creation of hybrids for Spain and Hungary. The Commission's investigation 
showed that the transaction, as initially notified, would have resulted in high market 
shares combined with limited prospects of entry and expansion in both the Spanish 
and the Hungarian markets for the commercialisation of sunflower hybrids. It would 
also have increased the ability and incentives for the merged entity to significantly 
reduce its activities of exchange and licensing of sunflower varieties in the EU, 
leading notably to a reduction in innovation, a foreclosure of competitors in the 
markets for the commercialisation of sunflower seeds and ultimately to a reduction 
of choice of sunflower seed hybrids for customers. The scope of the remedy package 
ensures that the businesses to be divested can be run in a viable and sustainable 
manner and that the purchaser will be able to take over the competitive role exercised 
by Monsanto in the markets for the trading of sunflower varieties in the EU and for 
sunflower seed commercialisation in Spain and Hungary. In light of the 
commitments, the Commission concluded that the transaction would not significantly 
impede effective competition in the internal market or any substantial part of it. 
80. On 17 November 2010, the Commission also cleared the planned acquisition by the 
Anglo-Dutch consumer goods company Unilever of the body and laundry care 
businesses of Sara Lee Corp of the US, subject to conditions. The Commission's in-
depth investigation had shown that the merger would give Unilever a very strong 
leadership position in a number of deodorants markets by combining the parties' 
brands, most notably Sanex with Dove and with Rexona which presently compete 
against each other. The Commission found that the merger, as initially notified, 
would raise competition concerns in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain and Portugal where it would remove an important 
competitive force and would likely have led to price increases. To remedy these 
concerns, the merging parties offered to divest Sara Lee's Sanex brand and related 
business in Europe. In light of these commitments, the Commission concluded that 
the proposed transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) or any substantial part of it. 
81. Air transport witnessed significant consolidation activity in 2010. The Commission 
examined the effects of the British Airways / Iberia and United Airlines / Continental 
Airlines mergers notably on competition on transatlantic routes63. The Commission's 
investigation showed that the merged entities will continue to face sufficient 
competition from other carriers active on these routes as well as on other long-haul 
routes. In terms of short-haul routes, the Commission examined notably the impact 
of the merger between British Airways and Iberia on the London-Madrid and 
London-Barcelona routes, where it appeared that passengers have adequate 
alternative options on these and other short-haul routes. The Commission continues 
to ensure that consolidation in the airline industry does not take place at the expense 
of certain categories of consumers (see Section II.E.2.1.2., points 315 to 316).  
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82. Merger activity also took place in relatively new markets during 2010, which led to 
assessing potential competition issues relating to market foreclosure, standardisation 
and open source products. The merger between UK subsidiaries of T-Mobile and 
Orange64 led to analyse whether the important share of combined radio spectrum of 
the two entities would not block future access of competitors to fourth generation 
telephony markets (see Section II.C.2.1.2., point 246). The acquisition by Microsoft 
of Yahoo's internet search and search advertising businesses led the Commission to 
analyse the dynamic online search market65 (see Section II.C.2.2.2., point 258). 
Some mergers in the pharmaceutical sector also concerned the dynamic market of 
biotech products, such as in the Teva /Ratiopharm and the Abbot / Solvay cases66 
(see Section II.D.2.1.2., points 291 and 292). 
83. Merger control activity in 2010 was also related to a number of cases stemming 
directly from decisions taken by the Commission in the application of the temporary 
rules for the State aid in the context of the economic and financial crisis. 
Restructuring plans in the financial sector involved divestments of activities by 
restructuring entities; these divestments were, where relevant, examined under the 
EU merger control rules (see Section II.A.2.2., points 174 to 175). 
84. Finally, the Merger Working Group established on 13 October 2009 in common 
agreement between the National Competition Authorities of the EU Member States 
and the Commission (observer status was given to the EEA Member States) met 
three times in 2010. The purpose of this group is to exchange best practices and to 
contribute to foster consistency, convergence and cooperation among the EU merger 
jurisdictions. The discussions this year dealt with the review at the national level of 
mergers with potential cross-border effects and the assessment of merger remedies.  
2. SELECTED COURT CASES 
2.1. Quantitative evidence and econometric studies 
85. In Ryanair v Commission67, Ryanair appealed a Commission decision of June 2007 
prohibiting Ryanair's acquisition of its Irish competitor Aer Lingus. The General 
Court upheld the Commission's prohibition decision, acknowledging in particular the 
Commission's very detailed and careful analysis of the competitive effects of the 
merger and the remedies proposed by Ryanair. The Court thereby again68 endorsed 
the Commission's approach to analyse horizontal mergers on the basis of the 
analytical framework set out in Horizontal Merger Guidelines69. 
86. The ruling also clarified important aspects of the Commission's investigative powers, 
notably concerning the Commission's extensive use of quantitative evidence and 
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econometric studies in the decision. The Court noted that the Commission was fully 
entitled to use this type of evidence for the assessment of the effects of the merger, in 
particular since quantitative evidence and economic studies were used by the 
Commission to complement and not to substitute the Commission's findings in the 
market investigation. 
87. It further confirmed the Commission's analytical approach to airline mergers, notably 
concerning market definition and acceptable remedies. It endorsed the Commission's 
practice to analyse the effects of airline mergers on the basis of individual routes on 
which both companies' activities overlap, and not on bundles of routes or by 
countries. The Court also followed the Commission in that it distinguishes in its 
assessment between mergers involving players active from different airports and 
mergers of companies operating from the same airport. 
88. Finally, the Court confirmed that the Commission was right to reject the remedies 
proposed by Ryanair at different stages of the procedure because of their formal 
shortcomings (inter alia unclear and contradictory formulations of some key parts of 
the remedies offer), thereby setting clear limits to the parties' freedom to disregard 
procedural rules set out in the Merger Regulation70 and the Merger Remedies 
Notice71. 
2.2. Minority shareholdings 
89. In a separate ruling on Aer Lingus v Commission72, the Court provided some 
important clarifications with regard to the Commission's powers under the Merger 
Regulation in cases of minority shareholdings. Prior to the merger notification, 
Ryanair had acquired a non-controlling minority share in Aer Lingus (currently 
29.4%) which it maintained after the Commission's prohibition decision. Aer Lingus 
asked the Commission to order Ryanair to fully divest its remaining minority 
shareholding, but the Commission's rejected this request by way of a decision, which 
was subsequently appealed by Aer Lingus. 
90. The General Court confirmed that the Commission was right to reject Aer Lingus' 
claim to divest Ryanair's non-controlling shareholding in Aer Lingus. According to 
the Court, Ryanair's acquisition of a minority share could, in the absence of a 
controlling minority shareholding, neither be regarded as "full" nor as "partial" 
implementation of a concentration. The Commission therefore had no power under 
the rules of the Merger Regulation to order Ryanair to divest its minority share. 
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D – STATE AID CONTROL 
1. SHAPING AND APPLYING THE RULES 
Overview of the Commission's activities in the field of State aid control in 2010 
91. In addition to work conducted on State aid related to the economic and financial 
crisis, the Commission adopted in 2010 around 450 decisions in other State aid cases 
in the industry and services sectors.  
92. The majority of aid approved in the industry and services sectors related to horizontal 
objectives of common interest. It included among others: culture and heritage 
conservation aid (49 cases), regional aid (48), aid in support of environment 
protection (26), aid in support of research, development and innovation (29) and 
compensations of damages caused by natural disaster (10). The Commission also 
authorised aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (25 cases) and for 
development of a specific sector such as coal or broadband networks (42 cases). The 
Commission also approved 39 cases in the transport sector, which focused mainly on 
the following objectives: sectoral aid (19 cases), regional development aid (7 cases) 
and rescuing firms in difficulty aid (5 cases). 
93. Member States have made wide use of the possibilities offered by the General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER)73, whereby measures which fulfil its criteria may be 
granted without prior notification to the Commission. In 2010, the Commission was 
informed about the introduction of 414 such new measures by Member States. The 
Commission also authorised 321 schemes and approved 114 individual measures. 
Over the year, the Commission took 14 fully or partly negative decisions related to 
State aid cases. 
Overview of aid amount authorised by the Commission, excluding crisis measures (2009) 
94. In terms of amount of aid authorised, figures are compiled with one year delay in the 
bi-yearly State aid Scoreboard. The latest Autumn update74 shows that the overall aid 
volume increased in 2009 compared to 2008, almost exclusively due to crisis 
measures. Disregarding the exceptional crisis measures, it is still higher but within 
the average of the past ten years. 
95. Total aid excluding crisis-related measures amounted in 2009 to 0.62% of GDP or 
EUR 73.2 billion, at a slightly higher level than 2008 (0.58% of GDP). State aid for 
industry and services amounted to EUR 58.1 billion (79% of total), while aid to 
agriculture, fisheries and transport amounted to EUR 15.1 billion (21%). 
96. On average, 84% of aid to industry and services was directed towards horizontal 
objectives of common interest while sectoral aid stood at 16%. The largest 
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proportion of aid was earmarked for regional development (around EUR 14 billion, 
24% of total State aid for industry and services), followed by environmental aid 
(EUR 13 billion, 23%) and aid earmarked to Research & Development & Innovation 
activities (around EUR 10.6 billion, 19%). Together, these three objectives 
represented around two thirds of total aid to industry and services. All other 
horizontal objectives taken together account for roughly 18% of total aid to industry 
and services: SMEs (7% of total aid), employment (4%), culture and heritage 
conservation (3%), training (2%), social support for individual consumers (2%), risk 
capital and other horizontal objectives (roughly 1%). Although figures for 2010 are 
not yet available, the volume and share of non-financial aid should not change 
dramatically in 2010 compared to 2009.  
97. Aid granted through block exemption, in particular the GBER, represented an 
increasingly important share of aid volumes at 19% of total aid to industry and 
services in 2009 (EUR 10.8 billion), compared to 16% in 2008 and 12% in 2007. The 
vast majority of aid (69%) was granted through schemes; individual aid accounted 
for the last 12%. 
State aid control – the Simplification Package 
98. 2010 was the first year of functioning with the Simplification Package in place. This 
Package, in force since 1 September 2009, comprises a Best Practice Code75 and a 
Notice on a Simplified Procedure76, both of which aim at improving the 
effectiveness, transparency and predictability of State aid procedures.  
99. The Best Practices Code details how State aid procedures should be carried out in 
practice. It includes a certain number of voluntary arrangements between the 
Commission and Member States to achieve more streamlined and predictable 
procedures at each step of a State aid investigation. One year after its entry into 
force, the first results of the Code were encouraging: in particular, it had a significant 
impact on complaints-handling, with an increasing number of complainants informed 
of the status of their complaints. The Commission is committed to further enhancing 
cooperation with the Member States, especially as regards the quality of notifications 
and exchange of information during the proceedings. 
100. The Simplified Procedure aims at improving the Commission's treatment of 
straightforward cases, such as those clearly in line with existing Guidelines or 
established Commission decision-making practice. The Commission wants to ensure 
that clearly compatible aid measures are approved within one month from a complete 
notification by a Member State. A transparency provision also ensures that third 
parties can provide their input. It thus took less time for the Commission to approve 
decisions in 2010 under the Simplified Procedure compared to the normal procedure.  
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1.1. Horizontal aid 
1.1.1. Regional aid 
101. In accordance with the Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-201377 (RAG 
2007), the Commission carried out the review of the State aid status and the aid 
ceiling of the statistical effect regions78 that benefited transitionally from a status as 
an assisted area pursuant to Article 107(3)(a)79 until the end of 2010. As from 
1 January 2011, those regions will benefit from eligibility to regional aid on the basis 
of Article 107(3)(c)80, with the exception of four regions (Hainaut, Kentriki 
Makedonia, Dytiki Makedonia and Basilicata) that maintain their status as Article 
107(3)(a) assisted areas with an aid intensity of 30% as their GDP per inhabitant over 
the period 2005-2007 was below 75% of the EU25 average81. 
102. Similarly, in the framework of the mid-term review of 2010 foreseen in the same 
Guidelines, the Commission accepted changes to national regional State aid maps 
notified by three Member States (France, Ireland and Italy) for certain areas eligible 
to regional aid on the basis of Article 107(3)(c). 
103. On the basis of the RAG 2007, the Commission approved in 2010 regional aid to six 
large investment projects. Four of these projects are in the photovoltaic sector, three 
in Germany (Solibro, Wacker Chemie and Sovello3)82 and one in Spain (Silicio 
Solar)83, while the other investment projects are in the mechanics industry (Liebherr 
in Germany and Fiat Powertrain in Italy)84. Furthermore, five ad hoc aid measures in 
favour of single enterprises for investments in areas under the Regional Aid maps 
2007-2013 were approved, as well as ten regional aid schemes, five of which 
regarding outermost regions. 
104. The Commission closed in 2010 three formal investigations (Deutsche Solar, Sovello 
and Fri-el Acerra)85, with one positive and two negative decisions. The negative 
decisions concerned an illegitimate SME bonus in favour of Sovello AG, to be 
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recovered by Germany as the beneficiary of the aid did not qualify for the SME 
status, and an incompatible aid measure in favour of Fri-el Acerra because of the 
absence of incentive effect and insufficient regional contribution of the investment in 
Region Campania in Italy. 
1.1.2. Environmental aid and security of electricity supply 
105. In 2010, the Commission approved 36 State aid measures under the Environmental 
Aid Guidelines86 or directly based on Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. 20 concerned aid 
schemes and 16 individual applications. The Commission took no negative decisions 
and opened two formal investigations. Eight decisions not to raise objections were 
taken on individual applications after a detailed economic assessment under the 
Environmental Aid Guidelines. 
106. The approved schemes included inter alia aid to secure supply of electricity, aid for 
renewable energy and to carbon capture and storage project. Investigations 
concerned a German measure to compensate non-ferrous metal producers for CO2 
costs contained in electricity costs87 and aid to the energy incumbent in Malta 
intended to bring the Delimara Power Station in early compliance with emission 
standards laid down by EU environmental law88. The Commission also authorised 
aid to remediate two contaminated sites in Austria89. (see Section II.B.2.2., point 
222).  
1.1.3. Research & Development & Innovation (R&D&I) aid 
107. Innovation has been placed at the heart of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Flagship 
Initiative on an Innovation Union90 outlines the necessity to improve the financing of 
innovation in Europe to boost its performance. The Community Framework for 
research and development and innovation91 supports this objective by making it 
easier for Member States to better target State aid to the relevant market failures. In 
2010, the Commission approved twelve aid schemes, with an overall budget of more 
than EUR 5 billion, on the basis of this Framework, and decided to initiate the formal 
investigation procedure regarding one further case which was subsequently 
withdrawn. Out of those measures, five were pure R&D schemes, four were 
innovation-oriented schemes and four were mixed, pursuing both R&D and 
innovation objectives. 
108. In addition, and following an in-depth economic assessment, the Commission 
decided not to raise objections to ten individually notifiable aids to large R&D 
projects referring to new processes for bio-methane production, use of composite 
materials for the fabrication of specific components of aero-structures, and 
lithography for semiconductor devices. Furthermore, it monitored information 
                                                 
86 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, p. 1) 
87 Case C33/2010 (ex N700/2009) Aid to non-ferrous metals producers for CO2 costs of electricity 
88 Case C32/2010 (ex N520/2009) Environmental Project for Delimara Power Station 
89 Cases N135/2000 Aid for the Remediation of a Contaminated Site in Linz (OJ C 312, 17.11.2010, p. 5-
6) and N197/2010 Individual Aid for the Remediation of the Contaminated Site in Unterkärnten 
(OJ C 265, 30.9.2010, p. 1) 
90 See the Communication on an "Innovation Union" (COM(2010) 546 final)  
91 Community framework for State aid for research and development and innovation (OJ C 323, 
30.12.2006, p. 1-26) 
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submitted on aids to 52 other R&D projects, which exceeded EUR 3 million 
although without falling under the obligation of individual notification. 
109. As to State aid granted in favour of R&D projects under the GBER, there were 40 
schemes providing aid for fundamental research, 91 for industrial research and 86 for 
experimental development. At the same time, the GBER was also used by Member 
States for measures relating to innovation, 42 of which related to industrial property 
rights for SMEs, 21 to young innovative enterprises, 24 to innovation advisory and 
support services, and eleven to the loan of highly qualified personnel. 
1.1.4. Aid to promote risk capital and urban development 
110. In the area of risk capital financing for SMEs, the Commission approved seven 
measures under the Risk capital guidelines92, with an overall budget of EUR 
380 million. Out of those measures, three did not comply with the safe harbour 
provisions and were therefore subject to a detailed assessment. Furthermore, eleven 
additional aid schemes were implemented in 2010 under the GBER, which some 
Member States increasingly used for risk capital purposes. 
111. In the view of the progressive deployment of the JESSICA initiative93, the 
Commission started to reflect on the development of general economic principles on 
the basis of which its funding mechanism, to the extent that it contains elements of 
State aid, could be assessed. The approach would build on the Commission's practice 
in the urban regeneration area and apply by analogy the relevant criteria from 
existing rules, notably the Risk capital guidelines. In particular, it would aim at 
ensuring that the envisaged measures address clearly identifiable market failures or 
equity objectives and have an incentive effect, and that any aid granted through 
JESSICA investments is limited to the minimum necessary to make urban projects 
commercially attractive for private sector investors. 
1.2. Sectoral and individual State aid 
1.2.1. Rescuing and restructuring aid for industry 
112. In 2010, the Commission adopted 21 decisions concerning rescuing and restructuring 
of firms in difficulty in the industrial sector. The Commission decided to open five 
formal investigation procedures94. Three formal investigation procedures were closed 
in 2010 with a no aid decision for Hydral95, a no-competence decision in the case of 
Mittal Steel Roman96 and a positive conditional decision in case of Varvaressos97.  
                                                 
92 Community guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (OJ C 194, 18.8.2006, p. 2) 
93 Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA) is a policy initiative of the 
Commission developed with the European Investment Bank and in collaboration with the Council of 
Europe Development Bank, with the objective of supporting sustainable urban development using 
financial engineering instruments in the context of EU Cohesion Policy for 2007-2013. 
94 Cases C12/2010 Deferral and rescheduling of liabilities of Ruse Industry (OJ C 187, 10.7.2010, p. 7), 
C4/2010 Intervention du FMEA en faveur de Trêves (OJ C 132, 22.5.2010. p. 12), C8/2010 
Restructuring aid to Varvaressos, C13/2010 Alleged aid to ELAN (OJ C 223, 18.8.2010, p. 8) and 
C27/2010 Potential aid to United Textiles (OJ C 357, 30.12.2010, p. 18) 
95 Case C40/2008 Restructuring aid to PZL Hydral SA (OJ L 298, 16.11.2010, p. 51) 
96 Case C40/2007 Privatisation Mittal Steel Roman 
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113. In February 2010, the Commission launched an in-depth investigation on the EUR 
55 million capital injection of the FMEA (Fonds de Modernisation des 
Equipementiers Automobiles) to the automotive supplier Trêves98. That investigation 
will allow it to be determined if the FMEA's investment is imputable to the French 
State and if it took place under market conditions.  
114. In July 2008 the Commission approved a rescue aid for fibre producer Varvaressos, a 
large company in difficulty, in the form of a State guarantee for a EUR 2.4 million 
loan. In January 2009, Greece notified a restructuring aid of EUR 14 million for the 
company. In the process of the restructuring plan's assessment, the Commission 
discovered that the company had already been granted a State guarantee for existing 
loans of EUR 23.4 million in May 2007, contrary to what Greece had declared (in 
November 2007) when it notified the rescue aid measure. On the basis of that new 
information as well as of the notified measure, the Commission opened the formal 
investigation procedure in March 2010 on a EUR 16.7 million restructuring package, 
raising doubts on the company's eligibility for restructuring aid, its contribution to 
the restructuring costs and the proposed compensatory measures. In December 2010, 
following clarifications from the Greek authorities and additional compensatory 
measures, the Commission closed the formal investigation procedure with a positive 
conditional decision. 
115. In August 2010, the Commission closed a formal investigation procedure into the 
restructuring plan of the Polish company PZL Hydral, a State-owned aeronautics 
civil and military parts supplier, with a no aid decision. Initially, the Polish 
authorities intended to grant as much as EUR 30 million of State aid to finance the 
restructuring of the company. Following the emergence of a potential private buyer 
of part of the assets of the company, the Polish authorities abandoned their plan to 
grant State aid and limited their interventions to debts waivers and debt to equity 
swaps in line with what private creditors already accepted. Thus those measures were 
considered as free of aid by the Commission since they merely reflected the behavior 
of any market operator in similar circumstances. 
1.2.2. Aid to the transport sector 
116. In 2010, the Commission adopted 53 decisions in the transport sector, including 14 
decisions in the railway sector, most of them on the basis of the 2008 Community 
guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings99, 13 decisions in the aviation sector, 
mainly on the basis of the 2005 Community Guidelines on financing of airports and 
start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airport100 and eleven in the maritime 
sector. As regards the latter, the decisions are mainly based on the Community 
guidelines on State aid to maritime transport101. The Commission also adopted its 
first decision applying Regulation No 1370/2007 on public passenger transport 
                                                                                                                                                        
97 Case C8/2010 Restructuring aid to Varvaressos 
98 Case C4/2010 Intervention du FMEA en faveur de Trêves (OJ C 133, 22.5.2010, p. 12) 
99 Community guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings (OJ C 184, 22.7.2008, p. 13) 
100 Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional 
airports (OJ C 312, 9.12.2005, p. 1) 
101 Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport (OJ C 13, 17.1.2004, p. 3) 
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services102, which entered into force on 3 December 2009 and broadly follows the 
Commission's previous practice in the field. It is also worth noting that in 2010 more 
than 40 notifications were introduced by Member States and close to 50 complaints 
were lodged in the field of transport. That activity demonstrates the importance of 
this field in applying State aid rules (see Section II.E.2., points 317 to 321, 328 to 
330 and 335 to 339). 
1.2.3. State aid for Broadband networks 
117. In 2010, the Commission continued to support the development of broadband 
networks on the basis of the Community Guidelines for the application of State aid 
rules in relation to rapid deployment of broadband network103, adopted in 2009. It 
authorised 20 schemes for public support to the development of broadband network, 
approving approximately EUR 1.8 billion of public funding which could generate up 
to EUR 3.5 billion in investment (see Section II.C.2.1.3., points 247 and 248). 
118. State aid policy authorises properly justified and proportionate broadband schemes if 
the distortion of competition and the effect on trade are limited and thus significantly 
contributes to the realisation of the objectives stated under the Digital Agenda for 
Europe104 of reaching fast broadband coverage (at least 30 Mbps) for all European 
citizens and ultra-fast broadband (above 100 Mbps) subscriptions for at least 50% of 
European households by 2020.  
1.2.4. Aid to the coal sector 
119. Following a proposition from the Commission in July 2010, the Council adopted a 
decision on State aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines105 on 
10 December 2010 in light of the expiry of the previous Regulation in December 
2010106. It provides that Member States might grant aid in two circumstances. First, 
aid may be given to cover coal production if there is a closure plan whose deadline 
does not extend beyond 31 October 2018. While the Commission favoured a shorter 
closure period, it took into account the strong political message from the Member 
States and the European Parliament and agreed to the compromise. Second, aid may 
be granted until 2027 to cover exceptional costs (such as social welfare, 
rehabilitation of sites or removal of waste water) associated with the closure of 
mines. Any closure aid must be decreasing over time with a specified rate and 
accompanied by measures to mitigate the negative environmental impact of coal 
production. No investment aid to hard coal mining may be granted under this 
decision. During 2010 the Commission approved aid schemes to the coal sector in 
                                                 
102 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
public passenger services by rail and road repealing Council regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 and No 
1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007). 
103 Community guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of 
broadband networks (OJ C 235, 30.9.2009, p. 7-25) 
104 A Digital Agenda for Europe (COM(2010) 245 final/2) 
105 Council decision of 10 December 2010 on State aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines 
(OJ L 336, 21.12.2010, p. 24-29) 
106 Council Regulation (EC) No 1407/2002 of 23 July 2002 on State aid to the coal industry (OJ L 205, 
2.8.2002, p. 1-8) 
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Germany107 and Poland108 intended to support access to coal reserves and cover 
exceptional costs. 
1.2.5. Aid to the agricultural sector 
120. The Commission assesses State aid granted to the agriculture and to the forestry 
sector on the basis of the Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013109. In 2010, 214 new State aid cases were registered and 161 
decisions were adopted (see Section II.H.2.3., points 387 to 391). 
121. Since the introduction of the possibility for Member States to approve EUR 15 000 
in limited amounts of aid to primary producers under the Temporary Framework, 14 
Member States submitted schemes which were approved by the Commission. 
1.2.6. Aid for compensating provision of Services of General Economic Interest: Social 
Housing undertakings 
122. During 2010, the Commission continued to examine a number of complaints lodged 
by private building companies and real estate developers acting on the housing 
market in competition with public operators. In analysing the various elements 
pertaining to the alleged presence of State aid granted in favour of social housing 
undertakings, the Commission found that public support often constitutes public 
service compensation granted to social housing undertakings carrying out activities 
qualified as services of general economic interest (SGEI) by the Member State 
concerned. In the field of State aid control regarding social housing, such 
compensations for SGEI are in principle covered by the 2005 Commission 
decision110, exempting them from notification regardless of the turnover of the 
beneficiaries and the level of the compensation they receive.  
123. In that context, in December 2009, the Commission had adopted a decision 
(published in 2010) declaring the Dutch Social Housing system compatible with EU 
State aid rules on SGEI111. The State support given to social housing corporations 
takes the form mainly of loan guarantees and grants. Following an in-depth 
investigation, the Commission endorsed commitments from the Dutch authorities to 
change the existing social housing system in order to bring it in line with EU State 
aid rules. In particular, the Dutch authorities will ensure that State funding is not 
used for commercial activities and that housing is attributed in a transparent manner 
according to objective criteria, focusing on a clearly defined target group of socially 
less advantaged persons. In addition, the Commission in that decision approved for 
the next ten years new aid amounting to EUR 750 million for social housing projects 
                                                 
107 Case N592/2009 Aid for German hard coal in 2010 (OJ C 94, 14.4.2010, p. 7) 
108 Case N653/2009 Investment aid for hard coal mining sector 
109 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007-2013 (OJ C 319, 
27.12.2006, p. 1). 
110 In particular, the Commission explained the manner in which it intends to apply Article 106(2) TFEU 
within the Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (OJ C 297, 
29.11.2005, p. 4-7) and the Commission decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 
86(2) EC to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (OJ L 312, 29.11.2005, p. 67-73).  
111 Cases E2/2005 and N642/2009 Existing and special project aid to housing corporations (Dutch Social 
housing) (OJ C 31, 9.2. 2010, p. 6)  
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in declining urban areas. In April 2010, the Commission's decision was challenged 
by private developers and the social housing undertakings in front of the General 
Court, and those annulment proceedings are currently pending112.  
1.3. State aid enforcement by national courts 
124. The Commission has exclusive competence for approving State aid. National courts 
nevertheless play an important role in the State aid field, since they can offer possible 
complainants effective legal protection "close to home" by ordering suspension and 
recovery of State aid granted in violation of the notification obligation of Article 
108(3) TFEU. According to a recent study113, more and more cases are brought 
before national courts, covering an increasing variety of issues. 
125. The potential of the private enforcement of the stand-still obligation114 in national 
courts was underlined in the Notice on State aid enforcement by national courts115 
issued by the Commission in April 2009. A year after its adoption, the first responses 
have been encouraging, with increasing numbers of requests for information and 
opinions being received by the Commission. 
126. In 2010, the Commission continued its efforts to improve the system of private 
enforcement of the stand-still obligation in national courts, focusing on enhancing 
communication with national judges. In October, it published a handbook on the 
"Enforcement of EU State aid law by national courts"116 in order to assist national 
judges in dealing with State aid cases. The handbook gathers the most important EU 
rules and relevant guidance material. It explains the role of national courts in the 
State aid field as defined by the European Courts and offers national courts practical 
and user-friendly support in individual cases. 
127. Given the importance of public awareness for effective and successful private 
enforcement of the stand-still obligation in national courts, the Commission 
continued its advocacy on the issue through dedicated web pages, publications, 
participation in conferences and trainings for national judges. In particular, eight out 
of the 14 sessions organised in 2010 under the national judges' training programme 
dealt with State aid. 
                                                 
112 Cases T-201/10 IVBN v Commission (OJ C 179, 3.7.2010, p. 49), T-202/10 Stichting Woonlinie and 
others v Commission (OJ C 179, 3.7.2010, p. 50), T-203/10 Stichting Woonpunt and Others v 
Commission (OJ C 179, 3.7.2010, p. 51) and T-206/10 Vesteda v Commission (OJ C 179, 3.7.2010, 
p. 53). A further case, T-151/10 BNG v Commission (OJ C 148, 5.6.2010, p. 43), has been withdrawn 
from the register of the General Court following the Commission's amending decision of 30 August 
2010. 
113 2009 Study on the enforcement of State aid law at national level available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/enforcement_study_2009.pdf 
114 Under EU State aid law, Member States are required to inform (“ex ante notification”) the Commission 
of any plan to grant or alter State aid and they are not allowed to put such aid into effect before it has 
been authorised by the Commission (“stand-still obligation”). 
115 Commission notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts (OJ C 85, 9.4.2009, p. 1) 
116 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/state_aid/national_courts_booklet_en.pdf  
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1.4. Ex-post monitoring of State aid measures 
128. The Commission has launched regular ex-post monitoring exercises since 2006 in 
order to ensure effective enforcement of the State aid rules, since an increasing 
number of aid measures are no longer subject to the notification obligation because 
they are granted through general schemes allowing for subsequent individual 
application or through Block Exemptions (BER)117.  
129. Monitoring implies a check at two levels: first, at the level of the general legislation 
in order to determine whether the national legislation is in line with the requirements 
of EU State aid rules (approved scheme or BER). In a second stage a few significant 
individual applications of the national aid measure are examined in detail in order to 
determine whether in practice EU State aid rules are also respected (typically cases 
above EUR 500 000). Respect of conditions such as the maximum aid intensity, 
maximum aid amount and the correct qualification of the eligible costs will typically 
be scrutinised at that level. 
130. Since 2006, the Commission has covered an important part of the main substantive 
types of aid: aid to SMEs, training aid, employment aid, regional aid, R&D aid, 
environmental aid, as well as rescuing and restructuring aid. In 2010, ex-post 
monitoring also included measures covered by the GBER, as well as, for the first 
time, aid in the form of risk capital, aid in the transport sector, aid in the broadband 
area, cultural aid and aid to the shipbuilding sector. The Commission also addressed 
aid measures adopted by 25 of the 27 Member States, thereby ensuring a balanced 
geographical coverage. The measures reviewed under the ongoing exercise concern 
primarily environmental and regional aid (20% each), R&D&I (17%), aid to SMEs 
and for the promotion of risk capital (17%).  
131. The results of the first exercises show that this part of the existing State aid 
architecture (schemes and BERs) functions in a satisfactory manner. In a minority of 
cases substantive problems or procedural issues (such as transparency, reporting, 
speed and quality of answers) were identified. The cases in which no appropriate 
solution was identified are still being investigated (one from 2006, and three from 
2008). Finally, all Member States cooperated with the Commission, although many 
submitted the requested information with considerable delay. 
1.5. Recovery policy 
132. When a negative decision is taken in cases of unlawful State aid, the Commission 
shall decide that the Member State must take all necessary measures to recover the 
aid from the beneficiary. Recovery is not a penalty, but a means to restore the 
situation previous to the granting of the unlawful aid. This objective is obtained once 
the aid (plus compound interest) is repaid by the recipient who enjoyed an advantage 
over its competitors in the market. 
133. A Member State is deemed to comply with the recovery decision when the aid (plus 
compound interest) has been fully reimbursed within the prescribed time limit or, in 
the case of an insolvent beneficiary, when the company is liquidated under market 
                                                 
117 Facts and figures on State aid in the EU Member States (SEC(2010) 1462)  
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conditions. Where the Member State concerned has not complied with the recovery 
decision, and where it has not been able to demonstrate the existence of absolute 
impossibility, the Commission may initiate infringement proceedings under Article 
108(2) TFEU118 or Article 260(2) TFEU119. The applicable rules regarding recovery, 
as well as detailed and concrete guidance to Member States, are provided in the 
Notice on the implementation of decisions ordering Member States to recover 
unlawful and incompatible State aid (Recovery Notice)120. 
134. By 31 December 2010, the amount of illegal and incompatible aid recovered had 
increased from EUR 2.3 billion in December 2004 to EUR 10.9 billion121. The 
percentage of illegal and incompatible aid still to be recovered has evolved 
accordingly from 75% at the end of 2004 to 14% at the end of 2010. The share of the 
total amount recovered has slightly decreased between December 2009 and 
December 2010 (from 88.0% to 86%) due to high amount of aid identified in several 
pending cases122. Over the year 2010, the Commission adopted six decisions 
regarding recovery and ensured the recovery of over EUR 500 million by Member 
States. 
135. In order to ensure better enforcement of its decisions, the Commission brought 
proceedings under Article 108(2) in three cases and under Article 260(2) in one case, 
thus leading to 26 cases under litigation. 41 recovery cases are currently pending. 
2. SELECTED COURT CASES 
2.1. Notion of aid 
136. In Hellenic Republic, Olympic Airways and Olympic Airlines v European 
Commission123 the General Court partially annulled the Commission decision finding 
that certain measures granted to Olympic Airways (OA) and Olympic Airlines 
(NOA), the new airline formed by the Greek State and which had taken over the 
flying activities of OA, constituted incompatible State aid. The General Court 
recalled first of all that, if there is economic continuity, NOA could be considered as 
the beneficiary of the aid granted to OA before NOA took over its flying activities. 
The Court confirmed that the economic continuity was sufficiently demonstrated in 
this case and that aid granted to OA before the creation of NOA could thus be 
recovered from NOA. However, the Court found that the unlawful aid granted to OA 
after NOA took over its flying activities, could not be recovered from the latter on 
                                                 
118 Actions under Article 108(2) TFEU are aimed at condemning a Member State for non-implementation 
of a State aid recovery decision. 
119 Actions under Article 260(2) TFEU are infringement actions aimed at condemning a Member State for 
non-implementation of a Court judgment, and may include the payment of fines (periodic penalties 
and/or lump sums). 
120 Notice from the Commission – Towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering 
Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid (OJ C 272, 15.11.2007, p. 4-17). 
121 These figures do not include State aid granted to the agricultural, fishery and transport sectors. 
122 At the time of the decision, the Commission cannot always identify the aid amount to be recovered: in 
such cases, Commission decisions include information enabling the Member State to determine the aid 
amount. 
123 Joined cases T-415/05, T-416/05 and T-423/05 Hellenic Republic, Olympic Airways and Olympic 
Airlines v European Commission [2010] ECR 
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the mere ground that it derived an indirect benefit. This factor does not suffice to 
conclude that NOA was the effective recipient of that aid, as the finding of economic 
continuity is irrelevant for the measures granted after the take-over. The Commission 
should have clearly identified the alleged advantage granted by OA to NOA and 
assessed separately whether, having regard to the market economy investor principle, 
it constituted State aid. 
137. Furthermore, as regards the application of the market economy investor principle, the 
Court recalled the Commission's obligation to examine the difference between the 
rents for the sub-leasing of aircraft paid by NOA and those available in normal 
competitive conditions on the market. From a procedural perspective, the Court 
recalled that the Commission had to prove that the rents were not in line with market 
conditions and that it can only adopt a decision based on the information available if 
the Member State does not provide the required information in spite of an 
information injunction. 
138. In Bundesverband Banken v Commission124 the General Court upheld the 
Commission's decision and confirmed that the Commission had correctly applied the 
market economy investor principle in its assessment of a silent partnership 
contribution of capital of unlimited duration by the Land of Hessen to one of 
Germany's largest banks Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale (Helaba). 
139. As regards the notion of advantage in the context of compensation for public service 
obligations, in Commission v Deutsche Post125 the Court of Justice, basing its 
reasoning on the Altmark jurisprudence126, upheld the General Court's annulment of 
the Commission's decision of 2002. The Court rejected the partial approach of the 
Commission which, instead of carrying out a comprehensive analysis of whether 
Deutsche Post had been overcompensated for its public service obligations in the 
postal sector, had focused exclusively on Deutsche Post's allegedly below-cost 
pricing strategy for door-to-door parcels. The Court emphasized the necessity to 
conduct a comprehensive analysis of all universal service revenues and costs to 
determine whether Deutsche Post was under- or over-compensated for its public 
services obligations. 
140. As further regards the notion of advantage, the General Court ruled in Mediaset SpA 
v Commission127 that a State subsidy granted to every user who purchased or rented 
equipment for the reception of TV signals transmitted using digital terrestrial 
technology was not technologically neutral and enabled cable operators and digital 
terrestrial broadcasters, such as Mediaset, to benefit, as compared with satellite 
broadcasters, from an advantage. The Court held that the measure, of which the 
direct beneficiaries were the final consumers, constituted an indirect advantage for 
operators on the digital TV market. 
                                                 
124 Case T-163/05 Bundesverband deutscher Banken eV v Commission [2010] ECR 
125 Case C-399/08 Commission v Deutsche Post [2010] ECR 
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141. In case ACEAElectrabel128, the Court upheld the judgment of the General Court and 
confirmed that the Commission is not obliged to carry out a detailed assessment of 
the potential advantages of a measure, in particular in relation to its impact on 
competitors, in order to state the presence of aid. It furthermore confirmed that the 
notion of economic entity in the context of State aid may differ from that in other 
areas of competition law and endorsed the Commission's application of the 
Deggendorf jurisprudence. 
142. In France and others v. Commission129 the General Court annulled the Commission's 
decision regarding the credit line offered by the French authorities to France 
Télécom. The Commission's decision had declared this measure incompatible State 
aid. The judgment established that for each State measure involved, advantage, State 
resources and the link between these two elements (connexité) set out in Article 
107(1) have to be established for finding State aid. The Court dismissed the global 
approach by the Commission to consider the credit line in the context of the 
declarations made by the French authorities and to base its finding of State aid on 
that link. The Court reasoned that earlier oral and written statements of a French 
Minister and the French authorities to support France Télécom, which were not 
themselves classified as State aid by the Commission and which took place in July, 
September and October 2002, could not be taken into account by the Commission to 
demonstrate that the credit line proposal of December contained an advantage 
granted by State resources. It dismissed the Commission's reasoning that the credit 
line was a "realisation of the earlier statements" by the French authorities to support 
France Télécom. The General Court found there was a rupture between those earlier 
and the notified events and that they were not sufficiently linked. Given this rupture, 
the Court found that, even if there were State resources involved in the credit line, it 
was not sufficiently demonstrated they were resulting from the advantage granted 
through the earlier statements. The judgment has been appealed by France Télécom's 
competitors and by the Commission130. 
143. In case The Netherlands and Nederlandse Omroep Stichting v Commission131, the 
General Court confirmed the Commission decision and deals with the notion of 
"undertaking". Its reference to the notion of "undertaking" in competition cases 
appears to confirm that the same notion is also applicable in a State aid context.  
2.2. Compatibility assessment 
144. In British Aggregates and Others v Commission132 the General Court annulled the 
Commission's decision because the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully 
the decision not to raise objection by failing to examine the question of possible tax 
discrimination between domestic products and imported products originating in 
Ireland. The judgment recalled the obligation on the part of the Commission to 
ensure that Articles 107 and 108 are applied consistently with other provisions of the 
                                                 
128 Case C-480/09P ACEAElectrabel [2010] ECR 
129 Joined cases T-425/04, T-444/04, T-450/04, T- 456/04 France and others v Commission [2010] ECR 
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131 Case T-231/06 and T-237/06 The Netherlands and Nederlandse Omroep Stichting v Commission.[2010] 
ECR 
132 Case T-359/04 British Aggregates and Others v Commission [2010] ECR 
 EN 44   EN 
Treaty, especially where those other provisions also pursue the objective of 
undistorted competition in the internal market, as Articles 28 and 30 or Article 110 
do in seeking to safeguard the free movement of goods and competition between 
domestic and imported products. 
145. In Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt v Commission133 the General Court 
upheld the Commission's decision, in which the latter had found that part of the 
notified training aid lacked incentive effect. That part of the aid covered costs of 
training which the company was anyway required by law to provide. The Court 
indicated that training aid which produces positive external effects cannot be 
considered compatible with the internal market where it does not fulfill the criterion 
of necessity. 
146. The case Métropole télévision (M6) and Télévision française 1 SA v Commission134 
concerned the capital injection by the French State into France Télévisions due to the 
critical financial situation of France Télévisions which experienced a sharp decline in 
advertising revenues. The Commission found in a no objections decision that the 
injection was necessary for the fulfillment of France Télévisions' public service 
obligation and thus compatible under Article 106(2) TFEU. In particular, in the 
Commission's assessment, there was no overcompensation as the injection was 
substantially lower than the public service costs. The General Court upheld the 
Commission's decision on all points and confirmed that the broadcaster's efficiency 
is not an element of the assessment whether public service compensation is 
compatible with Article 106(2). 
147. The Court of Justice dismissed on 2 December 2010135 the appeal lodged by Holland 
Malt against a judgment136 of the General Court relating to the application of the 
Agricultural Guidelines137. According to the General Court, the Commission was 
right in deciding that an aid which does not fulfil a certain condition of the 
Agricultural Guidelines (namely the presence of normal outlets on the relevant 
market) is not compatible with the internal market, without taking into consideration 
the beneficial effects of that aid. The Commission is bound by the guidelines it 
issues, to the extent that they do not depart from the rules in the Treaty.  
2.3. Recovery of aid 
148. In CELF and Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication v Société internationale 
de diffusion et d'édition (SIDE)138, the Court of Justice confirmed that national courts 
must freeze illegal aid until a final binding authorisation is given by the Commission. 
It is for the national courts to take appropriate actions in order to remedy the 
unlawfulness of the implementation of the aid, so that the aid does not remain at the 
                                                 
133 Case T-396/08 Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt v Commission [2010] ECR; the judgment 
was appealed. 
134 Cases T-568/08 and T-573/08 Métropole télévision (M6) and Télévision française 1 SA v Commission 
[2010] ECR 
135 Case C-464/09 P Holland Malt BV v European Commission, Kingdom of the Netherlands [2010] ECR 
136 Case T-369/06 Holland Malt v Commission [2009] ECR II-3313  
137 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007-2013 (OJ C 319, 
27.12.2006, p. 1) 
138 Case C-1/09 CELF and Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication v Société internationale de 
diffusion et d'édition (SIDE) [2010] ECR 
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disposal of the recipient pending a final decision of the Commission. The Court also 
clarified that the adoption by the Commission of three successive decisions declaring 
aid to be compatible with the common market, which were subsequently annulled by 
the Community judicature, is not, in itself, capable of constituting an exceptional 
circumstance such as to justify a limitation of the recipient's obligation to repay that 
aid, in the case where that aid was implemented contrary to Article 108(3). 
149. In Scott SA, Kimberly Clark SAS, v Ville d’Orléans139, the Court of Justice clarified 
that a national court may annul a recovery order issued by a national authority on 
grounds of there being a procedural defect as long as the annulment of the recovery 
order would not lead, even provisionally, to a new payment of the aid, where it had 
already been reimbursed. Otherwise, the annulment of the recovery order would 
prevent the immediate and effective execution of the recovery decision and thus be 
incompatible with the Member State's recovery obligations. 
150. Finally, the Court confirmed the non execution of the recovery decisions in cases 
Commission/Italy and Commission/Slovakia140 and clarified how Member States 
should implement their obligation to "adopt all the necessary measures" to 
implement a recovery decision. 
II – Sector Developments 
A – FINANCIAL SERVICES 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
151. The economic and financial crisis highlighted the key role financial markets play in 
the functioning of modern economies. They provide access to finance for businesses 
and consumers and are an essential instrument of economic activity. Their level of 
integration and competitiveness goes hand in hand with the efficiency level of 
allocation of capital and with long-term economic performance. Financial services 
include retail banking, wholesale banking, payment services, financial information 
services and insurance services. 
152. With the financial and economic crisis continuing into 2010, the year has been 
another difficult one for the financial sector in the EU and Member States have 
continued to be active in granting support measures. 
153. State aid was one of the main pillars of action in helping to counter the effects of the 
financial crisis from its beginning. The regulatory framework was established in 
2008 and 2009 through the Communications on Banking, Recapitalisation, Impaired 
Assets and Restructuring141, which seek to preserve financial stability and to ensure 
                                                 
139 Case C-210/09 Scott SA, Kimberly Clark SAS, formerly Kimberly Clark SNC v Ville d’Orléans [2010] 
ECR 
140 Cases C-304/09 Commission/Italy and C-507/08 Commission/Slovakia 
141 Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8) ("Banking 
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legal certainty continued to play a central role. The temporary State aid rules for 
financial institutions defined and implemented by the Commission provided a 
coordination mechanism from the early stages of the crisis, which ensured that 
national support programmes were established in a way which avoided undue 
distortions of competition and ensured that financial institutions and their 
shareholders bear a fair part of the burden of rescuing them. Their implementation 
was the main focus of competition enforcement over the year, in particular in the 
field of restructuring of State supported financial institutions (see Section I.A.1., 
points 1 to 7). 
154. This year, the Commission set out its roadmap for financial reform142 and made a 
number of key legislative proposals which are designed to increase transparency, 
foster a responsible attitude to risk taking, improve supervision of market 
participants and help mitigate the impact of any future crises. Key proposals include 
the AIFM Directive, the revision of the Capital Requirements Directive and the 
Communication on Crisis Management and Bank Resolution Funds together with the 
OTC derivatives and short selling initiative, the establishment of the new European 
supervisory authorities and the adoption of measures to strengthen the supervision of 
credit ratings agencies. The Commission has also started the review of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive143 (MiFID) which will enhance competition in 
financial markets, in particular through: (i) targeted improvements to ensure that 
market data is made available to participants on an equitable basis; (ii) reduction of 
information asymmetries in less transparent markets such as those for bonds and 
derivatives, while trading in more standardised derivatives is foreseen to move to 
exchanges and electronic trading platforms where trading conditions are most 
conducive to open competition and (iii) more equitable conditions between organised 
trading venues such as regulated markets and Multilateral Trading Facilities. 
Regarding credit rating agencies (CRAs), currently regulated under the Credit Rating 
Agencies Regulation of 2009144, the Commission is exploring further measures to 
enhance competition in this industry such as for instance the creation of a network of 
small and medium CRAs. 
155. However, other competition policy challenges affecting the financial sector also drew 
the attention of the Commission. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) continued 
to be an important focus of antitrust advocacy in the field of financial services. SEPA 
is a self regulatory initiative launched by the European Banking Industry and led by 
the European Payments Council to move to an integrated Euro payments area, so that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Communication"), Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current 
financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of 
competition (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2) ("Recapitalisation Communication"); Communication from the 
Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, 
p. 1) ("Impaired Assets Communication"); Communication on the return to viability and the assessment 
of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rule (OJ C 195, 
19.8.2009, p. 9) ("Restructuring Communication") 
142 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/roadmap/finanial_reform_en.pdf  
143 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC 
(OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1-44) 
144 Regulation 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit 
rating agencies (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1) 
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cross border payments are as easy and efficient as domestic payments. Once fully 
implemented, SEPA will cover credit transfers, payment cards and direct debits. 
SEPA, whilst primarily devised by the industry itself, is strongly supported by the 
European Central Bank and the Commission. Since it is based on decisions of and 
agreements between undertakings that are (potential) competitors it is subject to 
close competition scrutiny. Reinforcing and strengthening the competition dimension 
of SEPA will in turn help to achieve better services at a better price for retailers and 
consumers. SEPA should also help to remove the problem of cross border payments 
on the Internet which remains one of the barriers to a greater use of e-commerce. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Antitrust enforcement 
156. Antitrust investigations focused on the payments services sector but also on the use 
of standard identifiers for financial instruments, and the distribution of trading data 
and financial information. Two meetings of the European Competition Network were 
held regarding wholesale financial services markets and retail financial services 
markets to better understand the issues being faced by National Competition 
Authorities and to maintain close cooperation within the Network. 
2.1.1. Antitrust enforcement in the payments services sector 
The Visa case 
157. Following the adoption of a Statement of Objections against Visa Europe, Visa Inc. 
and Visa International Service Association in 2009145, Visa Europe offered 
commitments in April 2010 concerning in particular its Multilateral Interchange Fees 
(MIFs) for immediate debit cards transactions applicable to cross-border transactions 
in the EEA and to domestic transactions in those EEA countries where the domestic 
MIF rates apply in the absence of other MIFs or are set directly by Visa Europe. 
MIFs are fees agreed upon by Visa's member banks and charged by a cardholder's 
bank (the issuing bank) to a merchant's bank (the acquiring bank) for each sales 
transaction made at a merchant outlet with Visa card. MIFs form a large part of the 
merchant service charge, the fee a merchant must pay to his bank for accepting the 
card as means of payment. On 8 December 2010, the commitments were made 
legally binding for four years by virtue of a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 ("the commitments decision"). 
158. Following the entry into force of the commitments decision, Visa Europe's maximum 
weighted average MIF for cross-border immediate debit cards transactions in the 
EEA will be reduced to 0.2%. This cap will also apply separately in each of those 
EEA countries for which Visa Europe directly sets specific domestic consumer 
immediate debit MIF rates and in each of those EEA countries where the cross-
border consumer immediate debit MIF rates apply in the absence of other MIFs. In 
addition, Visa Europe will modify its network rules which should increase 
transparency and competition in the payment cards market. The MIF reduction and 
                                                 
145 Case COMP/39398 Visa MIF. See IP/10/1684, 8.12.2010. 
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the transparency measures are expected to generate direct benefits to merchants and 
consumers and contribute to the promotion of efficient payment instruments. 
159. The MIF reduction to 0.2% is in line with the unilateral undertakings given by 
MasterCard in April 2009146. The reduction reflects the application of the "merchant-
indifference methodology", which seeks to establish the MIF at a level at which 
merchants will be indifferent as to whether a payment is made by immediate debit 
card or by cash. The cap of 0.2% is based on four studies published by the central 
banks of the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden comparing the costs of cards with 
those of cash. This cap can be reviewed if new information regarding the costs of 
cards compared to the costs of cash become available, in particular as a result of the 
study aimed at comparing the costs of different means of payment, which is currently 
being carried out by the Commission. 
160. The commitments do not apply to Visa Europe's MIFs for consumer credit and 
deferred debit cards or for commercial cards. The Commission's investigation of 
Visa's consumer credit and deferred debit card MIFs is still ongoing. Investigations 
into the domestic MIFs set by local banks for transactions with payment cards were 
also launched by eight European NCAs, four of which have already adopted 
decisions on this issue.  
Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) 
161. SEPA continued to be an important focus of antitrust advocacy in the field of 
financial services in 2010. As a result of an informal dialogue with the European 
Payments Council (EPC), a number of competition concerns were addressed. For 
instance it was clarified that SEPA compliant card schemes do not need to cover all 
32 States of the SEPA territory, giving new schemes a real chance of entering the 
market. 
162. As regards SEPA Direct Debit (SDD), the Commission working document on the 
"Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to multilateral interbank-payments in 
SEPA Direct Debit" was published on 3 November 2009. It sets out principles for the 
assessment of collective financing mechanisms under European competition rules. A 
public consultation was launched to collect the substantive input from the market 
actors and other interested stakeholders. On 16 December 2010, the Commission 
adopted a proposal to the Council and Parliament on establishing technical 
requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euros147. This proposal includes 
provisions to forbid MIFs per transaction for SEPA Direct Debit after a transitional 
period but to allow MIFs for rejected transactions under certain conditions. 
Financial services information 
163. Access to financial services information and the availability of high quality and 
timely market data in relation to prices and structures of financial instruments is 
crucial for the functioning of financial markets. The markets for the provision of 
                                                 
146 Case COMP/34579 MasterCard. See IP/09/515 and MEMO/09/143, 1.4.2009. 
147 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing technical 
requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euros and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 
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financial information are often characterised by a high degree of concentration and 
the major global financial institutions and information services providers enjoy 
significant market power. Industry standardisation in such markets can lead to the 
development of quasi monopolistic providers of de facto market standard products, 
services, financial identifiers and indices. The Commission is investigating a number 
of issues arising in this sector such as access to information or services, standard 
setting, IP rights and interoperability between different products or services148. 
2.1.2. Securities Trading, Clearing and Settlement (C&S) 
164. Clearing and settlement149 are financial activities which are carried out by so-called 
post trade infrastructure providers (in particular Clearing Houses and Central 
Securities Depositories) after a financial transaction has taken place. Whereas the 
industry-led Code of Conduct on clearing and settlement150 signed on 7 November 
2006 achieved some positive developments as regards unbundling of services and 
price transparency, progress on access and interoperability between different post 
trade infrastructure providers remained limited, partially because of the opposing 
commercial interests of incumbent providers. The post-trade sector thus remains 
fragmented along national lines, making cross-border trades more complex and 
costly.  
165. Future regulation will aim at increasing competition between post trade infrastructure 
providers. On 15 September 2010, the Commission presented a proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories151. The draft 
Regulation foresees a common framework for central counterparties (CCPs) in the 
EU and lays down the conditions for the establishment of interoperability 
arrangements between CCPs for cash equities while ensuring that potential risks 
arising out of such interoperability arrangements are appropriately managed. 
Interoperability arrangements increase competition between different CCPs. They 
give customers a choice and allow them to consolidate clearing volume at a single 
entity. Irrespective of ongoing regulatory initiatives to increase competition in post 
trading markets, it remains the responsibility of (incumbent) market infrastructure 
owners to respect competition rules when facing access requests from other 
infrastructures wishing to compete152. 
                                                 
148 Cases COMP/39592 European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) and others v 
Standard and Poor's and COMP/39654 Reuters Instrument Codes 
149 Clearing refers to a number of activities from the time a commitment is made for a financial transaction 
(the trading) until the obligations related to the transaction are discharged. Clearing may involve a 
variety of different activities depending on the financial instrument in question (such as trade 
verification and matching, legal confirmation, position and payment netting, collateral management). 
Settlement refers to the final transfer of the ownership of the securities from seller to buyer and the final 
transfer of the funds from buyer to seller. In more recent years, a new type of clearing called Central 
Counterparty (CCP) clearing has become more prominent. In CCP clearing, an entity, the CCP, puts 
itself between the parties to the contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer 
to every seller and the seller to every buyer. 
150 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/code/code_en.pdf  
151 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories (COM(2010) 484/5, 2010/0250 COD) 
152 See case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream International SA v Commission [2009] 
ECR II-3155. 
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166. The proposed Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories also includes several measures aiming at making OTC derivatives 
markets safer and at enhancing financial supervision. It also requires market 
participants to clear eligible OTC derivative contracts via CCPs, which reduces 
counterparty risk and should be welcomed from a financial stability point of view. 
As a result of this requirement, some CCPs may attract all or a large part of existing 
clearing volumes for specific financial instruments. Such providers need to ensure 
that their conduct is in compliance with competition law principles. The high degree 
of concentration in individual OTC derivatives markets (such as Credit Default 
Swaps) requires close market monitoring from a competition policy point of view. 
2.1.3. Insurance sector 
Insurance Block Exemption Regulation 
167. In November 2007, the Commission began the review of the functioning of the 
insurance Block Exemption Regulation (BER) which expired on 31st March 2010153. 
In the context of a great number of individual notifications, the insurance sector has 
been covered by consecutive sector-specific BERs since 1992. A BER allows market 
players the benefit of a safe harbour from competition rules provided they comply 
with the BER's conditions. Agreements not covered by a BER are not presumed to be 
illegal, but instead must be assessed under Article 101(1) of the Treaty and if 
appropriate, Article 101(3). The previous BER applied Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
to four categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance 
sector, namely agreements in relation to (i) joint calculations, tables and studies; (ii) 
standard policy conditions (SPCs) and models on profits; (iii) the common coverage 
of certain types of risks (pools); and (iv) security devices. 
168. On the basis of the evidence gathered, the Commission adopted, on 24 March 2009, a 
report to the European Parliament and Council, which was published on the same 
day with a detailed accompanying working document154. The Report examined the 
functioning of the previous BER and made initial proposals for its amendment. 
169. Following a two and a half years review, involving all interested market players and 
National Competition Authorities, the Commission adopted on 24 March 2010 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010, the new insurance BER155, applying 
Article 101(3) to two categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in 
the insurance sector, namely agreements in relation to (i) joint compilations, tables 
and studies and (ii) the common coverage of certain types of risks (pools).  
170. As a result of its findings following the review process, the Commission decided not 
to renew two of the four types of cooperation covered under the previous BER, 
namely agreements concerning (i) standard policy conditions (SPCs) and (ii) security 
                                                 
153 Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the application of Article 81(3) of 
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devices. The decision was primarily taken because the evidence gathered during the 
review indicated that such agreements are not specific to the insurance sector and 
therefore their inclusion in such an exceptional legal instrument would have resulted 
in unjustified discrimination in relation to other sectors which do not benefit from a 
BER in this respect, such as the banking sector. In addition, although these two forms 
of cooperation may generate some benefits to consumers, the Review showed that 
they can also give rise to certain competition concerns. 
171. In this context, the Commission considered it more appropriate that a compliance 
analysis for these types of agreements be conducted on a case-by-case basis under 
Article 101(1) and if appropriate 101(3). The issue of SPCs is now addressed in the 
standardisation chapter of the Horizontal Guidelines adopted in 2010 (see Section 
I.B.1.1.2., points 35 to 44). As presented through the insurance specific example 
given in those Guidelines, SPCs do not generally raise competition problems. Indeed, 
as long as there is no standardisation of the insurance products and as long as SPCs 
are not binding, the conditions provided in Article 101(3) are likely to be fulfilled.  
172. Similarly, agreements on security devices are now to be assessed on the basis of the 
new standardisation chapter of the new Horizontal Guidelines and an example 
specific to the insurance sector was also introduced in these Guidelines. In 
accordance with this example, agreements on security devices could be pro-
competitive as long as they do not have effects on the downstream market by 
excluding manufacturers through very specific and unjustified requests. 
Maritime insurance 
173. As regards the maritime insurance sector, the Commission opened formal 
proceedings against 13 Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs that are part of the 
International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) on 26 August 2010. In the framework of the 
IG, the clubs have concluded two separate agreements: (i) the International Group 
Agreement and (ii) the Pooling Agreement that contain rules on the sharing of 
insurance claims and joint reinsurance as well as rules on the contractual 
relationships between the P&I Clubs and their members. The Commission is 
concerned that such provisions could restrict competition between the P&I Clubs and 
exclude, to some extent, commercial insurers and other mutual P&I insurers from the 
relevant markets. 
2.2. Merger control 
174. The trend of reduced merger activity continued in 2010 in the financial sector. The 
Commission examined cases in the sectors of retail banking services156, asset 
management157 and distribution of mutual funds services158, further consolidating its 
practice in these areas.  
                                                 
156 Cases COMP/M.5948 Santander / Rainbow (OJ C 320, 25.11.2010, p. 1) and COMP/M.5960 Crédit 
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175. A number of cases resulted directly from State aid decisions taken by the 
Commission during the financial crisis and were examined under the EU merger 
control rules. In particular the decision in the State aid case approving State measures 
to Royal Bank of Scotland159 led to three notified cases, regarding three businesses 
that had been committed to be divested, including certain retail and commercial 
banking assets160, its merchant payment services161 and its commodities trading 
arm162. This involved close cooperation with the relevant National Competition 
Authorities. All cases were cleared in first phase without remedies. 
2.3. State aid control: restructuring of financial institutions 
176. Restoring viability of individual financial institutions is a prerequisite for restoring 
the viability of the EU banking sector as a whole. Lending to the real economy, re-
establishing a level playing field across financial institutions, and the smooth 
functioning of the European internal market can be ensured only through viable 
financial institutions. In 2010, the Commission approved, subject to applicable 
conditions, a number of restructuring measures in respect of banks that received State 
support. Over the year, the Commission approved for 14 banks restructuring or 
liquidation plans and adopted one negative decision in applying the Restructuring 
Communication. Some examples are detailed in this section, which aim at providing 
a view across the diversity of restructuring decisions, in terms of Member States 
concerned, type of financial institutions restructured and of conditions of 
restructuring. 
177. The restructuring process of banks is based on the crisis-related State aid rules as laid 
down in the Restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009163. The Communication 
provides guidance on the conditions under which restructuring aid for banks in need 
of financial assistance beyond an emergency rescue can be authorised. The first 
principle is the return to long-term viability without State aid, based on a sound 
restructuring plan (including stress-testing of the bank's financial projections). The 
second principle is burden-sharing between the bank/its stakeholders and the State. 
Shareholders and other capital holders must adequately contribute to bearing the 
costs of financial, organisational and other necessary restructuring measures. Finally, 
the third principle requires measures to limit competition distortions. They usually 
comprise structural measures (divestitures) and behavioural measures (e.g. 
acquisition bans or limitations on aggressive commercial behaviour financed by State 
aid). The measures are decided on a case-by-case basis. 
178. The Commission requests and analyses detailed regular reports on the 
implementation of the restructuring plans. Moreover, separate managers, so-called 
monitoring trustees and divestiture trustees, are being appointed to assist the 
Commission in determining that the approved restructuring plans are being 
implemented properly. 
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Aegon 
179. Aegon is a Dutch company providing life insurance, asset management and 
retirement products. It has a total balance sheet of EUR 298.6 billion. In November 
2008, the Dutch State made available EUR 3 billion in new capital for Aegon, in the 
form of convertible core capital securities. The coupon of those instruments is set to 
be the highest of either 8.5% or an increasing percentage of the dividend paid on 
ordinary shares. The repurchase price of the securities is fixed at 150% of the issue 
price. One third of the securities could be repaid within 12 months at more 
favourable terms. Alternatively the securities can be converted into ordinary shares 
after three years from issuance. 
180. The Commission temporarily approved the rescue measure on 27 November 2008, 
subject to the submission of a restructuring plan164. The Dutch authorities submitted 
the preliminary plan on 19 November 2009 and the final plan was submitted on 
26 July 2010 and approved on 17 August 2010165. Under that plan Aegon is supposed 
to implement further changes to its activities to rebalance its business model.  
181. The businesses affected by the plan are mainly those that were at the origin of 
difficulties of Aegon: the institutional spread-based business is going to be closed 
down and exposure to equity risk stemming from variable annuities is being hedged. 
The overall size of general account of Aegon USA is going to be reduced by USD 
25 billion (EUR 19 billion). The plan includes financial projections in a stress 
scenario and a sensitivity analysis demonstrating capacity of Aegon to withstand 
adverse developments in the future. 
182. In November 2009 Aegon paid back EUR 1 billion while the plan provides for a 
repayment schedule for the remaining State capital. On 30 August 2010 Aegon 
repaid EUR 500 million of the State capital securities. The repayment was made 
under more favourable conditions than initially agreed, ensuring an internal rate of 
return for half of the State capital securities of 15%. Such an amendment of the 
initially agreed repayment conditions resulting in additional State aid was considered 
acceptable for the Commission in view of the incentive for early repayment, the high 
level of overall return achieved by the State and the in-depth restructuring measures 
committed to by Aegon. The remaining EUR 1.5 billion of State capital securities 
will be repaid before the end of June 2011 at the initially agreed repurchase price of 
150%. Depending on the repayment date, the rate of return will be between 17.8% 
and 21%.  
183. Until full repayment of the aid, Aegon will be subject to a price leadership ban in 
specific segments of the Dutch market and to a rating withdrawal of its main life 
subsidiary in the Netherlands, in order to limit competitive distortions in the Dutch 
mortgage and savings and pensions markets. Furthermore, Aegon is subject to an 
acquisition ban during the same period. 
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Bank of Ireland 
184. Bank of Ireland is one of the two largest banks in Ireland, with operations mainly 
focused on its domestic market, but also with significant activity in the UK and some 
niche lending operations in the US, France and Germany. It operates mainly in retail 
and corporate banking, but is also active in areas such as investment banking, 
insurance and pension products. 
185. In March 2009, the Irish State provided EUR 3.5 billion in preference shares to 
ensure the bank was adequately capitalised166. The bank also participates in Ireland's 
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), an impaired asset relief scheme for 
financial institutions, approved by the Commission in February 2010167. The transfer 
of loans with a book value of EUR 12.2 billion is expected to include an aid element 
of about EUR 1.0 billion. The bank also used State guarantees under the Irish 
guarantee scheme for financial institutions' access to finance, approved by the 
Commission in October 2008, and the eligible liabilities guarantee scheme, also 
approved by the Commission in January 2010 and subsequently prolonged by the 
Commission in May and June 2010168. 
186. The Commission, by its decision of 15 July 2010, approved Bank of Ireland's 
restructuring plan169. The Commission concluded that the restructuring plan fulfilled 
the criteria of the Restructuring Communication, as it is supposed to lead to a 
restoration of viability of the bank, and there seemed to be sufficient own 
contribution and burden-sharing by the bank as well as sufficient measures limiting 
the distortion of competition. 
187. The proposed measures are supposed to ensure the viability of the bank by exiting 
risky portfolios and by implementing more prudent risk management practices. In 
particular, in order to contribute to the costs of its own restructuring and to limit the 
distortions of competition created by the aid, Bank of Ireland will reduce its presence 
in certain market segments through the transfer or winding down of assets and 
through divestitures. 
188. In addition, Bank of Ireland will also implement other measures aimed at enhancing 
competition on the Irish banking market. Specifically, the bank is supposed to offer 
certain services to new entrants or to small banks already active in Ireland to reduce 
the cost for competitors to develop business in Ireland. That action comprises a 
"Service Package", which enables competitors to access certain back-up services, for 
example access to its ATM network, and a "Customer Package" to help reduce the 
costs of acquiring new customers that involves Bank of Ireland presenting customers 
with alternative services for their current account and credit card products. 
189. Finally, the Irish authorities committed to a number of market opening measures in 
order to enhance competition in the Irish banking market by facilitating the entry and 
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expansion of competitors and by increasing consumer protection in the financial 
sector. They include for example measures enhancing customer mobility between 
banks and furthering electronic banking.  
190. After the 15 July approval of Bank of Ireland's restructuring plan, the economic and 
financial situation in Ireland deteriorated further; that development led to the 
country's economic adjustment programme in November 2010. While confirming 
that all commitments undertaken in the restructuring plan will be honoured, the Irish 
authorities committed to notify any further State aid in favour of Bank of Ireland for 
approval under EU competition rules (see Section I.A.4.2., points 25 to 29). 
Dexia 
191. Dexia is a bank active in financing to local authorities in a number of countries 
worldwide and in retail banking, mainly in Belgium, Luxembourg and Turkey. The 
capital of Dexia is held mainly by the Caisse des dépôts et consignations, Holding 
communal SA, Arcofin SA, and, since the capital injection undertaken in September 
2008, by the Belgian and French Governments. The balance sheet of Dexia totalled 
EUR 578 billion on 31 December 2009. 
192. On 26 February 2010 the Commission approved aid granted by Belgium, France and 
Luxembourg for the restructuring of Dexia170, subject to its meeting a number of 
conditions, including liquidity ratios, and implementing the structural and 
behavioural measures notified to the Commission. 
193. In response to the difficulties threatening the survival of the bank, Belgium, France 
and Luxembourg had granted four aid measures that consisted of: (i) a capital 
injection of EUR 6 billion, of which the Commission regards EUR 5.2 billion as 
State aid171; (ii) a guarantee by the Belgian, French and Luxembourg Governments in 
respect of certain of Dexia's liabilities up to a maximum of EUR 150 billion, reduced 
to EUR 100 billion since 1 November 2009; (iii) an emergency liquidity support 
from the Belgian National Bank, guaranteed by the Belgian State, and (iv) a 
guarantee by the Belgian and French Governments in respect of a portfolio of 
impaired assets held by Financial Security Assurance Asset Management (FSAM) 
for a nominal amount of USD 16.6 billion (EUR 12.9 billion) at 30 January 2009. 
Some of these aid measures were subject to an earlier temporary Commission rescue 
approval of 19 November 2008.  
194. Under the restructuring plan, the group will focus on its core banking activities and 
its traditional markets in Belgium, France and Luxembourg. In order to decrease its 
funding needs, Dexia must reduce its public-sector lending activity outside those 
markets and its bond portfolio, which will be isolated in a specific division in the 
bank, and progressively amortised according to a predefined plan. In addition, Dexia 
has to continue to reduce its market activities and to cease proprietary trading. Dexia 
will also have to improve the stability, quality and maturity of its sources of 
financing by respecting a number of target ratios. 
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195. The Commission concluded that the restructuring measures should allow Dexia to 
restore its long-term viability, in particular by reducing its dependence on the money 
and bond markets. In this respect, compliance by Dexia with quantitative targets for 
improving its financing is expected to improve the stability, quality and maturity of 
its sources of funding. Dexia will also make a sufficient own contribution to the 
restructuring costs by suspending, for two years, any cash dividend payments and 
interest payments on instruments constituting own funds. Finally, the Commission 
takes the view that the gradual cessation of certain activities provided for in the 
restructuring plan will be enough to offset the distortions of competition caused by 
the aid. 
Parex 
196. Before the crisis, Parex was the second largest bank in Latvia in terms of assets. It 
was partly nationalised in November 2008 as the financial and economic crisis 
exposed serious weaknesses in its business model. The bank benefitted from State 
guarantees, recapitalisation and liquidity support for a total of around LVL 
1.1 billion (EUR 1.6 billion). The measures were cleared temporarily as emergency 
aid in 2008 and 2009. On 29 July 2009, the Commission opened an in-depth 
investigation on the restructuring172. 
197. Under the restructuring plan submitted by the Latvian authorities, the core assets and 
operations of Parex were transferred into a new viable bank called Citadele banka on 
1 August 2010. The Latvian State (75%) and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (25%) are the shareholders of this new bank. The business model 
of Citadele banka focuses on business in the Baltic countries, whilst discontinuing 
lending and leasing in the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is 
considered riskier. By refocusing on its core activities and by materially reducing the 
size of its total assets, Citadele banka is expected to return to profitability in 2011 
and repay the State liquidity support received. 
198. Until the full repayment of the State liquidity measures, Citadele banka is subject to 
market presence caps in deposits and lending markets and to an acquisition ban, 
aiming at limiting competition distortions caused by the aid. The plan also includes 
an adequate contribution of the (former) shareholders and holders of subordinated 
debt to the restructuring costs. In fact the main shareholders lost their ownership 
rights and the remaining legacy minority shareholders and the subordinated debt 
holders have a claim only against "old Parex", which keeps the remaining impaired 
and non-strategic assets. 
Sparkasse KölnBonn 
199. Sparkasse KölnBonn is the second-largest savings bank in Germany with a balance 
sheet of EUR 30 billion. In the wake of the financial crisis, the capital of Sparkasse 
KölnBonn was strengthened by a total of EUR 650 million, through the issue of 
certificates of participation with a coupon of 8% and a "silent participation" whereby 
investors receive remuneration (12-month Euribor plus 7.25%) but do not have 
voting rights. 
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200. In November 2009, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to examine the 
compatibility of the measures with EU State aid rules as it had doubts whether the 
remuneration on both instruments was still sufficient after the market for hybrid 
instruments had completely dried up as of the end of 2008. 
201. The Commission approved the restructuring plan the bank submitted following the 
opening decision on 29 September 2010173. According to the plan, Sparkasse 
KölnBonn will focus on its statutory core business model of a regional savings bank 
and will thus concentrate on providing retail banking services to its traditional 
customer segments, i.e. private customers and SMEs. It will withdraw from 
proprietary trading and investments in structured products and will furthermore 
divest non-core subsidiaries which were a major source for the losses 
SparkasseKölnBonn incurred. Overall, the restructuring measures will result in a 
balance sheet reduction of 17% (not including growth in the traditional local 
customer segments) by the end of 2014 as compared to the end of 2008. 
202. Following the in-depth investigation, the Commission found, in particular, that the 
restructuring plan ensures the long-term viability of Sparkasse KölnBonn, as the 
main causes of its difficulties, the subsidiaries related to the regional development 
and the exposure to volatile investments, are addressed through the divestments of 
the respective investments and subsidiaries and a gradual withdrawal from those 
activities. The holders of hybrid instruments bear to the extent possible the losses 
incurred, as both coupon payments and the principal of the hybrid capital were 
suspended or participated in the absorption of Sparkasse KölnBonn's losses. The 
Commission further found that Sparkasse KölnBonn adequately contributed to the 
restructuring through divestments of profitable non-core subsidiaries and cost-cutting 
measures which will result in a cost reduction of EUR 28 million per year by the end 
of the restructuring period, representing 6% of its total costs. The divestments of 
non-core subsidiaries and the behavioural commitments provided by the German 
authorities sufficiently limit the distortions of competition brought about by the aid. 
Banco Privado Português 
203. Banco Privado Português (BPP) was a Portuguese bank that provided private 
banking, corporate advice and private equity services. The bank ran into severe 
financing difficulties after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing severe 
crisis in the financial markets. 
204. A guarantee was granted by the Portuguese State to six banks in Portugal to lend 
EUR 450 million to BPP at the height of the financial crisis, on 5 December 2008. 
The State guarantee was prolonged, without prior Commission approval, on 5 June 
and on 5 December 2009. 
205. The Commission, in early 2009, temporarily approved the loan guarantee as 
emergency support on the condition that Portugal would submit a restructuring plan 
within six months. As the Commission did not receive the plan despite several 
reminders, in November 2009 it opened a formal investigation procedure. The main 
reason was that it had concerns that the bank was being kept alive artificially. 
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Moreover, it had concerns that the pricing of the guarantee was below the level 
required under the Communication on the application of the State aid rules to public 
support to banks during the crisis. On 15 April 2010, the Bank of Portugal revoked 
the banking licence of BPP and initiated the process of its liquidation. Consequently, 
the six Portuguese banks called the State guarantee and were re-paid the loan by the 
Portuguese government on 7 May 2010. 
206. The Commission took a decision on 20 July 2010 that the guarantee granted by the 
Portuguese State on 5 December 2008 and its prolongations, constituted illegal and 
incompatible State aid for the period from 5 December 2008 until 15 April 2010, 
given the non-compliance with the obligation to present a restructuring plan and the 
low fee paid for the guarantee174. While the liquidation of the bank addresses the 
competition distortion stemming from the aid, the Portuguese government must file 
its claim as a creditor in the liquidation procedure and recover from BPP the 
difference between the price the bank should have paid for the guarantee and the 
lower fee actually paid, including accrued interest. Portugal stated that it has already 
filed the necessary claims to enforce its privileged and priority rights over the 
collateral it holds over BPP and that it would continue to do so until it has recovered 
the full loan which it had to pay to the creditor banks in execution of the guarantee. 
B – ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
207. The energy sector is of significant importance in Europe. In 2009, total retail sales of 
gas and electricity were over EUR 500 billion while crude oil sales were more than 
EUR 390 billion. Environmental services will become an increasingly important part 
of the European economy and will be one of the drivers of the economic recovery 
(turnover in this sector was over EUR 300 billion in 2009175). 
208. Article 194 TFEU spells out the three central goals for European energy policy: 
sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. While some progress has been 
made towards these goals, of which an open and undistorted energy market is a 
fundamental instrument, the remodelling of Europe's energy systems is not 
proceeding as swiftly as could be hoped. Improving the functioning of the markets to 
provide secure energy supplies at competitive prices while limiting the 
environmental impact of energy production and use is thus one of the priorities set 
out in the Europe 2020 Strategy176. 
209. An open and competitive single EU market should contribute to the energy and 
climate change objectives for 2020, ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of 
energy at competitive prices by encouraging the rapid development of renewable 
energies and promoting the development of new environmentally friendly 
technologies. To meet these objectives, the Commission has defined a new energy 
                                                 
174 Case C33/2009 Restructuring of BPP 
175 2008 Commission estimates 
176 Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (COM(2010) 2020 final) 
 EN 59   EN 
strategy for the next ten years in the framework of the Flagship Initiative of the 
Europe 2020 strategy on a "Resource Efficient Europe"177.  
210. The remaining anti-competitive practices in the energy sector will need to be tackled 
effectively, not only by the Commission but also by Member States. The 
Commission will seek to promote the further liberalisation of the energy markets and 
unbundling. It will continue to act against abuses of a dominant position in the 
energy and environment sectors. Through its State aid policy it will seek to ensure 
the development of sustainable energy sources and act against Member States' 
policies that distort competition. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Antitrust enforcement 
211. In 2010 the Commission continued to follow up its 2007 energy sector inquiry, 
adopting four major antitrust decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003178, in 
which the Commission makes binding the commitments proposed by undertakings to 
put an end to potential infringements. The Commission also initiated proceedings 
relating to procedural infringements under Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 against 
certain undertakings which had been the target of surprise inspections by the 
Commission. 
212. In the EDF Customer Foreclosure179 case, the Commission had concerns that EDF 
may have abused its dominant position in France by (i) concluding supply contracts 
which foreclosed the market given their scope, duration and exclusive nature and by 
(ii) including resale restrictions in its supply contracts. In reaction to the 
Commission's concerns, EDF offered, for a period of ten years, to ensure that other 
suppliers could compete for on average 65% of the electricity EDF contracts with 
large French industrial users each year and to limit the duration of any new contract 
concluded with large industrial users to five years. In addition, EDF committed to 
remove all resale restrictions in its supply contracts and to assist customers wishing 
to resell electricity. These commitments were planned to come into effect on 1 July 
2010, but were postponed to 1 January 2011. 
213. In the Svenska Kraftnät (SvK)180 case the Commission had concerns that SvK may 
have abused its dominant position in the Swedish electricity transmission market by 
limiting the export capacity available on interconnectors. Its objective was to relieve 
internal congestion on its network and to reserve domestic electricity for domestic 
consumption, thus favouring Swedish consumers. To address the Commission's 
concerns, SvK offered, from 1 November 2011, to operate the Swedish electricity 
market on the basis of several flexible bidding zones. This will allow electricity 
trading to adjust to available transmission capacity through market prices, rather than 
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through arbitrary measures. In the transition period, SvK has committed to manage 
congestion in its network by using counter trade which involves paying generators 
and consumers to adjust respectively their production and consumption schedules. 
Once the zones are operative, SvK will manage congestion in the Swedish 
transmission system without limiting trading capacity on interconnectors. The only 
exception is the West-Coast-Corridor where SvK will build and operate a new 400 
kV transmission line by 30 November 2011 at the latest. 
214. In E.ON Gas181, the Commission's investigation showed that E.ON had reserved, on 
a long-term basis, the largest part of the available transport capacity at the entry 
points to its gas transmission networks. This may have prevented other gas suppliers 
from accessing the German gas market. The Commission reached the preliminary 
view that the long-term reservations might have infringed EU rules on the abuse of a 
dominant market position182. E.ON undertook to release capacity, corresponding to 
about 15% of pipeline capacity, at the entry points to its gas networks by October 
2010. From October 2015, E.ON will further reduce its bookings of entry capacity in 
the NetConnect Germany grid to 50% and in E.ON's grid for low-calorific gas to 
64% of the pipeline capacity. The commitments are expected to have a major 
structural impact, allowing other companies to compete on the German market. 
215. In the ENI183 case, the Commission had concerns that ENI may have abused its 
dominant position in the gas transport markets by refusing to grant competitors 
access to capacity available on the transport network (capacity hoarding), by granting 
access in an impractical manner (capacity degradation) and by strategically limiting 
investment (strategic underinvestment) in ENI's international transmission pipeline 
system. ENI may also have had the incentive to foreclose rivals to protect its margins 
in the downstream gas supply markets. ENI has committed to the structural 
divestment of its international transport activities for the import of gas into Italy, 
from Russia (TAG) and from Northern Europe (the system TENP/Transitgas). In the 
case of TAG, ENI will divest its share to a public entity controlled by the Italian 
Government. The sale of ENI's shares in the international transport pipelines will be 
carried out under the supervision of a trustee and the buyers will need to be approved 
by the Commission. These commitments are expected to increase the opportunity for 
other companies to transport gas into Italy and to compete on the Italian market to 
the benefit of gas consumers as the gas transport networks will be owned and 
managed independently of ENI. 
216. In two of the inspections carried out in the energy and environment sectors the 
Commission encountered difficulties. In April, the Commission carried out surprise 
inspections in France in the water and waste water sectors184. During the inspection 
at the premises of Lyonnaise des Eaux (a wholly owned subsidiary of Suez 
Environnement), a seal affixed upon an office door was broken, in serious breach of 
the rules governing the Commission's powers of investigation. On the basis of these 
facts the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Lyonnaise des Eaux and to 
Suez Environnement. On 17 May, the Commission initiated proceedings against the 
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J&T Group and Energetický a průmyslový holding, active in the electricity sector in 
the Czech Republic185, for a possible obstruction of the Commission inspectors 
during site inspections in November 2009. A number of incidents relating to the 
handling of e-mail accounts and access to electronic records occurred. In both cases a 
fine of up to 1% of the previous business year's turnover of the company concerned 
may be imposed if the allegations are proven. 
2.2. State aid control 
Regulated electricity tariffs 
217. In the context of the open investigations, the Commission is still examining aid 
granted in the form of regulated electricity tariffs in France and Spain. Regulated 
tariffs may result in undue price advantages for electricity end-users and create 
market foreclosure. In the majority of Member States, regulated tariffs in favour of 
medium and large undertakings have been abolished or are being phased-out. France 
will phase-out regulated tariffs for medium and large undertakings in 2015, in the 
framework of a reform of the electricity market (loi Nome) which is set to be 
implemented as of 2011. Spain abolished such tariffs in 2009.  
Partial exemptions from feed-in tariffs for energy intensive industries 
218. After partially clearing an Austrian scheme subsidising feed-in tariffs in favour of 
producers of renewable energies, the Commission continued to investigate certain 
provisions of the scheme which seemed to favour large energy consumers186. Feed-in 
tariffs are the higher tariffs available to producers of sustainable energy to 
compensate them for their higher costs. The Commission expressed doubts as to the 
compatibility of the scheme with State aid rules since the partial exemption of energy 
intensive industries from the feed-in tariffs may provide these industries with an 
unfair competitive advantage that does not seem justified. These costs are then 
passed on to consumers. The partial exemption granted by the Austrian scheme 
would lower the costs of the companies benefitting from it. The Commission also 
opened an investigation into a German scheme granting operating aid to energy 
intensive large non-ferrous metal producers (i.e. aluminium, zinc, and copper) in the 
form of compensation for the CO2 costs included in their electricity prices187, thus 
putting them in a more favourable position than competitors in other Member States 
who have to pay the full CO2 costs. 
Support for energy saving and renewable energy production  
219. The Commission cleared a number of measures in support of energy saving and 
renewable energy production under the horizontal Environmental Aid Guidelines188. 
An increasing number of these notifications concerned relatively large individual aid 
measures (i.e. above EUR 7.5 million investment aid per undertaking), which were 
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subject to a detailed economic assessment189 as part of the more economic approach 
to State aid analysis. The Commission analysed in detail the possible negative effects 
of a State aid measure on competition and balanced these effects against the positive 
effects of the aid for the environment. 
220. The Commission authorised investment aid for the implementation of an innovative 
production process to one German steel producer and investment aid to another 
German steel producer for the implementation of a process recycling the gas emitted 
in the steelmaking process190. In France, the Commission cleared investment aid for 
the construction of a biomass boiler191. Investment aid was also approved for the 
construction of a high-efficiency combined heat and power plant in Austria192.  
Aid related to carbon capture and storage 
221. The Commission also dealt with two individual support measures for industrial-scale 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration projects. The Commission 
authorised investment aid for a CCS demonstration project in Rotterdam covering the 
whole cycle where the CO2 from power generation is captured and stored in a 
depleted gas field193. The project was granted funds from the European Energy 
Programme for Recovery (EEPR)194. The Commission also approved investment aid 
to a Dutch power generator for a project in which the CCS technology is tested on a 
coal gasification process195. 
Remediation of contaminated sites 
222. The Commission authorised a grant of more than EUR 145 million to Voestalpine 
Stahl for the remediation of a site owned by the company in Linz (region of Upper 
Austria) and whose contamination dates back to World War II196. The Commission 
found the state support to be in line with EU rules on State aid for environmental 
protection. In particular, it respected the "polluter pays" principle and did not result 
in overcompensation. This measure was preceded by a similar case involving the 
remediation of an Austrian landfill site in Brückl, which was contaminated with 
chlorinated hydrocarbons from the production of chlorides197. 
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Security of energy supply 
223. The Commission dealt with a number of cases in the area of security of electricity 
supply. It authorised a Spanish aid scheme intended to compensate electricity 
generators for using indigenous coal for some of their production as a public service 
obligation198. The Electricity Market Directive199 allows Member States to take such 
measures for security of supply reasons. However, such measures are also subject to 
the State aid provisions in the Treaty and hence, the Commission verified that the 
scheme met all the requirements of the Community framework for State aid in the 
form of public service compensation200. This framework takes into account the wide 
margin of discretion given by EU case law to Member States in defining their public 
service obligations. Besides, it contains precise rules concerning the level of financial 
compensations granted to companies on which such obligations are imposed. In its 
assessment, the Commission found no manifest error of assessment in the 
justifications made by Spain as regards the definition of the public service obligation 
and verified that all the requirements of the framework were satisfied. Furthermore, 
the scheme being of a transitional nature, Spain undertook not to extend it beyond 
2014. Finally, the Commission obtained from Spain commitments ensuring 
consistency between this measure and current and future EU rules on State aid to the 
coal industry. 
224. The Commission also approved aid for the construction of a 400 MW thermal power 
plant in Latvia201 on the basis of a number of special factors including the effective 
isolation of the Latvian energy market, Latvia's increasing dependence on gas and the 
closure of the Lithuanian Ignalina nuclear power plant at the end of 2009. In addition 
the competitive selection process would minimise the aid and limit distortions of 
competition. 
225. Similarly, the Commission authorised a Dutch scheme using tax deductions to 
encourage investment in the exploration and exploitation of small, marginal gas 
fields on the Dutch continental shelf in the North Sea202. The Commission found that 
the measure increases the supply of natural gas and as such enhances the delivery 
security in the Netherlands and, on a wider scale, for a number of countries within 
the EU which import Dutch gas. The Commission also approved State aid amounting 
to EUR 390 million for the construction or capacity increase of four underground gas 
storage sites in Poland as a project of common European interest203, these projects 
positively contributing to the security of supply in Poland and in the EU. 
226. The Commission cleared EEPR support combined with a government guarantee for 
the construction of an undersea electricity interconnection between Malta and Sicily 
                                                 
198 Case N178/2010 Preferential dispatch of indigenous coal plants (OJ C 312, 17.11.2010, p. 6) 
199 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (OJ L 176, 
15.7.2003, p. 37)  
200 Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (OJ C 297, 29.11.2005, 
p. 4)  
201 Case N675/2009 Tender for Aid for New Electricity Generation Capacity (OJ C 213, 6.8.2010, p. 1) 
202 Case N718/2009 Development of marginal offshore gas fields (OJ C 270, 6.10.2010, p. 1) 
203 Case N660/2009 Aid to PGNiG for underground gas storage in Poland (OJ C 213, 6.8.2010, p. 10) 
 EN 64   EN 
and an extension of its 132 kV network to integrate the interconnection204. The 
Commission found that the measure did not constitute State aid since the European 
funds from the EEPR do not constitute State aid and the guarantee was priced at 
market terms. 
227. The Commission opened an in-depth investigation into Maltese aid to the energy 
incumbent intended to bring the Delimara Power Station in early compliance with 
emission standards laid down by EU environmental law205. The Commission raised 
doubts on the security of supply arguments brought forward by Malta and, moreover, 
the planned aid does not seem in line with the rules of the environmental aid 
guidelines.  
228. An Italian scheme designed to remunerate industrial companies for the provision of 
instant interruptibility services (i.e. the acceptance of power cuts to avoid black outs 
for other consumers) in Sardinia and Sicily206 was considered not to involve State aid 
because the remuneration will be established through public tenders open to a wide 
range of companies. The scheme aims to provide a transitory solution to continuity 
of supply problems identified by the network operator linked to the inadequate 
interconnection with the mainland, obsolete power plants which are prone to outages 
and a high proportion of wind-power generation. 
229. Furthermore, the Commission cleared a State aid scheme aimed at compensating 
power generators for certain costs resulting from the termination of long-term power 
purchase agreements in Hungary (so-called stranded costs)207. 
C – INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
1.1. Telecommunications 
230. Communication technologies ranging from the basic telephone service to the latest 
satellite systems and personal area networks are converging, allowing the delivery of 
increasingly powerful Information Society services. This convergence stimulates 
growth – electronic communications services account for about 2.5-3% of European 
GDP. The social impact of telecommunications has concurrently become significant 
– for example, the facts that there are more than 250 million daily internet users in 
Europe and that virtually all Europeans own mobile phones has changed the 
European life style. 
231. As a part of the Europe 2020 Strategy208, the Commission launched on 26 August a 
Flagship Initiative on a Digital Agenda for Europe209. The European Digital Agenda 
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notes, among other things, that the current economic crisis wiped out years of 
economic and social progress in the digital market. It sets out the Commission's 
priorities in the field of the digital economy and highlights the creation of a single 
market for content and telecom services as a vital tool to turn this development 
around. In particular, it puts forward the Commission's objective to bring to near zero 
the difference between roaming and national tariffs by 2015. It also sets ambitious 
target for fast and ultra-fast internet access in Europe. 
232. In 2010, more effective competition due to competition law enforcement, sector 
regulation, technological developments and new business models resulted in lower 
prices for electronic communication services and innovative service offers. A 
Commission report released on 1 June 2010210 shows that EU telecom markets have 
become more competitive thanks to the Commission's guidance in the consultation 
and review process under the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications211 (known as the "Article 7 procedure"). 
233. Providers of electronic communications services are bound to operate within this 
framework which is designed to facilitate access to legacy infrastructure, foster 
investment in alternative network infrastructure and bring choice and lower prices for 
consumers. Article 7 of the Framework Directive gives the Commission power to 
oversee draft national regulatory measures through a consultation at EU level. This 
ensures consistent regulation and brings more transparency into the regulatory 
process. Ex ante regulation under the Regulatory Framework builds on competition 
law principles. 
234. As regards retail competition, the trend towards lower prices for electronic 
communications services persisted and the market for traditional fixed voice 
telephony continued to decline. In the mobile voice markets, penetration increased 
again, while growth of revenues slowed down. 
235. There has been an increase in the deployment of optical fibre networks to provide 
very high bandwidth broadband internet services in many Member States. Gradual 
availability of very high bandwidth will allow content providers to market new 
broadband applications and services. The emergence of new contents and services 
creates a desire for further increase in bandwidth, even where it is not profitable for 
market operators to offer access, e.g. in remote and sparsely populated areas. This 
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often triggers use of public funding; therefore numerous aid schemes have been 
motivated in the past by the need to follow the above evolution. Public intervention 
in some Member States is now gradually shifting towards support for very high 
speed broadband networks, the so-called "next generation access" (NGA) networks. 
1.2. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
236. The ICT sector accounts for 5-6% of EU GDP. It is characterised by digital 
convergence and the concomitant growing importance of interoperability and 
standards. Efficient ICT products and services are a key contributor to the smart 
growth put forward as a major objective of the Europe 2020 Strategy. In order for the 
EU to fully take advantage of the potential of the digital economy, it is essential to 
preserve the opportunity of new firms to enter the market and challenge established 
players. The Commission therefore carefully scrutinised in 2010 allegedly anti-
competitive business practices of dominant market players highlighted by its ongoing 
investigation of IBM practices212. In the context of its investigation of Google 
practices213, the Commission has also started to look into new web based services 
such as search services which have experienced a considerable increase in popularity 
during the last years and are of crucial importance to a competitive online 
marketplace. 
237. Due to the fast evolution of digital markets the Commission's regulatory activities in 
the ICT sector are increasingly challenged by the emergence of new business 
environments such as "cloud computing", which is aimed at integrating 
communication, data storage, data management and application services for 
businesses, or mobile eco-systems providing users with all the services they need in 
one device. To ensure that multi-sided digital platforms such as application stores 
yield the positive network externalities that they are capable of bringing about, it is 
crucial for them to remain as open as possible, as illustrated by the Commission's 
preliminary investigation into Apple's iPhone related business practices. 
238. Also with regard to increasingly networked services, interoperability and standards 
remain the key issues for competition since they typically favour entry by a greater 
number of players and drive down the costs of innovation. Limiting the availability 
of interoperability information can be used as a technical means to stifle competition 
and therefore warrants careful scrutiny. It is also essential to ensure that standard-
setting procedures work well and that access to standards is available on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. 
1.3. Media 
239. Media is vital for the development of information and communication technologies 
as well as for the development and preservation of culture, information, education 
and democracy. The European media industry generated total revenues of over EUR 
180 billion in 2009214. 
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240. Access to attractive content is a key for media development and innovation. As 
highlighted in the Commission's Digital Agenda for Europe, access to attractive 
content is restricted by the fact that Europe is still a patchwork of national markets 
which results in the complex licensing of content. A key priority of the Digital Single 
Market pillar of the Digital Agenda set by the Commission is to simplify copyright 
clearance and cross-border licensing of content. 
241. The two general trends in the media sector which were identified in the Report on 
Competition Policy 2009215 continued in 2010. First, the multiplication of 
distribution platforms, ongoing technological development, and changing 
consumption patterns are transforming the traditional market roles and power 
structures between market players in the television, music and book sectors. This 
transformation of the marketplace will lead to increased competition and business 
uncertainty, which in turn will lead to pressure upon these players to secure their 
positions in the new digital marketplace. 
242. Second, media convergence216 will create conditions conducive to entry by more 
efficient market players with new business models seeking to offer new products and 
services at competitive prices. These efficient market players will seek to maximize 
efficiencies resulting from online technological advances enabling offerings on a 
multi-language, multi-country basis and will no longer be constrained by 
technologies tied to physical presence on national territories. Potential competition 
issues resulting from these trends will generally fall into three categories: (i) 
availability of attractive content, (ii) access and digitisation issues (including 
copyright bottlenecks) and (iii) challenges posed by new revenue-generating models 
(monetisation issue).  
243. The switch from analogue to digital broadcasting, which Member States are due to 
complete by the beginning of 2012217, concerns all commonly available broadcasting 
transmission platforms. A number of Member States are providing public funding to 
encourage broadcasters and consumers to facilitate the switchover. The Commission 
has no general objection to the granting of State aid in this area. However, the 
General Court confirmed in a judgment of 10 June 2010 that Member States have to 
demonstrate in particular that the aid is neutral regarding the technology 
employed218.  
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Policy developments in telecommunications sector 
244. In 2010, the Commission received 136 notifications from National Regulatory 
Authorities and adopted 91 comments letters and 32 no-comments letters within the 
Community consultation mechanism under Article 7 of the Framework Directive. 
Eight notifications were withdrawn by the notifying NRA, whereas four cases were 
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still open at the end of 2010. In one of these notifications, the Commission raised 
serious doubts as to the compatibility of the notified measures with EU law and 
opened a second phase investigation under Article 7(4) of the Framework Directive. 
The measures were later on withdrawn by NRA in phase II. Two cases notified in 
2009 where closed in 2010 by veto (PL/2009/1019-1020).  
2.1.1. Antitrust enforcement 
245. In the Telekomunikacja Polska case219, the Commission sent a Statement of 
Objections to the Polish telecoms incumbent operator on 1 March 2010, in which it 
came to the preliminary conclusion that Telekomunikacja Polska had infringed 
Article 102 by abusing its dominant position in refusing to supply remunerated 
access to its wholesale broadband services.  
2.1.2. Merger control 
246. The T-Mobile / Orange case220 concerning the merger of France Télécom's and 
Deutsche Telekom's UK subsidiaries highlighted the importance of spectrum 
ownership in the development of 4G networks. The investigation showed that the 
parties' combined contiguous spectrum could result in the new entity being the only 
mobile network operator (MNO) in the UK able to offer next-generation mobile data 
services through long term evolution technology at the best possible speeds in the 
medium term. The clearance decision of 1 March 2010 was conditional upon 
divestiture of a quarter of the parties' combined spectrum in the 1800 MHz band and 
the amendment of the Radio Access Network221 sharing agreement with 3UK, 
another MNO, to ensure that the competitive constraint exercised by the latter would 
not be eliminated as a result of the proposed transaction. 
2.1.3. State aid control 
247. The Commission stated in the European Digital Agenda its objective to reach fast 
broadband coverage (at least 30 Mbps) for all European citizens and ultra-fast 
broadband (above 100 Mbps) subscriptions for at least 50% of European households 
by 2020. The Commission thus takes a favourable view as regards aid measures 
having the objective to provide adequate broadband coverage at affordable prices for 
all European citizens. In its assessment of public funding schemes under the State aid 
rules, the Commission acknowledges that private operators may not have sufficient 
market incentives to provide adequate broadband services, typically in rural and 
remote areas. The Commission has built up a clear and consistent State aid policy in 
the last years and authorises properly justified and proportionate broadband schemes 
if the distortion of competition and the effect on trade is limited, on the basis of the 
Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid 
deployment of broadband networks (Broadband Guidelines)222. 
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248. In 2010, the Commission assessed and approved the use of State aid and other types 
of public funding of approximately EUR 1.8 billion in Europe which could generate 
total investments in broadband networks of up to EUR 3.5 billion. The schemes 
increasingly address the rollout of, and the upgrade of existing broadband 
infrastructure to very high speed broadband networks. 
249. Member States may also qualify and design the operation of a broadband network as 
a service of general economic interest (SGEI). In this regard, the Commission 
approved the public financing of the rollout of a NGA network in Estonia223. The 
Commission concluded that the public funding constituted State aid, but in the form 
of a compensation for performing a SGEI. 
2.2. Policy developments in ICT sector 
2.2.1 Antitrust enforcement 
Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements and standardisation 
250. Standards are of particular importance for the ICT sector. In the fast evolving digital 
economy, the swift establishment of technical specifications for ICT products and 
services is critical to satisfy the constantly decreasing time-to-market. Given that the 
ICT sector is prone to network effects, successful products and services can easily 
become the platform for further product development and innovation. Against this 
background, the Commission sought to provide more guidance on standardisation 
agreements in the framework of its review of the regime for the assessment of 
horizontal cooperation agreements under the EU competition rules (see Section 
I.B.1.1.2., points 39 to 41).  
251. A public consultation on these revised rules was held between 4 May and 25 June 
2010224. The chapter on standardisation agreements turned out to be of utmost 
interest to the participating stakeholders of which about two thirds provided 
comments. While the majority of stakeholders welcomed the additional guidance on 
standardisation, further clarification was required in particular with regard to the IPR 
policy standard setting organisations could implement in line with competition rules. 
252. To this end, the new Horizontal Guidelines225 identify some minimum requirements 
that must be met to ensure that the positive effects of standardisation can fully 
materialise. The standard-setting process should be transparent and accessible to all 
interested market players. In addition, holders of intellectual property rights are 
encouraged to commit to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
(FRAND commitment) and effectively adhere thereto to ensure accessibility of the 
standard. 
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Cases developments 
253. On 26 July 2010, the Commission initiated formal antitrust investigations against 
IBM Corporation based on two different alleged infringements of EU antitrust rules 
related to the abuse of a dominant position226. Both potential infringements are 
related to IBM's conduct on the market for mainframe computers. Mainframes are 
powerful computers which are used by many large companies and government 
institutions worldwide to store and process critical business information. It is 
estimated that the vast majority of corporate data worldwide resides on mainframes. 
The first part of the Commission's investigation follows complaints by emulator 
software vendors T3 and TurboHercules, and focuses on IBM's alleged tying of 
mainframe hardware to its mainframe operating system. The complaints contend that 
the tying shuts out providers of emulation technology which could enable the users to 
run critical applications on non-IBM hardware. The second part of the investigation 
was initiated on the Commission's own initiative and focuses on IBM's alleged 
exclusionary practices towards competing suppliers of mainframe maintenance 
services. 
254. In spring 2010, the Commission launched two parallel preliminary investigations into 
Apple's business practices relating to the iPhone227. Apple had made warranty repairs 
service available only in the country where the iPhone was bought, which made the 
exercise of warranty rights throughout the EU/EEA difficult and could have 
potentially led to a partitioning of the EU/EEA market. At the same time, Apple had 
restricted the terms and conditions of its licence agreement with independent 
developers of iPhone applications (apps) requiring the use of Apple's native 
programming tools and approved software languages to the detriment of third-party 
software. This could have ultimately resulted in shutting out competition from 
applications developed for running on other than Apple's mobile platforms. In 
September, Apple decided to introduce cross-border iPhone warranty repair services 
within the EU/EEA and to relax the restrictions on the development tools for iPhone 
apps giving developers more flexibility. The Commission therefore decided to close 
both investigations without opening formal proceedings. 
255. On 30 November 2010, the Commission initiated formal proceedings against 
Google228 with a view to further investigating allegations that Google has abused a 
dominant market position in online search, online advertising and online advertising 
intermediation. The Commission's probe focuses in essence on the following 
allegations. First, the Commission is investigating whether Google has lowered the 
ranking of unpaid search results of competing services which are specialised in 
providing users with specific online content such as price comparisons (so-called 
vertical search services). Second, whether Google has accorded preferential 
placement to the results of its own vertical search services in order to shut out 
competing services. Third, the Commission is looking into allegations that Google 
has lowered the "Quality Score", one of the factors that determine the price paid to 
Google by advertisers, for sponsored links of competing vertical search services. 
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Fourth, the Commission's investigation focuses on allegations that Google has 
imposed exclusivity obligations on advertising partners, preventing them from 
placing certain types of competing ads on their web sites, as well as on distribution 
partners such as computer and software vendors, with the aim of shutting out 
competing search tools. Finally, the Commission's probe also covers alleged 
restrictions on the portability of online advertising campaign data to competing 
online advertising platforms.  
256. On 16 December 2009, the Commission made legally binding Microsoft's 
commitments to address the competition concerns raised in a Statement of 
Objections in January 2009 relating to the tying of Microsoft's Internet Explorer web 
browser to its dominant client PC operating system, Windows229. Microsoft 
committed (i) to distribute a Choice Screen software update to users of Windows 
client PC operating systems within the EEA that offers users an unbiased choice 
between the most widely used web browsers, and (ii) to make available a mechanism 
in Windows 7 and subsequent versions of Windows in the EEA enabling PC 
manufacturers and end users to turn Internet Explorer on and off. In 2010, as 
foreseen in the Commitment decision, Microsoft sent to the Commission the first two 
reports on the implementation of the Choice Screen. By the end of November 2010, 
the Choice Screen had been seen more than 270 million times, and more than 
84 million web browsers had been downloaded through it. 
2.2.2. Merger control 
257. On 21 January, the Commission cleared the planned acquisition of Sun Microsystems 
by Oracle Corporation, the leading proprietary database software vendor230. One of 
the complex issues raised by the case was how to assess the competitive effect of 
open source software products, such as Sun's database MySQL. Following a second 
phase investigation into the database software market, the Commission concluded 
that the transaction would not lead to a significant impediment to effective 
competition. The Commission's investigation showed that although MySQL and 
Oracle compete in some segments of the database market, they are not close 
competitors in others, such as the high-end segment. Furthermore, another open 
source database, PostgreSQL, was considered by many users as a credible alternative 
to MySQL, and could be expected to replace to some extent the competitive force 
exerted by MySQL. Given the specificities of the open source software industry, the 
Commission also took into account the open source nature of MySQL, as well as 
certain public announcements made by Oracle concerning issues such as the 
continued release of future versions of MySQL under the General Public License 
(open source license).  
258. In the Microsoft / Yahoo! Search Business case231 cleared on 18 February 2010, the 
Commission analysed the dynamic online search market. The case concerned the 
acquisition by Microsoft of Yahoo's internet search and the search advertising 
businesses. The investigation revealed that market participants expected the 
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transaction to increase competition in internet search and search advertising. The 
Commission cleared the concentration unconditionally. 
259. On 29 March 2010, the Commission conditionally approved the acquisition of 
Tandberg by Cisco232. The investigation revealed concerns regarding the market for 
high-end videoconference products due to interoperability issues between the merged 
entity's solutions and those of its competitors. The decision was conditional notably 
upon the divestment of the telepresence interoperability protocol developed by Cisco 
for its videoconference solutions to an independent industry body to ensure 
interoperability and allow other vendors to participate in the development of the 
protocol. The Commission actively cooperated with the US Department of Justice on 
this case to identify suitable remedies. 
2.3. Policy developments in the Media and Sport sector 
2.3.1. Antitrust and regulatory enforcement 
260. The Commission's main objective from a competition perspective is to ensure a level 
playing field in the media sector, and that the opportunities created by digitization for 
firms seeking to offer new and more efficient products and services to European 
consumers at competitive prices are not artificially blocked. 
261. The Commission continued to closely monitor the transition from analogue to digital 
broadcasting in the EU Member States. In September 2010, in the context of the 
ongoing infringement procedure concerning the Italian broadcasting legislation, the 
Italian Authority for Communications (AGCom) adopted criteria and rules aimed at 
ensuring that more frequencies resulting from the "digital dividend" are assigned to 
newcomers and smaller existing companies. The tender for such frequencies will 
likely be launched in 2011 through a beauty contest procedure meant to take into 
account both quantitative and qualitative criteria.  
262. Moreover, on 24 November 2010, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to 
the French authorities regarding the 2007 French law which had granted to the 
existing analogue TV broadcasters the possibility to obtain an additional national TV 
channel at the date of the digital switchover. The Commission considered that, in the 
absence of convincing evidence that such TV broadcasters obtained the additional 
channels based on objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate 
criteria required by Directive 2002/77233, the French law appeared to be in breach of 
EU law. 
263. In the area of sport, the Commission closed a preliminary investigation in June 2010 
into two cases related to rules of handball federations234 and based on complaints by 
the Spanish handball league and a group of handball clubs. The complainants 
alleged, among others, that the rules of the European Handball Federation and the 
International Handball Federations on the release of players for matches of the 
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national teams playing in international competitions were in breach of Article 101 
and 102. Prompted by the Commission's preliminary investigation, the European 
handball stakeholders sought an amicable solution, eventually agreed in May 2010.  
2.3.2 Merger control 
264. The ProSiebenSat.1 / RTL interactive / JV case235 dealt with the increasing 
convergence between TV and the Internet. ProSiebenSat.1 and RTL planned to 
create an Internet catch-up-TV platform allowing consumers to watch repeats of TV 
programmes free-of-charge. On 24 September 2010, the Commission referred the 
case to the Austrian and German competition authorities at their request.  
265. In December 2010, the Commission cleared the acquisition by News Corporation of 
the UK pay-TV operator British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB)236. The Commission 
assessed in particular whether the transaction could lead to anticompetitive effects of 
a vertical and conglomerate nature (such as input or customer foreclosure, bundling 
or tying) in the audiovisual sector, in newspaper publishing and in advertising. The 
Commission concluded that the transaction would not lead to a significant 
impediment to effective competition. The Commission's findings concern solely the 
competition aspects of the transaction. They are without prejudice to the 
investigation by the competent UK authorities of whether the proposed transaction is 
compatible with the UK interest in media plurality.  
2.3.3. State aid control 
Public Service Broadcasting 
266. In line with the interpretative Protocol No 29 on the system of public service 
broadcasting in the Member States, annexed to the TEU and the TFEU, the 
Commission recognises that it is the prerogative of Member States to organise the 
functioning and funding of public service broadcasting. The objective of the 
Commission's policy is to ensure that public funding does not exceed what is 
necessary for public broadcasters to fulfil their public service mission and does not 
lead to unnecessary distortions of competition. 
267. The Commission continued to approve State financing for public service 
broadcasters where both the public service remit and the financing are determined in 
full transparency and where the State funding does not exceed what is necessary to 
fulfil the public service mission. On 26 January 2010, the Commission closed the 
investigation into the existing financing regime for the Dutch public service 
broadcasters, following amendments made to this regime and formal commitments 
by the Netherlands regarding the definition of the public service remit and in 
particular the entrustment of the broadcasters with new audiovisual services in line 
with the Amsterdam Protocol237. On 20 July 2010, the Commission closed with a 
positive decision the formal investigations into the new system of financing public 
service broadcasters in France and Spain in view of the phasing out of advertising by 
these chains. The Commission assessed concerns regarding a potential over-
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compensation by the envisaged measures and the way the public broadcasters will in 
the future be financed from taxes on telecom operators and on commercial television 
companies238. 
State aid for films 
268. As in previous years, there were several State aid decisions approving film support 
schemes. Some of the schemes were designed to attract major film productions. The 
Commission also authorized aid for various audiovisual productions of Austrian 
commercial and non-commercial broadcasters other than the public service 
broadcasters, under condition that these productions qualify as a cultural product239.  
D – PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY & HEALTH 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
269. Health care is an important economic sector representing about 9% of EU GDP, 
comprising the pharmaceutical sector for prescription and non prescription medicines 
(close to 2% of EU GDP) and the health services (6.5%)240. Other expenses, e.g. for 
medical devices and other health products, account for the remaining 0.5% of EU 
GDP. The health care sector is essential for the welfare of European citizens who 
need access to innovative, safe and affordable health products and services. 
270. Member States bear directly or indirectly the largest share of the costs for the 
provision of health care whereas patients pay directly out of their pockets over 11% 
of the costs, equivalent to EUR 122 billion per year. Total expenditures on healthcare 
are rising faster than economic growth in EU Member States, leading to an 
increasing ratio of health spending to GDP. Moreover, several structural factors 
contribute to the further increase of health care costs in the future: increased costs of 
medical services through technological change, higher expectations of patients 
regarding quality of treatment and ageing of the European population. 
271. The recent economic downturn further accentuated the increase in the ratio of health 
spending to GDP while public budgets underwent significant constraints. A number 
of Member States therefore took measures to reduce health care costs, in particular in 
the pharmaceutical sector, such as unilateral price cuts of up to 27% in Greece. 
Moreover, price increases for health services have been increasingly charged for 
directly to patients inter alia through higher co-payments. This has potentially 
negative effects on consumer welfare and even possibly on health status, an issue 
which triggered a number of NCA-led initiatives241.  
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272. In order to adjust to the challenges raised by the health care sector, DG Competition 
has integrated its antitrust activities regarding all health care sectors in a new unit 
operating under the title "Antitrust: Pharma and Health services", responsible for the 
enforcement of competition law for all health products and services. The mandate of 
the European Competition Network Pharma subgroup was also extended to cover 
health services and health products others than pharmaceuticals.  
1.1. Overview of the pharmaceutical sector 
273. The pharmaceutical sector is highly regulated and R&D driven. On the supply side, 
originator companies aim to bring innovative products to the market. The patent 
system provides the legislative framework allowing the companies to reap the 
benefits of their successful R&D activities. Upon loss of patent exclusivity, generic 
companies enter the market with bio-equivalent versions of the originator products, 
however at much lower prices. This contributes to keep public budgets under control 
and gives originator companies incentives to develop new proprietary drugs. 
274. Price setting for pharmaceuticals falls into national competences under EU law. 
Many Member States introduced, or reflected upon, measures reducing the prices and 
encouraging the use of generic medicines. Within this context, the Court of Justice 
confirmed by its judgment of 22 April 2010242 a UK scheme that provides incentives 
for doctors to prescribe with preference similar medicines within the same 
therapeutic class (e.g. generic products). The Court of Justice rejected the argument 
that the UK scheme would be illegal under the EU law, as it would amount to a 
commercial promotion of medicines243. Moreover, no danger to public health was 
established, since all medicines are constantly reviewed by health authorities. 
However, the Court required that national schemes must not discriminate between 
national medicines and those of other Member States and that Member States make 
public, inter alia, the therapeutic evaluations relating to such schemes.  
275. Many patent protected blockbuster (i.e. with high sales volumes) drugs will loose 
exclusivity in the years to come, which will be a challenge for the originator 
industry, in particular if they are not able to find and develop new innovative 
products. This gives originator companies incentives to defend the revenue of 
existing blockbusters against approaching generic entry and contributes to the overall 
trend of industry consolidation. Consolidation has been taking place in all forms: 
acquisition of generic and originator (including biotech) companies by other 
originator companies, as well as mergers between generic companies. 
1.2. Overview of the health services sector 
276. The organisation of the health care sector is primarily the responsibility of Member 
States under Article 168 TFEU. However, to the extent that the activities in question 
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Products Regulatory Agency [2010] ECR 
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on the Community code relating to medicinal product for human use (OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p. 67-128) 
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involve offering goods or services on the market244, the provision of health care 
services is generally subject to EU competition rules.  
277. Health services are mainly provided on a national or even local scale. The service 
providers are very often small or medium-sized undertakings such as physicians, 
pharmacists and hospitals. They are usually organised in professional associations 
with mandatory membership (i.e. being a member of such association is a 
precondition for entering the market). As a consequence of different regulations in 
Member States, the competitive environment may vary across Member States. 
Generally, a market entry of a health services provider in another Member State 
seems more burdensome than in many other services sectors, possibly due to the high 
degree of regulation and control on the basis of national public policy. 
278. The Council of Ministers adopted on 13 September 2010 its first-reading position on 
a draft Directive concerning the application of patients´ rights in cross-border health 
care245. The proposed Directive would provide more clarity about possibilities to 
seek and be reimbursed for healthcare in another Member State and also foster 
cooperation in areas such as health technology assessment or cross-border 
recognition of medical prescriptions. The Directive can increase the intra-community 
competition between health service providers in certain areas. Although the vast 
majority of EU patients receive healthcare in their own country, they may prefer to 
seek certain types of healthcare abroad (for example for highly specialized care 
where access, quality and price are of importance for the patient concerned). 
279. The main antitrust issues identified so far include practices of national associations 
of healthcare professionals, such as recommendations of minimum prices, 
influencing market behaviour of their members or certain exclusionary practices. The 
fact that professional associations are often entrusted with tasks in the public interest 
does not exclude them from scrutiny under competition rules. As for the effect of 
such practices on trade between Member States, the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice confirms that practices extending over the whole of the territory of a Member 
State have, by their very nature, the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets 
on a national basis and may therefore affect intra-Union trade246. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Policy developments in the pharmaceutical sector 
280. Following the conclusion of the inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector in 2009247, the 
Commission's focus shifted in 2010 to the implementation of the policy 
recommendations. Apart from enforcement action under EU competition law, the 
Commission announced that it would examine a possible revision of Council 
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Directive 89/105/EEC248 (the so-called Transparency Directive) setting minimum 
rules for pricing and reimbursement procedures. The review will examine ways to 
improve the transparency of such measures and to avoid market access delays linked 
to pricing and reimbursement procedures, in particular for generic medicines. 
Commission proposals will be based on an extensive impact assessment and are 
foreseen by end 2011. 
281. The sector inquiry also contributed to the momentum towards the adoption of the 
Community patent and the specialised patent litigation system in Europe as 
advocated and proposed by the Commission. On 10 December 2010 the Council 
indicated that an enhanced cooperation, as provided for in the EU treaty, is the only 
option for moving ahead on the creation of a unified EU patent system. The 
Commission submitted such a proposal on 14 December 2010249. The advantage of 
this approach is that those Member States willing to go ahead with the patent reform 
can do so, whilst the others can join in at a later stage if they wish. 
282. The discussions in Council and Parliament on other legislative proposals concerning 
the pharmaceutical sector are ongoing, in particular regarding the pharmaceutical 
package consisting of the fight against counterfeits, pharmacovigilance (the process 
and science of monitoring the safety of medicines and taking action to reduce their 
risks and increase their benefits) and information to patients.  
283. Finally, a number of Member States have taken up recommendations from the sector 
inquiry on improving market access for generic medicines, for instance through 
accelerated approval procedure or through prohibition for national bodies to link 
market approval or pricing and reimbursement status for generic medicines to the 
patent status of the originator reference product – the so-called patent linkage. This 
shows that the sector inquiry also produced important results at national level. 
2.1.1. Antitrust enforcement 
Monitoring of patent settlements 
284. As a follow up to the sector inquiry, the Commission started the monitoring of patent 
settlements in the EU250. The first monitoring report identified three types of patent 
settlements potentially raising competition concerns: (i) those based on a sham or 
unmeritous patent, (ii) those containing restrictions going beyond the exclusionary 
zone of the patent ("out of scope settlements") and (iii) those limiting generic entry 
and containing a net value transfer from the originator to the generic company. The 
monitoring exercise showed that the number of patent settlements in the 
pharmaceutical sector that are potentially problematic fell to 10% of total patent 
settlements in the sector in the period from July 2008 to December 2009 compared 
with 22% in the period covered by the sector inquiry (January 2000 – June 2008). 
Also the level of direct value transfers foreseen in the settlements decreased from 
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more than EUR 200 million recorded in the sector inquiry period to less than EUR 
1 million in total in the period covered by the first monitoring. The overall number of 
patent settlements nonetheless increased, showing that companies are not prevented 
from concluding settlements by the Commission's ongoing enforcement action. The 
Commission will continue monitoring patent settlements in 2011. 
Cases developments 
285. As a follow up to the sector inquiry, different enforcement actions under EU 
competition law are under way. Amongst others, the Commission is investigating 
patent settlement agreements concluded by Servier and a number of generic 
operators for the hypertension drug perindopril251. Unrelated to this investigation, the 
Commission issued a Statement of Objections against Servier in July 2010, stating its 
preliminary view that Servier had submitted incorrect and misleading information in 
reply to a simple request for information in the context of the sector inquiry252.  
286. The Commission also opened formal proceeding against the Danish pharmaceutical 
undertaking Lundbeck253 to examine potential breaches of Articles 101 and 102. This 
investigation relates to its antidepressant drug citalopram and concerns among others 
potentially anticompetitive patent settlements. 
287. In 2010, the Commission also carried out surprise inspections at the premises of a 
number of pharmaceutical companies and continued investigations on inspections 
which had been carried out in 2009. 
288. On 1 July 2010, the General Court largely confirmed the decision of the Commission 
taken in the AstraZeneca case in 2005254. In this decision, the Commission had 
imposed a fine of EUR 60 million on the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca for 
having abused its dominant position in the market of proton pump inhibitors by (i) 
misusing the patent system and (ii) by selectively withdrawing marketing 
authorisations for its product Losec in certain Member States with the sole purpose 
of preventing or delaying generic market entry. The Court confirmed the assessment 
of the market and AstraZeneca's dominance by the Commission. The judgment also 
contains very important clarifications on the relationship between exclusive rights 
(such as intellectual property rights) and EU competition law. The General Court 
declared that the submission to public authorities of misleading information liable to 
lead them into error and therefore to make possible the grant of an exclusive right to 
which an undertaking is not entitled, or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, 
constitutes a practice falling outside the scope of competition on the merits which 
may be particularly restrictive of competition. Moreover, the Court found that, in so 
far as an undertaking in a dominant position is granted an unlawful exclusive right as 
a result of an error, it is required, at the very least, to inform the public authorities of 
this so as to enable them to rectify those irregularities. However, the Court reduced 
the fine to EUR 52.5 million in view of limited effects on parallel trade. The 
judgment is under appeal. 
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289. For a number of National Competition Authorities (NCAs) the pharmaceutical sector 
has also become a priority sector. For instance, in the UK, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) issued a Statement of Objections to Reckitt Benckiser in February 2010 which 
admitted the infringement and agreed to pay a fine of GBP 10.2 million255. 
According to the OFT, the pharmaceutical company withdrew one of its products 
(Gaviscon Original Liquid) from the National Health Service (NHS) list of 
prescription drugs after the patent had expired, but before the publication of the 
generic name for it so that more prescriptions would be issued for its alternative 
product Gaviscon Advance Liquid. Pharmacies that receive prescriptions for 
Gaviscon Advance Liquid must dispense it, as it is patent protected and there are no 
generic equivalent medicines. The company received a GBP 1.8 million reduction for 
agreeing to cooperate with the OFT during the investigation, admitting the 
infringement of UK and EU competition law.  
290. The Italian NCA recently opened a formal investigation against the originator 
company Pfizer over a potential abuse of the patent system by artificially prolonging 
patent protection for the drug latanoprost aimed at delaying generic entry. 
2.1.2. Merger control 
291. The trend of consolidation in the pharmaceutical sector continued in both the 
originator and the generic segment of the market. The main cases that were examined 
were Abbott / Solvay Pharmaceuticals256, Teva / Ratiopharm257 and Novartis / 
Alcon258. These cases were cleared in the first phase with commitments. 
292. The Abbott / Solvay Pharmaceuticals case involved two originator companies active 
in pharmaceutical and in vitro diagnostics markets. In light of concerns arising in 
cystic fibrosis diagnostics products, parties committed to the divestment of Solvay's 
entire EEA cystic fibrosis diagnostics business. The Teva / Ratiopharm case involved 
the acquisition by the largest generic company in the world of a strong European 
generic company. Despite both companies having a wide portfolio of products, 
concerns arose only in a limited number of areas, primarily in the Netherlands. In 
light of these concerns, the commitment entailed, in the first place, the divestment of 
Ratiopharm's respective products. As an alternative divestment in the Netherlands, 
the commitment also included the entire Ratiopharm business in case a suitable 
buyer was not found for the initial divestment products. The Novartis / Alcon case 
involved the acquisition by a global pharmaceutical company of a global medical 
specialty company focused on eye care. Although the acquisition was largely 
complementary, it raised competition concerns in a broad range of national markets 
for ophthalmic pharmaceuticals and consumer vision care products. In light of these 
concerns, the commitment primarily entailed the divestment of a number of Novartis' 
products on an EEA wide or national basis. 
293. Given that pharmaceutical companies are often active worldwide, the procedures 
involved cooperation with other competition authorities around the world. In 
particular, the Commission coordinated with the US federal Trade Commission work 
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on the Novartis / Alcon case since both US and EU markets were significantly 
impacted by the merger. 
2.2. Policy developments in the health services sector 
2.2.1 Antitrust enforcement 
294. The Commission adopted its first antitrust decision in the health services market 
imposing a fine of EUR 5 million on the French Association of Pharmacists 
(ONP)259. In its decision, the Commission condemned the market behaviour of ONP 
in the French market for clinical laboratory testing. The Commission established that 
ONP limited possible price reductions (through rebates) for clinical testing and 
restricted the development and growth of certain (larger) groups of laboratories with 
a view to protecting the economic interests of the majority of its members. The 
Commission established in particular that the prices for comparable services in other 
Member States were considerably lower. 
295. On 26 October 2010, the General Court confirmed that the inspections carried out by 
the Commission in the ONP case were fully compatible with EU law260. ONP had 
claimed that it could not be a rightful addressee of a Commission's inspection 
decision because it lacked legal personality. Furthermore, it was argued by ONP that 
the inspection mandate was drafted too broadly so that the applicants´ rights of 
defence were violated. Finally, ONP and its sections would not be bounded by EU 
competition rules as ONP is entrusted with a public mission and a part of its 
members are not undertakings. The court rejected those arguments and declared the 
inspection decision of the Commission as legal. 
2.2.2 Merger control 
296. Over the course of 2010, the Commission examined a limited number of mergers in 
the health care services sector. Most of them were cleared through simplified 
procedure since they did not raise competition concerns. On 21 May 2010, the 
proposed acquisition by the British investment group 3i of the French Vedici group 
of health care facilities was cleared261 because the vertical relationship between 
Vedici's activities in the hospital care sector and the provision of bio-medical tests by 
the laboratories of Labco SAS, a subsidiary of 3i, was found not to pose a significant 
impediment to effective competition. 
2.2.3 State aid control 
297. The public support granted to the provision of health care services may not be 
considered State aid provided that the strict conditions defined by the Court of 
Justice case law are rigorously complied with262. Should such financial support 
measures constitute State aid, they can nevertheless be declared compatible with the 
internal market pursuant to Article 106(2) if they are necessary and proportionate to 
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fulfil an appropriately entrusted mission of Services of General Economic Interest 
(SGEI), under certain conditions set out in the Commission framework on public 
service compensation263. Furthermore, State aid granted to hospitals providing 
medical care to be qualified as SGEI is covered by the block exemption contained in 
the 2005 Commission decision on public service compensation264, regardless of the 
turnover made by such hospitals and the level of the compensation they receive. 
Pursuant to case law265, Member States enjoy a wide margin of discretion regarding 
the definition and entrustment of SGEI, and also the determination of the cost 
compensation. The control exercised by the Commission and other EU institutions in 
this regard is therefore limited to verifying the existence of a manifest error in the 
way the Member State uses its wide margin of discretion.  
298. During 2010, the Commission examined a number of complaints lodged by private 
health service providers acting on the relevant markets in competition with public 
operators, in particular concerning hospital and home care. Most of the complaints 
on subsidies for hospitals and home care providers came from operators in Member 
States with health care markets more open to competition (e.g. Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands). Many such complaints were filed by private hospitals 
or private health care associations against their allegedly unfair treatment or against 
allegedly excessive compensation of publicly-owned hospitals in various Member 
States, the latter often being subject to allegations of cross-subsidising commercial 
activities from public financing they received. 
299. The Commission assessed whether the corresponding activities qualified as economic 
or non-economic activities, and examined the definition and entrustment of the 
respective public service missions and the necessity and proportionality of the 
compensation received by the beneficiaries (such as public hospitals), as well as the 
absence of cross-subsidisation and compliance with EU transparency 
requirements266. Practice again highlighted that the main challenges for national 
authorities continued to be the establishment of transparent entrustment acts which 
precisely define public services and their public funding and the accurate separation 
of accounts between public and commercial services. The Commission thus required 
appropriate amendments where necessary. 
300. At the end of 2009, the Commission adopted a decision concerning the public 
financing granted in favour of the public hospitals in the Brussels Region 
(Belgium)267 following a State aid complaint by two Belgian associations 
representing the leading private hospitals operating in the same region. The 
Commission's positive decision found that these public funds were granted for the 
provision of the health and social public service missions entrusted to the public 
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hospitals concerned and were in line with the requirements set out under Article 
106(2). In March 2010, the Commission's decision was challenged by one of the 
original complainants in front of the General Court, and the Court case is currently 
pending268. 
301. The Commission also continued to examine cases involving possible State aid in the 
field of health insurance, in particular in countries with competitive health insurance 
markets. In this context, in July 2010 the Commission approved an extension of the 
risk equalisation scheme applicable to health insurance in the Netherlands269, which 
had been approved by the Commission in 2005. 
E – TRANSPORT 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
302. Transport is an essential component of the European economy. The provision of 
transport services (including storage, warehousing and other auxiliary activities) 
account for about 4-5% of EU GDP and for some 4.4% of the total workforce, more 
than 9.2 million persons270. The transport sector includes passenger transport (~30% 
of value-added from transport and storage), freight transport (~35%) and logistics 
services (~35%). The efficient functioning of the transport sector in Europe 
contributes to the productivity of all economic sectors and is an essential part of the 
strategy towards a more sustainable growth in Europe.  
303. The economic downturn in 2009 had a significant impact on almost all transport 
sectors while 2010 proved to be a year of progressive recovery. By the end of 2010, 
prices in air and maritime transport had largely come back to pre-crisis levels.  
304. Within the EU, the airline liberalisation package of 1992 removed all barriers to 
intra-EU airline mergers. Outside of the EU, the aviation sector is still governed by 
bilateral treaties that prevent or restrict cross-border airline mergers. Because of this 
regulatory landscape, EU airlines tend to consolidate among themselves via mergers 
and acquisitions – which are assessed under the EU Merger Regulation271 – while 
they integrate operations with non-EU airlines via alliances, joint ventures or other 
forms of looser cooperation, which are assessed under Article 101. Airport 
congestion remained a critical issue. In this context, the Commission worked in 2010 
on the revision of the Slot Regulation planned for 2011272. 
305. The inter-EU passenger rail transport market started being liberalised as of 2010, 
with gradual opening up of Member States' markets planned by 2012. Competitors 
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have entered the rail freight market but monopolies still exist both for freight and for 
passenger transport services in many Member States. For new entrants, access to the 
infrastructure and rail-related services, which are often owned and operated by the 
incumbent rail undertaking, is of critical importance273.  
306. As for maritime transport, it has now undergone a full modernisation of its 
competition law framework, bringing it within the generally applicable competition 
rules. This regulatory work was complemented by investigation and enforcement 
actions.  
307. As described above, competition policy challenges in the field of transport differ 
significantly from one modal market to the other. On a general basis, the 
Commission remained vigilant to any signs of crisis cartels, protectionist measures or 
other forms of anticompetitive behaviour. In 2010, the Commission also examined 
proposed mergers – pertaining to a broad spectrum of passenger and freight/cargo 
transport activities, including air, rail, road and maritime transport and logistics, and 
assessed a number of cooperative agreements, with a view to ensuring that such 
market consolidation was not to the detriment of consumers. 
308. As regards State aid, a significant number of rescuing and restructuring measures 
were notified and authorised by the Commission in 2010, in particular in aviation, 
maritime and railway sectors. This increased number of notifications is inter alia 
linked to the consequences of the economic downturn, which worsened the structural 
difficulties encountered by the undertakings concerned. Despite the progressive 
recovery of the sector, this trend is expected to continue in 2011, especially as 
regards airlines.  
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Air transport 
2.1.1. Antitrust enforcement 
309. On 14 July 2010, the Commission made legally binding the commitments274 offered 
by three members of the Oneworld airline alliance, British Airways (BA), American 
Airlines (AA) and Iberia (IB). The commitments were offered in response to the 
Commission's concerns that the planned joint venture between the parties could 
violate EU antitrust rules and harm consumers on transatlantic routes. After a market 
test, the Commission concluded that the commitments offered were suitable to 
remedy the competition concerns. The decision, based on Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003275, does not conclude on whether there was any infringement of EU 
competition rules. It legally binds BA, AA and IB to the commitments offered and 
ends the Commission's investigation. In the event that BA, AA and IB should break 
their commitments, the Commission can impose a fine of up to 10% of each 
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company's total annual turnover without having to prove a violation of the EU 
competition rules. These commitments will be binding on BA, AA and IB for ten 
years. A trustee was appointed to monitor their implementation. Throughout its 
investigation, the Commission has been in close contact with US authorities, in 
particular the US Department of Transportation, which is conducting a parallel 
review under US rules. 
310. The three airlines BA, AA and IB, concluded agreements to involve in extensive 
cooperation in their air passenger services on transatlantic routes between Europe 
and North America. In particular, the parties agreed to coordinate prices, capacity, 
schedules, marketing and sales, as well as to share revenues. The Commission's 
investigation identified competition concerns on five routes from London to the US 
(Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Miami and New-York) and on one route from Madrid to 
Miami. The investigation of the Commission showed that on these routes of concern 
the parties provided overlapping non-stop services and held a strong market position 
protected by high barriers to entry, notably the lack of landing and take-off slots at 
London Heathrow airport. The Commission's concerns related to restriction of 
competition between the parties and between them and third party airlines. The latter 
restriction was likely because of the potential of the parties to limit their competitors' 
access to connecting traffic, which was important for viable operations on the routes 
of concern. 
311. To address the identified competition issues, BA, AA and IB offered the following 
commitments on the routes of concern (i) to release seven daily slot pairs at London 
Heathrow or London Gatwick airports – at the competitor's choice – on four routes of 
concern; (ii) to offer fare combinability agreements (which would enable competitors 
to offer services on the parties' flights); (iii) to offer special pro-rate agreements 
(which would enable competitors to obtain connecting traffic from the parties on 
favourable terms); and (iv) to provide competitors access to the parties' frequent flyer 
programmes. The Commission found these commitments sufficient to enable 
competitors to start new or maintain existing services on the routes of concern.  
312. The close cooperation between the Commission and the US authorities, in particular 
the US Department of Transportation resulted in compatible sets of remedies adopted 
on both sides of the Atlantic. The investigation was particularly important since the 
commitments adopted facilitate additional competition on some of the largest extra-
EU routes to the benefit of air passengers and the European economy. This case 
constitutes a useful precedent for future assessments of cooperation between airlines.  
313. On 16 November 2010, the Commission published a report on the role of alliances in 
the market for transatlantic air services276. This report was the outcome of the 
qualitative phase of the research project jointly launched by the Commission and US 
Department of Transportation (DoT) in 2008. The report examined the competitive 
structures of the airline industries in Europe and the United States and compared the 
respective legal regimes and analytical frameworks applied by the Commission and 
DoT. The report concluded that the competitive structures of the airline industries are 
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similar. Despite important differences in legal regimes, the report found that there is 
scope for the Commission and DoT to work towards the promotion of compatible 
regulatory approaches, as specified in Annex 2 to the EU-US Air Transport 
Agreement, to achieve pro-competitive outcomes for consumers and the airline 
industry. This project marked a step forward in the regulatory cooperation between 
the Commission and DoT. 
2.1.2. Merger control 
314. In 2010, air transport concentrations constituted an important focal point in merger 
control, especially in light of the ongoing industry consolidation. The economic and 
financial crisis caused a sudden and sharp drop in both cargo and passenger traffic, 
and this accelerated the trend towards consolidation in the airline industry, either 
through mergers or the exit of loss-making airlines from the market. These mergers 
allowed some of the larger flag-carriers to consolidate their position as market 
leaders. This development was reflected in an increase in the number of airline 
merger cases that the Commission has had to deal with over the past couple of years. 
315. On 14 July 2010, the Commission cleared the merger between BA and IB following 
a market investigation, which showed that the merged entity will continue to face 
sufficient competition in passenger and air cargo transport as well as ground 
handling277. On 27 July 2010, the Commission approved the merger of United 
Airlines and Continental Airlines, which are both U.S. carriers providing scheduled 
air passenger and cargo transport between the EEA and the US278. The market 
investigation confirmed the complementary nature of United's and Continental's 
transatlantic networks. On 30 July 2010, the Commission opened an in-depth 
investigation of the planned merger between Olympic Air and Aegean Airlines 
following initial indications that the proposed concentration would lead to very high 
market shares on a number of routes279. 
316. On 14 September 2010, the Commission cleared the proposed acquisition of the 
German tour operator Öger Tours GmbH by Thomas Cook Group plc of the UK, as 
the combined market position of the two parties on the wholesale markets for hotel 
accommodation and airlines seats would not be sufficient to foreclose other tour 
operators from accessing these capacities280.  
2.1.3. State aid control 
317. The Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption in Iceland in April 2010 created a cloud of 
volcanic ash which covered most of Europe, except the Mediterranean region 
airspace. In its information note of 27 April 2010281, the Commission acknowledged 
the impact on the air transport industry of the closing of the affected airspace. In that 
context, the Commission proposed a series of short-term emergency measures and of 
structural measures to respond to the situation created by the flight restrictions. With 
                                                 
277 Case COMP/M.5747 British Airways / Iberia (OJ C 241, 8.9.2010, p. 1) 
278 Case COMP/M.5889 United Airlines / Continental Airlines (OJ C 225, 20.8.2010, p. 1) 
279 Case COMP/M.5830 Olympic Air / Aegean Airlines, (OJ C 174, 1.7.2010, p. 8) 
280 Case COMP/M.5867 Thomas Cook Group Plc / Öger Tours GmbH. (OJ C 275, 12.10.2010, p. 15) 
281 This information note was presented by Vice-president Kallas in association with Vice-president 
Almunia and Commissioner Rehn and was endorsed by the Commission on 27 April 2010. 
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regard to possible compensation for the air transport industry, this note indicated that 
the Commission "could prepare a communication clarifying the requirements to be 
fulfilled” to provide State aid in the relevant context. In the conclusions on the EU 
response to the consequences of the volcanic ash cloud on air transport adopted by 
the Extraordinary TTE (Transport) Council of 4 May 2010282, the Council agreed to 
"recall the existing legal framework283 applicable to potential support measures by 
Member States". However, as no Member State expressed in 2010 its intention to 
grant State aid to the air transport industry in the above mentioned context, the 
adoption of a communication did not appear appropriate. 
318. As in previous years, several State aids for investments in airport infrastructure were 
approved as compatible with the internal market for airports in the United Kingdom 
(Derry Airport)284, in Finland (Vaasa airport and Oulu airport)285 and in Latvia (Riga 
Airport)286. The Commission also approved in June 2010 a guarantee granted by the 
Region of Murcia (Spain) to the consortium awarded to build, exploit and manage 
the new airport287.  
319. The Commission closed the formal investigation procedure into the agreement 
concluded until 2016 between Bratislava Airport and Ryanair concerning Ryanair's 
operations at this airport. Having carried out a cost-benefit-analysis of this 
agreement, the Commission concluded that in similar circumstances a private 
investor operating under normal market conditions would have entered into the same 
or similar commercial arrangement as the operator of Bratislava Airport. Therefore, 
no advantage was being granted to Ryanair288. As regards start-up aid289, the 
Commission authorised in May and September 2010 two schemes intended, through 
airport fees reduction, at the creation of new air routes and additional frequencies 
from Dijon-Longvic290 and Antwerp291 to other EU airports.  
320. The Commission opened in February 2010 a formal investigation procedure on the 
State aid aspects of a loan granted to ČSA-Czech Airlines by a State-owned entity 
(Osinek) as well as a subsequent liberation of the collaterals of the loan292. In 
December, the Commission initiated an in-depth investigation into several measures 
granted by the Hungarian authorities to support Malév, the national air carrier in the 
context of its privatisation and subsequent re-nationalisation293. Two formal 
investigation procedures were also opened into compensation for losses incurred by 
                                                 
282 MEMO/10/161 
283 Article 107(2)(b) TFEU states that "shall be compatible with the internal market (…) aid to make good 
the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances". 
284 Case NN65/2009 City of Derry airport (OJ C 144, 3.6.2010, p. 27) 
285 Cases N397/2009 Kiinteistö Oy Cargo Apron Vaasa (OJ C 29, 5.2.2010) and N286/2010 Public 
financing for the infrastructure investments and expansion at Oulu Airport 
286 Case N41/2010 Development of Airport Infrastructure of Airport "Riga" (OJ C 143, 2.6.2010, p. 23-24) 
287 Case N63/2010 State guarantee for the construction of Murcia Airport (OJ C 217, 11.8.2010, p. 1) 
288 Case C12/2008 Agreement between Bratislava Airport and Ryanair. See IP/10/56, 27.1.2010. 
289 Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional 
airports (OJ C 312, 9.12.2005, p. 1) 
290 Case N709/2009 Aide à la compagnie Eastern Airways pour le démarrage de nouvelles liaisons 
aériennes au départ de l'aéroport de Dijon-Longvic (OJ C 125, 13.5.2010, p. 1) 
291 Case N114/2010 Aide au démarrage en faveur de programmes importants qui améliorent la promotion 
et le développement de l'aéroport d'Anvers (OJ C 250, 17.9.2010, p. 1) 
292 Case C6/2010 State aid implications of a loan provided by Osinek a.s. See IP/10/179, 24.2.2010. 
293 Case C38/2010 Malév Hungarian Airlines. See IP/10/1753, 21.12.2010. 
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SEA Handling, an Italian ground handling company operating at airports in Milan294, 
and concerning the public financing to cover losses incurred by the Reggio Calabria 
airport in Italy295. 
321. Finally, the Commission authorised in November 2010 a loan facility worth EUR 
52 million for the Maltese flag carrier296. Air Malta is a small carrier operating 12 
aircrafts mainly in Europe. It is of key importance for Malta's economy that heavily 
depends on tourism. This rescue aid is a short-term measure to tackle liquidity 
problems faced by Air Malta and a sound restructuring plan of the company should 
be submitted to the Commission within six months. 
2.2. Rail and inland transport 
322. The Commission adopted a proposal to recast the first railway package on 
17 September 2010297. The proposal aims at increasing competition on rail market. In 
particular, it seeks to improve access to rail-related services such as terminals and 
maintenance facilities. The proposal strengthens the powers of the national rail 
regulators, notably by extending their competence to rail-related services, and 
enhances their independence vis-à-vis other public authorities. 
2.2.1. Merger control 
323. On 22 January 2010, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition of 
Financière Ermewa, a Swiss company involved in rail freight wagon and tank 
container hire in several EU Member States, by TLP, a subsidiary of the French rail 
transport company SNCF298. This approval was conditional upon the divestment of 
Ermewa's activities related to the transport of cereals.  
324. On 17 June 2010, the Commission decided to give the go-ahead to the proposed 
creation of the "New Eurostar" joint venture by the SNCF and London Continental 
Railways299. This decision was conditional upon commitments ensuring an effective 
access for new entrants to international stations served by Eurostar.  
325. On 14 July 2010, the Commission cleared the acquisition of Giraud, an international 
road freight group by Geodis, which belongs to the SNCF group as well300. The 
Commission considered that there would be no incentive for SNCF to restrict access 
to its rail transport services following the acquisition.  
326. On 11 August 2010, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition of rail and 
bus operator Arriva plc of the UK by Deutsche Bahn301. This decision was 
                                                 
294 Case C14/2010 Aide présumée octroyée à la société SEA Handling S.p.A. See IP/10/787, 23.6.2010. 
295 Cases C20/2010 (ex N536/2008 and NN32/2010) Italy – Calabria Region - SO.G.A.S. - Società per la 
gestione dell'aeroporto dello Stretto (OJ C 292, 28.10.2010, p. 30) 
296 Case N504/2010 Air Malta plc. See IP/10/1509, 15.11.2010. 
297 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a single European 
railway area (COM(2010) 475 final, COD 2010/253) 
298 Case COMP/M.5579 TLP / Financière Ermewa (OJ C 60, 11.3.2010, p. 1) 
299 Case COMP/M.5655 SNCF / LCR / Eurostar (OJ C 272, 8.10.2010, p. 2) 
300 Case COMP/M.5877 Geodis / Giraud (OJ C 213, 6.8.2010, p. 16) 
301 Case COMP/M.5855 Deutsche Bahn / Arriva plc (OJ C 276, 13.10.2010, p. 1) 
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conditional upon Deutsche Bahn's commitment to divest Arriva Deutschland, which 
includes the entire rail and bus business of Arriva in Germany.  
327. On 12 August 2010, the Commission approved the merger of Veolia Transport's and 
Transdev's activities in the area of scheduled international transport by coach302, but 
it referred the examination of the merger's impact in France and the Netherlands to 
the respective National Competition Authorities. 
2.2.2. State aid control 
328. In February 2010, the Commission adopted its first decision applying the new 
regulation on public passenger transport services which entered into force on 
3 December 2009303. By this decision, the Commission concluded the formal 
investigation procedure initiated in 2008 regarding the public-service contracts 
concluded with the Danish railway company Danske Statsbaner (DSB)304. The 
Commission found that the compensation paid by the government every year to DSB 
for the costs incurred in meeting its public-service obligations was limited to what 
was strictly necessary to cover those costs.  
329. As regards the rail freight transport sector which has been fully liberalised since 
2007, the Commission authorised on 26 May 2010 the plan of Société nationale des 
chemins de fer belges (SNCB) to restructure its freight activities305. The Commission 
considered that the restructuring plan would address the problems affecting SNCB's 
freight activities and ensure the viability of those activities without unduly distorting 
competition in the internal market. In accordance with the 2008 Community 
guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings306, the SNCB's freight division shall 
be legally separated and transformed into a commercial company under ordinary 
commercial law. The creation of an independent operator is designed to ensure that 
there will be no cross-subsidisation between freight and passenger transport 
activities. The restructuring plan also includes a substantial reduction in the capacity 
of SNCB's freight activities to contribute to healthy competition in the market 
concerned. Generally, a division of an undertaking, namely an economic entity 
without legal personality, is not eligible for restructuring aid on the basis of the 2004 
Guidelines on State aid for restructuring307. Due to the very specific situation of the 
European rail freight sector, a specific approach for restructuring of freight divisions 
of railway undertakings was maintained for a transitional period, namely for 
restructurings notified before 1 January 2010. This case will thus be the only case of 
application of those provisions. 
                                                 
302 Case COMP/M.5741 CDC / Veolia Environment / Transdev / Veolia Transport (OJ C 266, 1.10.2010, 
p. 2) 
303 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
public passenger services by rail and road repealing Council regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 and No 
1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1-13) 
304 Case C41/2008 Public service contracts between the Danish Government and Dankse Statbaner. See 
IP/10/178, 24.2.2010. 
305 Case N726/2009 Aide à la restructuration des activités "fret" de la SA de droit public SNCB. See 
IP/10/615, 26.5.2010. 
306 Community guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings (OJ C 184, 22.7.2008, p. 13) 
307 Community guidelines on State aid for restructuring (OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2) 
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330. Finally, the Commission authorised in December 2010 a rescue aid of approximately 
EUR 128 million for BDZ EAD, the 100% State-owned Bulgarian railway which 
operates on both freight and passenger railway markets308. This short-term measure 
is intended to tackle BDZ EAD's liquidity problems and enable the company to pay 
creditors and properly maintain its rolling stock pending the implementation of a 
restructuring plan to be submitted to the Commission within six months. 
2.3. Maritime transport 
2.3.1. Antitrust enforcement 
331. On 26 April 2010, the Commission's new Block Exemption Regulation for Consortia 
entered into force309. It will apply for five years. A consortium is an operational 
cooperation between liner shipping carriers to provide a joint service for the carriage 
of cargo on a route. In substance the new regulation notably reviewed the list of 
exempted activities and the applicable market share threshold. .  
332. Moreover, in 2010 the Commission continued to pursue advocacy efforts in the area 
of maritime antitrust vis-à-vis third countries. Regulation 1419/2006310 – the 
regulation that repealed the block exemption regulation for liner shipping 
conferences, which are a type of price-fixing cartel – contains a recital that calls on 
the Commission to take "appropriate steps to advance the removal of the price fixing 
exemption for liner conferences that exist elsewhere". The Commission's consistent 
message towards third countries is to advocate the exemption of certain consortia to 
some extent, whilst prohibiting all forms of anti-competitive price-fixing and 
capacity-fixing agreement. To this end, DG Competition officials held face-to-face 
meetings or conference calls with Australian, Canadian, Chinese, Hong Kong, 
Japanese, Korean, and US transport ministries and competition authorities. 
333. In January 2010, the Commission initiated proceedings against the "Baltic Max 
Feeder" scheme whereby owners of container vessels intended to jointly cover the 
costs of removing vessels from service. The investigation aimed to establish whether 
the scheme's purpose was to reduce capacity and, therefore, push up the charter rates 
the owners charged for such vessels. In response to the initiation of proceedings by 
the Commission the planned scheme was abandoned and the case was closed311. 
2.3.2. Merger control 
334. The Commission cleared on 17 June 2010 the acquisition of Norfolk, which provides 
ferry and cargo shipping services in the North Sea area, by DFDS of Denmark312. 
                                                 
308 Case N402/2010 Rescue aid for the Bulgarian State railways EAD (BDZ). See IP/10/1733, 16.12.2010. 
309 Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 of 28 September 2009 on the application of Article 81(3) of 
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Clearance was conditional on the conclusion by DFDS of a space charter agreement 
with a new entrant on routes between the UK and Denmark. 
2.3.3. State aid control 
335. In January 2010 the Commission approved for the first time State aid for launching a 
"Motorways of the Sea" project on the basis of both the Maritime Guidelines and the 
Complementary aid Guidelines313. The aid is complementary to Union financing 
granted under Marco Polo II Programme. The project concerns the establishment of a 
maritime link operated by GLD Atlantique between the French port of Nantes-Saint 
Nazaire and the Spanish port of Gijón314. The aim is to capture between 3% and 5% 
of the road traffic which currently passes through the west of the Pyrénées. The 
overall financing of the project (State aid and Marco Polo grant) is limited to 35% of 
the eligible costs within the first four years of its operation. 
336. In April 2010, the Commission authorised the extension of the Dutch tonnage tax 
scheme to cable layers, pipeline layers, research vessels and crane vessels315. This 
decision was based on the approach adopted in 2009316, when the activities of cable-
layers were considered to be eligible for State aid by applying by analogy the 
Maritime Guidelines317. Similarly, the Commission authorised the Cypriot tonnage 
tax scheme318 as well as reduced social contributions rates for seafarers in 
Germany319.  
337. In August 2010 the Commission approved a rescue aid for the company 
SeaFrance320. The company is a 100% subsidiary of French SNCF. It operates 
exclusively on the route between Calais and Dover and transports both passengers 
and freight. The company was placed in insolvency by the Tribunal de Commerce of 
Paris on 30 June 2010. The aid was intended to allow the company to weather its 
financial difficulties until it is either restructured or taken over by new investors and 
to finance the social cost of the severe employment cuts made necessary to ensure 
SeaFrance is brought back to profitability.  
338. In November 2010 the Commission authorised rescue aid for Tirrenia di Navigazione 
S.p.A321 and through Tirrenia, its regional subsidiary, Siremar – Sicilia regionale 
Marittima S.p.A. The companies faced severe difficulties and were admitted to the 
collective insolvency procedure foreseen under Italian law for large companies, 
"amministrazione straordinaria". 
                                                 
313 Communication from the Commission providing guidance on State aid complementary to Community 
funding for the launching of the motorways of the sea (OJ C 317, 12.12.2008, p. 10) 
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339. As regards State aid to finance ports infrastructure, the Commission decided to 
launch a study to collect information to better understand the functioning of ports and 
the public financing of their infrastructure. On the basis of its results, the 
Commission will be able to define a reliable approach for moving forward in that 
field. 
F – POSTAL SERVICES 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
340. Postal services generate about 1% of EU GDP and an annual corresponding turnover 
of EUR 94 billion. Sectors such as e-commerce, publishing, mail order, insurance, 
banking and advertising heavily depend on the postal infrastructure. Postal services 
also bring social benefits which cannot always be qualified in economic terms. Postal 
services are labour intensive and are one of the principal public employers in Europe. 
Employment in the sector is principally provided by Universal Service Providers 
(USP) and has been stable over time, with about 1.8 million persons employed322. As 
defined in the Postal Directive323, USP are public or private companies, usually the 
former public monopolistic incumbent, which are required to provide universal 
postal services or parts thereof to all residents of a Member State. In accordance with 
the provisions of the Postal Directive, Member States are required to notify the 
Commission the identity of the USP they designate. Since providing services to all 
residents may not be an economically profitable activity, USP may receive 
compensation from the Member States. Virtually all USP in the EU are public 
undertakings, i.e. owned by the Member States, with the notable exceptions of 
Germany and Netherlands. 
341. Postal services continue to evolve substantially. Postal operators are facing 
increasingly fierce pressure from electronic means of communication. This is in turn 
forcing them to adapt their businesses to better respond to customers' needs and to 
improve efficiency. The market entry of new and more efficient postal operators is 
also increasing the pressure on USP to realise significant efficiency gains. In 
addition, physical mail is being supplemented by multi-channel delivery and tailor-
made solutions for customers, for example via hybrid mail services (e-mail and 
physical letter). Moreover, many postal operators are entering adjacent markets by 
developing IT services for their customers or other new and value-added services. 
342. Under the third revision of the Postal Directive, most Member States will have to 
accomplish full market opening by eliminating any remaining reserved area by 
31 December 2010, with a further two years to accomplish this being allowed for 
                                                 
322 Economic statistics in this section on the postal sector are from: "The evolution of the European postal 
market since 1997", Final Report, ITA Consulting GmbH and WIK Consult GmbH, August 2009 and 
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services (OJ L 52, 27.2.2008, p. 3). In particular, Article 3(1) states that "Member States shall ensure 
that users enjoy the right to a universal service involving the permanent provision of a postal service of 
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eleven Member States, most of which recently joined the Union324. The liberalisation 
process is progressing swiftly and certain Member States (Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) already fully opened 
their postal markets ahead of the EU deadline. Moreover, the 2008 Directive 
confirms the minimum scope and standard of the postal universal service and 
reinforces the role of national regulatory authorities. The Directive also offers a 
variety of measures that Member States may take to safeguard and finance the 
universal service, if this proves to be necessary. 
343. Despite the progress to-date, genuine competition, notably in the letter mail segment, 
is only just beginning to emerge even in cases where the monopoly has been 
completely abolished or substantially reduced. In the letter post segment, market 
shares of competitors, although increasing, remain at a low level even in Member 
States that have fully liberalised their postal markets. Estimated market shares of 
competitors in these Member States ranged from around 8% to 12% in 2007. Thus, 
whereas the parcels/express market is increasingly open to competition across 
Member States, the letters market remains traditionally subject to monopoly and 
dominated by incumbents, holding over 95% market share. It is declining in the old 
Member States, whereas still growing (though from much lower levels) in the new 
Member States. Some Member States have already partly or fully privatised their 
incumbent operator (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands) whereas others 
have indicated similar reforms (UK).  
344. Major competition policy challenges in the postal sector services relate to avoiding 
distortion of competition linked to the status of universal service provider. In 
particular, ensuring that the compensation received by a USP for its delivery of 
public service is consistent with the actual costs of the services and does not 
constitute an indirect advantage (through cross-subsidisation of other services for 
example) is essential to ensure a level playing field and the market entry of new 
competitors. Another challenge in the years to come will be to ensure the 
development of competition in former reserved areas, where barriers to entry, such as 
the VAT exemption or excessive licensing requirements, still remain. Market 
behaviours of incumbents will have to be monitored closely.  
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Merger control  
345. On 30 November 2010 the Commission cleared the proposed creation of a joint 
venture between the Österreichische Post and the Schweizerische Post in the area of 
direct mailing325. 
2.2. State aid control 
346. Within the postal sector, the State aid assessment carried out by the Commission 
includes a verification of any compensation granted to postal operators for 
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325 Case COMP/M.6023 Österreichische Post / Schweizerische Post / JV (OJ C 357, 30.12.2010, p. 16) 
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discharging public service obligations in order to ensure that it does not exceed what 
is necessary to cover the costs incurred in doing so (taking into account the relevant 
receipts and a reasonable profit) and that commercial activities outside the Services 
of General Economic Interest (SGEI) are not cross-subsidised. The compatibility 
principles the Commission applies in its assessment are contained in the Community 
framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (the 
Framework)326. However, the third Postal Directive provides for a new way of 
calculating the net costs of postal universal services, based on the net avoided cost 
methodology which departs from the mere accounting approach of actual loss 
compensation embodied in the Framework. In the new methodology, the cost for 
providing the universal service is calculated as the difference between the net cost for 
a designated universal service provider of operating with the universal service 
obligations and the same postal service provider operating without those universal 
service obligations. 
Deutsche Post 
347. In 2010 the Commission continued its investigation, opened in 2007, into the alleged 
overcompensation of Deutsche Post AG327 for carrying out its universal service 
obligations from 1989 to 2007. The main focus is on two public measures concerning 
the subsidy which Deutsche Post received from its affiliate Deutsche Telekom 
between 1990 and 1995 to cover its losses and the public financing which Deutsche 
Post has received since 1995 in order to finance the pensions of its civil servants.  
348. At the end of 2009, the Commission received an expert's final report aiming to 
quantify the possible amount of overcompensation. Germany submitted several 
comments and counter-expertise in 2010 which were analysed by the Commission. 
In September 2010 the Court of Justice upheld328 the Court of First Instance's 
annulment329 of the 2002 Commission decision which had found certain aid 
measures for Deutsche Post AG to be incompatible with the internal market, because 
the Commission did not take into account all income and costs related to the 
universal services. The ongoing investigation follows the comprehensive approach as 
demanded by the Court of Justice. In separate proceedings, the General Court 
confirmed the validity of the Commission's information injunction of 30 October 
2008 (which had requested from Germany the information necessary for the expert's 
report), ruling that the actions for annulment brought by Germany and Deutsche Post 
against that information injunction were inadmissible330.  
                                                 
326 Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (OJ C 297, 29.11.2005, 
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Belgian Post 
349. In 2010, the Commission continued its formal investigation procedure opened in 
2009 in order to examine whether certain measures in favour of the Belgian postal 
operator De Post - La Poste are in line with EU State aid rules331. 
350. The Commission's initial approval of a series of measures in favour of De Post - La 
Poste in 2003 was overturned by the Court of First Instance on 10 February 2009332, 
which found that a formal investigation procedure was required in order to guarantee 
the possibility for competitors to submit their views to the Commission. The Court of 
First Instance's annulment of the Commission decision has been challenged by 
Belgium before the Court of Justice. The court case is currently pending. The 
Commission's current investigation, opened on 13 July 2009, aims to establish in a 
comprehensive way whether the totality of the measures in favour of De Post - La 
Poste since its incorporation in 1992 can be considered compatible with the internal 
market. The investigation concerns a large number of measures, including the yearly 
compensation granted by Belgium for public service tasks, capital injections, relief of 
pension liabilities, transfer of buildings and tax exemptions. The investigation is 
progressing swiftly with active cooperation of the Belgian authorities. 
Unlimited guarantee to the French La Poste 
351. With its final decision of 26 January 2010333, the Commission closed the formal 
investigation procedure opened in 2007 in which it had examined an alleged State aid 
granted in favour of La Poste in the form of an unlimited State guarantee resulting 
from its public-law status. The closure of the formal investigation procedure 
followed the adoption by the French Parliament on 12 January 2010 of the Law on 
the public company La Poste and on postal activities334. 
352. The Commission considered that due to its public law status, an implicit government 
guarantee had been set on all the liabilities of La Poste, under which individual 
creditors were assured of having their debt repaid. This status also provided La Poste 
with an institutional guarantee of its continued existence and/or its obligations. The 
double guarantee would thus enable La Poste to access financing at rates lower than 
its competitors. The guarantee was considered unlimited in time, un-remunerated and 
not limited to activities of the universal postal service but also covering commercial 
activities exercised by La Poste, granting it an economic advantage over its 
competitors, who operate without such a guarantee. The guarantee was therefore 
deemed to distort competition in postal markets and considered to constitute 
incompatible State aid. Considering that the legal provisions concerned had been in 
force since before 1 January 1958, the Commission applied the rules concerning 
existing aid. Consequently, France was not obliged to recover the alleged aid from 
La Poste but was required to put an end to the State guarantee. 
353. The Commission concluded that the incorporation of La Poste into a limited liability 
company ("société anonyme") on 1 March 2010, as provided for under the mentioned 
                                                 
331 Case C20/2009 (ex N763/2002) Mesures en faveur de La Poste (OJ C 176, 29.7.2009, p. 17) 
332 Case T-388/03, Deutsche Post and DHL International v Commission, [2009] ECR II-199 
333 Case C56/2007 Garantie d'Etat illimitée - La Poste (France) (OJ L 274, 19.10.2010, p. 1) 
334 Loi n° 2010-123 du 9 février 2010 relative à l'entreprise publique La Poste et aux activités postales 
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Law, would effectively put an end to the de facto unlimited State guarantee it 
enjoyed. It was therefore an appropriate measure to eliminate the State aid element 
involved in its previous legal status. France sought the annulment of the Commission 
decision on 2 April, mainly disputing the existence of the State guarantee and the 
economic advantage that the guarantee would grant to La Poste.  
354. By its final decision, the Commission did not challenge the public service mission of 
La Poste, nor its public ownership and control, particularly in light of the neutrality 
of European rules as concerns the various property regimes applicable in Member 
States. Only the State guarantee that resulted from the special status of La Poste, and 
not its ownership, was considered to represent incompatible State aid. Therefore, 
only that State guarantee was required to be removed, which reflects the fact that the 
relevant European competition rules apply equally to private and public 
undertakings. 
Polish Post (Poczta Polska) 
355. At the end of 2009, the Commission had authorised under EU State aid rules the 
scheme intended to compensate Poczta Polska as the universal postal service 
provider in Poland for net losses incurred in discharging its public service obligations 
until 31 December 2011335. During 2010, the Commission actively monitored the 
fulfilment of the conditions which had been attached to this decision. 
356. Further to a 2004 notification from the Polish authorities of the aid scheme 
"Compensation to Poczta Polska for carrying out universal postal services", the 
Commission opened a formal investigation on 29 June 2005 in this case. In its 2009 
decision, the Commission found the compensation mechanism to be compatible with 
Article 106(2), in accordance with the Commission's framework on public service 
compensation. The measure was thus authorised, subject to the fulfilment of certain 
conditions. In particular, Poland was required to improve the entrustment act and to 
ensure that any significant changes to the cost allocation method for compensatory 
payments remain compatible with the cost accounting rules of Article 14 of the first 
Postal Directive. 
G – AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES 
1. OVERVIEW OF THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 
357. The EU is the world's largest producer of motor vehicles with around 18 million 
vehicles a year and 33% of the world's passenger cars. The automotive industry’s 
direct weight in the EU GDP is less than 1% but reaches almost 3.5% in countries 
such as Germany or the Czech Republic. More than 5 million people in the EU are 
directly employed in the industry, 2.3 million by original equipment manufacturers 
(OEM) and another 3 million by their suppliers. In total, the European automotive 
industry directly and indirectly supports 13 million jobs in the EU, accounting for 
one third of the manufacturing employment, is the largest investing sector in 
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Research and Development with EUR 28 billion and is an important contributor to 
net external EU trade336. 
358. In 2010, the motor vehicle sector began to emerge from the economic crisis that hit it 
particularly hard in 2008 and 2009. However, although the total production of motor 
vehicles in the EU increased by 34% in the first quarter of 2010 from the 
corresponding period of 2009, it was still 17% down compared with 2008337. The 
negative effects on vehicle registrations of the expiry of car scrapping schemes in 
late 2009 and during 2010 in many Member States was more than outweighed by a 
surge in export activity, particularly in the premium segment. 
359. The effects of the economic and financial crisis on US car manufacturers also had 
significant consequences on the car sector in Europe. The re-launched General 
Motors returned to profit in May 2010 after emerging from bankruptcy and 
eventually undertook to restructure its Opel/Vauxhall subsidiary without further 
government support. Meanwhile, Fiat entered into a broad partnership with Chrysler, 
which also came out of bankruptcy after being reorganised within the framework of 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code338.  
360. In May 2010, the Commission revised the competition framework for vertical 
agreements in the motor vehicle sector, comprising a set of supplementary guidelines 
and three additional hard core clauses. This framework applies to agreements for the 
repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts as of 1 June 2010, and 
will apply to vehicle sales agreements from 1 June 2013. The new rules represent a 
major alignment with the general regime for vertical restraints (see section I.B.1.1.1., 
points 30 to 34) and a more proportionate approach to the differing intensities of 
competition in the various markets. 
361. Future challenges for the industry will involve the launch of more resource-efficient 
and "greener" cars, in particular new electric and hybrid models, the need to tailor 
existing distribution networks to demand levels and the increasing competition from 
emerging countries' car manufacturers, including in the "green car" markets. 
Competition issues relating to market developments include managing the necessary 
restructuring of the sector, fostering the development of "greener" cars while 
maintaining a level playing field. The after-sales market, which represents a 
significant part of consumer expenditures linked to car ownership, experiences 
specific competition issues, relating to misuse of vehicle warranties or independent 
operators' access to technical information. 
                                                 
336 Data on the importance of the automotive sector in the European economy are from: "Product Market 
Review 2009: micro-economic consequences of the crisis and implications for recovery", European 
Economy 11, 2009. 
337 http://www.acea.be/index.php/files/acea_economic_report_first_quarter_2010  
338 Chapter 11 enables a firm to be sold off as a working concern after reorganisation, rather than having its 
assets sold piecemeal. It is therefore considered to be more economically efficient, and to bring greater 
returns for shareholders, as well as to better protect employees. 
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2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Antitrust enforcement 
362. On 27 May 2010, the Commission adopted new competition rules for agreements 
between vehicle manufacturers and their authorised dealers, repairers and spare parts 
distributors. The new framework applies the general Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation339 of 20 April to such agreements from 2010 as regards the aftermarkets, 
and 2013 as regards the markets for the sale of new vehicles. In addition, the 
Commission adopted Regulation 461/2010340, which sets out three supplementary 
hardcore clauses relating to spare parts distribution, and a detailed set of 
supplementary guidelines for assessing vertical agreements in the sector341. The new 
rules represent a flexible and proportionate response to the differing intensities of 
competition on the primary and aftermarkets and broadly align the rules applicable to 
agreements between car manufacturers and their authorised dealers, repairers and 
spare part distributors with the general regime applicable to other sectors. 
2.1.1. Vertical agreements in the vehicle sales markets 
363. The Commission's analysis showed that on the vehicle sales markets, the restrictive 
nature of the legal framework laid down by Regulation 1400/2002342 was out of 
place given the intensity of competition manifested by low profit margins, falling 
real prices and increased choice brought about by new entries and expanding brand 
ranges. Many of the sector-specific clauses in the Regulation, such as those relating 
to contractual protection, to dealers selling vehicles from different manufacturers 
(multi-branding) and to the use of location clauses343 had not achieved their aims, 
and in some cases had led to unsatisfactory results. For example, with a view to 
protecting intra-brand competition, the Regulation aimed to promote multi-brand 
sales by allowing dealers to sell the brands of different manufacturers within the 
same showroom. In the face of this provision, vehicle manufacturers pushed up 
investments required of dealers in order to protect brand image and corporate 
identity. This in turn increased distribution costs, to the detriment of consumers. 
364. The new regime adopted on 27 May 2010 therefore provides that the sector will be 
subject to the same rules that apply to vertical agreements in other areas from 2013. 
The three-year transition was decided upon in order to allow dealers to amortise 
investments that they may have made pursuant to the old regime, in particular in 
multi-brand premises. 
                                                 
339 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices (OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, p. 1-7) 
340 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
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341 Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles 
and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles (OJ C 138, 28.5.2010, p. 16-27) 
342 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector 
343 Location clauses specify that a dealer must carry on his business from a given location, and may not 
open other outlets elsewhere. 
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365. As well as doing away with the conditions and hardcore clauses relating specifically 
to the sale of new vehicles, the alignment with the general regime will also imply a 
reduction in the market share threshold for exemption from 40% to 30% market 
share of manufacturers for the quantitative selective distribution agreements that are 
the norm in this sector344. This in turn implies that there will be more national 
markets on which those agreements will need to be self-assessed. The supplementary 
Guidelines give extensive clarifications on the treatment of particular clauses both 
above and below the exemption threshold, and also explain the advantages in terms 
of compliance brought about by transparency in contractual relations. 
2.1.2. Vertical agreements in the repair and spare parts markets 
366. The competitive conditions on the vehicle sales markets are in stark contrast to those 
on the repair and spare parts distribution, where the authorised networks commonly 
have market shares in excess of 50%. Their competitors, the independent repairers, 
have to rely on the vehicle manufacturers for essential inputs in the form of technical 
information and spare parts. There is therefore a clear risk that carmakers may seek 
to give an advantage to their contractual partners by withholding these inputs. The 
repair and maintenance markets are of great importance to consumers since these 
services make up 40% of the total cost of vehicle ownership. Prices have moreover 
been rising in real terms. The spare parts markets are also potentially problematic 
since many spare parts are captive to the vehicle manufacturers, mainly because of 
design rights protection in several Member States. This implies that the complete 
range is only available from the authorised repair networks, implying in turn a 
situation of dependence of the independent repairers on their authorised competitors. 
367. In these circumstances, the sector-specific regime set out in Regulation 1400/2002 
appeared incongruous since it was more favourable than the general rules, in 
particular because it granted an exemption up to a 100% market share for the 
qualitative selective agreements that are the norm in the motor vehicle repair and 
spare parts distribution sectors. This created two difficulties:  
– Firstly, when faced with anti-competitive behaviour in the context of an 
agreement, the Commission was forced to check whether the behaviour related 
to one of the hardcore clauses, since if it did not, the agreement would be 
protected by the safe harbour and the only option open to the Commission 
would be to disapply the block exemption. This made it more difficult for the 
Commission to act in respect of new types of anti-competitive behaviour that 
had not been foreseen when Regulation 1400/2002 was adopted, and had not 
therefore been included in the hardcore list. One such issue may arise when 
carmakers make warranties conditional on all repairs being carried out in the 
authorised networks. 
– The second problem related to a particular hardcore clause – Article 4(2) on the 
provision of technical information to independent operators. The scope of this 
clause was defined in Recital 26 of the Regulation so as to exclude information 
                                                 
344 In order for an agreement to be exempted, neither the dealer nor the vehicle manufacturer may have a 
market share exceeding 30%. A quantitative selective distribution system is generally defined as a 
system in which the supplier uses criteria for the selection of distributors or repairers which directly 
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relating to safety and security, and proved to be a particular problem since 
today's vehicles contain complex systems in which it is difficult to disentangle 
security and safety functions from features such as engine management and 
ride control. 
368. Aligning the rules applicable to agreements between car manufacturers and 
authorised repairers with the general regime applicable to other sectors means that a 
30% exemption threshold will apply to such agreements. Because of the prevailing 
high market shares noted above, the majority of these agreements will no longer be 
block exempted, and it will therefore be easier for the Commission and National 
Competition Authorities to tackle possible abuses that threaten to foreclose 
independent repairers from the market to the detriment of consumers. In view of 
stakeholders' desire for clarity, the Commission included detailed explanation in the 
Guidelines on issues such as access to the authorised repair networks, the release of 
technical information and the abuse of warranties. 
369. As regards spare parts distribution, the Commission responded to stakeholders' views 
and maintained three additional hardcore clauses in the new Regulation 461/2010 
concerning the supply of spare parts by component manufacturers, and the ability of 
independent repairers to access "captive" parts that are only available from the 
vehicle manufacturers and the members of their authorised networks. A block 
exemption was felt to be an effective instrument given the difficulty of defining 
product markets in this field. 
370. The rules adopted on 27 May 2010 therefore implied a major alignment with the 
general regime for vertical restraints set out in Regulation 330/2010. There will be 
fewer constraints on relationships between vehicle manufacturers and dealers; on the 
aftermarket, it will be easier for the Commission to act against anti-competitive 
agreements. The commonality of rules will also make life simpler for firms in the 
sector and for legal practitioners. 
2.2. Merger control 
371. In 2010, 15 mergers in the automotive industry were notified to the Commission. 
Most of these transactions involved automotive suppliers establishing joint 
ventures345. Only one case – the acquisition of Volvo Cars by the Chinese companies 
Geely and Daqing346 – dealt with car manufacturers. All cases were cleared in the 
first phase without commitments. 
2.3. State aid control 
372. The automotive sector had the possibility to make use of the exceptional support 
measures contained in the State aid Temporary Framework as long as the approved 
schemes were not restricted to this activity but open to all the sectors of the 
economy. In particular, the Commission authorised on 8 February 2010 plans 
notified by Sweden to provide a guarantee that would enable Saab Automobile AB to 
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access a loan from the European Investment Bank347. The EUR 400 million loan 
aimed at co-financing Saab's business plan in the light of its sale by General Motors 
to Dutch carmaker Spyker Cars N.V. According to the business plan, Saab intended 
to use the EIB loan for an investment project worth EUR 1 billion related inter alia 
to fuel efficiency and car safety. The Commission found that 82.8% of the guarantee 
to be provided by Sweden was in line with the Temporary Framework. In particular, 
Saab paid an adequate remuneration for the guarantee and provided sufficient 
securities in case the guarantee would be drawn. On 16 December 2010, the 
Commission authorised a comparable guarantee by Sweden to enable Volvo Cars 
Corporation to access a EUR 500 million loan from the EIB to finance research and 
engineering activities related to fuel efficiency and road safety348. This decision 
modified the terms of the guarantee authorised by the Commission on 5 June 
2009349, which Volvo Cars had never used. 
373. In July 2010, the Commission extended its formal investigation initiated in October 
2009 under State aid rules regarding Hungarian aid for an investment project of Audi 
Hungaria Motor Kft. in its existing plant in Győr350. This extension became 
necessary to take into account the change in the initial investment project and 
concentrated on the question of the appropriate definition of the relevant geographic 
market. The Commission doubted the argument put forward by Hungary that not the 
EEA but the global market is the relevant geographic market for passenger cars. The 
extension decision gave interested third parties the possibility to comment on the 
issue at stake.  
374. In June 2010, the Commission authorized State aid measure in favor of Fiat 
Powertrain351, a subsidiary of the Fiat Group, for the production of car transmissions 
in Verrone, Piedmont, Italy, an area eligible for regional investment aid under Article 
107(3)(c). An existing plant is to be equipped with new machining and assembly 
lines to produce an innovative transmission unit intended for mid-range vehicles. The 
investment is expected to reach full production in 2013. In order to approve this State 
aid, the Commission had to assess the company's (and the Fiat Group's) position in 
the relevant transmission and car market segments. 
H – FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
375. The food supply chain connects three important sectors of the European economy – 
agriculture, the food processing industry and the distribution sectors – that together 
make more than 5% of European value-added and 7% of employment. Moreover, its 
performance has direct consequences for all European citizens, since food represents 
16% of European households' expenditures. 
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376. The food sector continued to draw much political and public attention in the context 
of the economic downturn and global developments in agricultural commodity 
prices. A decrease in prices paid to farmers whilst food prices remained relatively 
high at consumer level in many Member States raised concerns regarding the 
functioning of the food supply chain. The situation in the dairy sector, where the 
price drop was the sharpest, has been in particular in the spotlight. 
377. In July 2010, the Commission set up a High Level Forum for a Better Functioning 
Food Supply Chain352 to discuss and follow-up the implementation of the policy 
initiatives laid down in the Communication of October 2009 on "A better functioning 
food supply chain in Europe"353. The policy initiatives proposed by the Commission 
aimed at three main objectives: promoting sustainable and market-based 
relationships between stakeholders in the food supply chain, increasing transparency 
along the food supply chain to encourage competition and improve its resilience to 
price volatility and foster the integration and competitiveness of the European food 
supply chain across Member States.  
378. One of the main priorities of the High Level Forum will be to tackle unfair trading 
practices resulting from contractual imbalances and differences in bargaining power 
between suppliers and buyers in the food supply chain. These practices, which must 
be distinguished from anticompetitive practices which may be caught by Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, have been addressed at national level through different policy tools 
other than competition law instruments such as, for example, contract law or unfair 
commercial practices laws. An ad hoc Expert Platform on Business-to-Business 
Contractual Practices in the Food Supply Chain was set up as a working group of the 
High Level Forum to address this issue. 
379. The functioning of the food supply chain in Europe also raises challenges directly 
relating to competition policy and enforcement. A coherent application of 
competition rules across Member States requires attention, as the food supply chains 
are mostly national and even local. The concentration of retail markets has been a 
source of concern in some Member States. New and increasingly prevalent business 
practices, stemming either from the food industry or the distribution sector, also 
require detailed analysis to assess their potential impact on competition. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Food supply chain 
380. In its Communication on "A better functioning food supply chain in Europe", the 
Commission set as a priority the strengthening of the application of competition rules 
in food markets through a coordinated approach between National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs) within the framework of the European Competition Network 
(ECN). 
381. The ECN Food Subgroup continued to serve as an operational framework for 
discussion and coordination among NCAs on specific competition issues related to 
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food markets. Indeed, NCAs are often well placed to investigate any possible 
anticompetitive behaviour affecting these markets in their respective Member States 
given the national or regional scope of food markets. In line with the experience of 
past years, NCAs gave due priority in 2010 to the pursuit of anticompetitive practices 
on food markets by applying the legal instruments at their disposal to investigate and 
sanction numerous infringements of competition rules affecting consumer welfare.  
382. A significant number of NCAs also actively undertook sector inquires so as to 
identify potential malfunctionings of food and retail markets. The different 
enforcement, advocacy and monitoring actions taken by the NCAs over the last years 
in the food sector are due to be reported by the Commission to the Forum.  
2.2. Dairy sector 
383. Special attention was devoted to the dairy sector in light of the difficulties faced by 
dairy farmers during the recent milk crisis. In this context, the High Level Group on 
Milk, established by the Commission in October 2009, continued its works aimed at 
identifying medium and long-term solutions for the dairy sector taking into account 
the phasing out of the milk quota system by 2015. The issues under discussion 
included in particular the contractual relationships between farmers and processors, 
the possibility of strengthening farmers' bargaining power and the role of producer 
organisations and inter-branch organisations in the dairy sector. 
384. The Directorate-General for Competition, together with the French Autorité de la 
Concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt, actively participated in these 
discussions and, in coordination with the ECN Joint Working Team on Milk, 
presented at the meeting of the High Level Group of 23 February 2010 the state of 
play of the existing EU legal framework governing cooperation agreements between 
farmers in the dairy sector. For this purpose, DG Competition published an 
explanatory Brochure on "How EU competition policy helps dairy farmers in 
Europe" and a Working Paper on "The interface between EU competition policy and 
the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP): competition rules applicable to cooperation 
agreements between farmers in the dairy sector"354. 
385. Both documents, elaborated in cooperation with NCAs in the framework of the ECN 
Joint Working Team on Milk, reflect the common understanding of Competition 
Authorities about the role that competition policy should play in the dairy sector in 
the context of the recent milk crisis. They also represent a joint advocacy initiative 
on how EU competition policy can contribute to encourage the creation of 
efficiency-enhancing forms of cooperation whilst ensuring an effective level playing 
field in dairy markets. In particular, they clarify the various forms of cooperation that 
milk farmers can develop in order to adopt more market-oriented business models 
and strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis their buyers without infringing EU 
competition law. Such forms, which must be assessed under the rules applicable to 
horizontal agreements between competitors, can range from joint commercialisation 
(e.g. use of a common broker) to joint production agreements (e.g. use of common 
facilities for milk collection or the development of cooperatives active at the 
processing stage). 
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386. The High Level Group on Milk concluded its work in June and submitted to the 
Commission a Report including several recommendations aimed at addressing the 
future challenges of the EU dairy sector355. Further to these recommendations, the 
Commission adopted a legislative proposal in December 2010 on contractual 
relationships in the milk sector356. The proposal allows collective bargaining 
negotiations by producer organisations of milk farmers subject to certain limits based 
on their share of EU-wide and national milk production volumes, so as to reduce the 
risk of undue restrictions of competition on raw milk procurement markets within the 
EU. The proposal also provides for a "safety clause" that allows the competent NCA 
or the Commission to decide that the negotiations by a producer organisation may 
not take place where they would limit competition severely or where they would 
inflict a serious prejudice to dairy processors, in particular SMEs. 
2.3. State aid to the agricultural sector 
387. The Commission assesses State aid granted to the agriculture and to the forestry 
sector on the basis of the Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
sector 2007 to 2013357. In 2010, 214 new State aid cases were registered and 161 
decisions were adopted. 
388. On 20 July 2010, the Commission adopted a final conditional decision on the 
parafiscal charge for the promotion of wine applied by Portugal358. The Commission 
concluded that the parafiscal charges, levied by Portugal in favour of the IVV (Vine 
and Wine Institute) in view of promoting wine, were illegal. The decision considered 
the aid to be compatible provided that Portugal repaid to the contributors of the 
parafiscal charge the part of the charge imposed on products from other Member 
States. This condition aimed at remedying the violation of Article 110 TFEU, since 
charges had been imposed on imported products which did not benefit from the aid 
in the same measure as the domestic products. Portugal has brought annulment 
proceedings which are now pending before the General Court359. 
389. The Court of Justice dismissed in a judgment of 2 December 2010360 the appeal by 
Holland Malt against a judgment of the General Court361 relating to the application of 
the Agricultural Guidelines. According to the General Court, the Commission was 
right in deciding that an aid which does not fulfil a certain condition of the 
Agricultural Guidelines (namely the presence of normal outlets on the relevant 
market) is not compatible with the internal market, without taking into consideration 
the beneficial effects of this aid. The Commission is bound by the guidelines it 
issues, to the extent that they do not depart from the rules in the Treaty. 
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 EN 104   EN 
390. The Commission requested, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, that the Court of Justice 
should annul four Council decisions on the granting of State aid by Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Hungary for the purchase of agricultural land between 
1 January 2010 and 31 December 2013362. The Council, by adopting the contested 
decisions, overturned the Commission's decision resulting from the proposal for 
appropriate measures in Point 196 of the 2007 Agricultural Guidelines and from its 
unconditional acceptance by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Hungary, obliging them 
to bring to an end existing aid schemes for the purchase of agricultural land by 
31 December 2009 at the latest. Under the guise of exceptional circumstances, the 
Council in fact allowed the Member States mentioned above to maintain their 
schemes for the purchase of agricultural land until the expiry of the 2007 
Agricultural Guidelines on 31 December 2013. The Commission has argued that the 
Council lacked competence to take such a decision and that the circumstances put 
forward by the Council as the grounds for its decisions are self evidently not 
exceptional circumstances of such a nature as to justify the decisions taken and make 
no allowance for the Commission's decision on these schemes.  
391. Since the introduction of the possibility for Member States to approve EUR 15 000 
in limited amounts of aid to primary producers under the Temporary Framework, 14 
Member States submitted schemes which were approved by the Commission for a 
total aid volume of EUR 1 210 million. The Italian scheme was prolonged until end 
2011 and France, Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands notified prolongations of 
their respective schemes until the same date (apart from France until end of March 
2011). In addition, Romania notified such a new scheme. 
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III – The European Competition Network and cooperation with 
National Courts 
392. In 2010, the European Competition Network (ECN), the network for cooperation 
between National Competition Authorities (NCAs) of Member States and the 
Commission for the enforcement of EU antitrust rules, continued to be a very active 
forum for discussion and exchange of good practices. As in previous years, the 
network functioned efficiently under the mechanisms laid down in Regulation 
1/2003363, with a view to ensure the efficient and consistent enforcement of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.  
1. COOPERATION ON POLICY ISSUES  
393. The ECN provides a platform for EU competition authorities to constructively 
coordinate enforcement action, ensure consistency and discuss policy issues of 
common interest. During 2010, the ECN met in the following fora: 
– The new Director-General of DG Competition met the Heads of NCAs in the 
ECN context for the first time on the occasion of an ad hoc Meeting on 1 June 
2010. The regular annual meeting at Director-General level took place on 16-
17 November 2010.  
– Two ECN Plenary meetings served as an important tool for debates about 
general issues of common interest and exchange of experiences and know-how.  
– Various working groups dealt with non-sector-specific issues. The long-
standing Working Group on Cooperation Issues and Due Process pursued its 
work on enhancing cooperation within the ECN. The Cartels Working Group, 
following on from the earlier Leniency Group, met three times during 2010 to 
discuss questions of practice and policy within its remit. The Working Groups 
on horizontal agreements and on vertical restraints were particularly active this 
year by reviewing national case experiences and providing input to the 
Commission in the context of the review of the vertical and horizontal Block 
Exemption Regulation and accompanying Guidelines. These groups suspended 
their discussions with the adoption of the relevant block exemptions and 
guidelines (see Section I.B.1.1., points 30 to 44). Finally, the Merger Working 
Group met three times in 2010 and discussed the review at national level of 
mergers with potential cross-border effects and the assessment of merger 
remedies.  
– The ECN also gathered several sector-specific Working Groups, relating to the 
energy, environment, financial services, food, pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunications and transport sectors. 
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competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25) 
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1.1. The ECN Brief  
394. In 2010, the ECN launched the ECN Brief, a publication by NCAs and the 
Commission, for the attention of the legal and business communities as well as of 
consumer organisations and academics. The ECN Brief provides news on the 
activities of both NCAs and the Commission in the area of competition law 
enforcement and advocacy. It includes information on cases based on Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, on legislation and policy developments as well as on events and key 
actors of competition policy in Europe. It aims at increasing public awareness of the 
activities conducted by the ECN. 
395. In 2010, the ECN Brief was published five times (January, March, June, October and 
December). In addition to the regular ECN Brief, a "Special Issue" was published on 
16 December 2010 compiling contributions on common activities of the ECN as well 
as presentation pages of each National Competition Authority364. 
1.2. Cooperation in individual cases  
396. Cooperation between the ECN members in individual cases is organised around two 
obligations on the NCAs under Regulation 1/2003, namely to inform the 
Commission when new cases are opened (Article 11(3)) and before the final 
enforcement decision is taken (Article 11(4)). Informing the Commission and the 
Network about new cases facilitates swift reallocation of cases if necessary and 
promotes enhanced and effective enforcement. The second requirement contributes 
to the consistent application of EU law. 
1.2.1. Case allocation 
397. The Commission was informed under Article 11(3) of Regulation 1/2003 of 158 new 
case investigations launched by NCAs in 2010. Amongst the new cases, 47% 
concerned the application of Article 101 TFEU, 42% concerned the application of 
Article 102 TFEU and the remainder concerned the application of both. The figure 
for Article 101 cases includes notably the enforcement action of the NCAs in the 
area of cartels. Large numbers of cases could be observed inter alia in the transport, 
energy, manufacturing, media and telecom sectors. 
398. With regard to work-sharing within the Network, the flexible and pragmatic 
approach introduced by Regulation 1/2003 and by the Network Notice365 continued 
to function well in practice. Work-sharing may occur when a complainant or a 
leniency applicant chooses to contact both the Commission and one or more NCAs. 
In 2010, there were once more very few instances where discussions on allocation of 
cases took place, and even fewer occasions where a case changed hands after initial 
allocation. A small number of complaints were re-allocated from the Commission to 
NCAs that were willing to follow up the matters raised. Collaboration on cases also 
took place through assistance by NCAs in respective national investigations under 
Article 22 of Regulation 1/2003, underscoring the ability of NCAs to deal with 
investigations involving cross-border aspects. 
                                                 
364 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/index.html  
365 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (OJ C 101, 
27.4.2004, p. 43-53) 
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1.2.2. Coherent application of the rules 
399. In 2010, there was a significant increase in the number of enforcement decisions 
reported by NCAs in the field of the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The 
Commission services reviewed a record 94 envisaged decisions under Article 11(4) 
of Regulation 1/2003, as well as advised on a number of informal requests and 
queries from NCAs. The number of envisaged decisions went up by 36% compared 
with 2009. The envisaged decisions submitted to the Commission related to a broad 
range of infringements in different sectors of the economy. 
400. As in previous years since the implementation of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission 
did not initiate in 2010 any proceedings with the view to ensuring coherency in 
decision-making, as foreseen by Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003. 
2. APPLICATION OF EU COMPETITION RULES BY NATIONAL COURTS IN THE EU 
2.1. Assistance in the form of providing information or in the form of issuing an 
opinion 
401. Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 allows national judges to ask the Commission for 
information in its possession or for an opinion on questions concerning the 
application of the EU competition rules. In 2010, the Commission responded to two 
requests from national courts (Spain and Belgium). 
402. On 17 December 2009, the Commission submitted an opinion upon request by a 
Belgian court. The Tribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles/Rechtbank van koophandel 
Brussel asked the Commission a number of questions concerning inter alia the 
definition of the relevant market, the assessment of a dominant position and a 
possible abuse of dominant position. The questions were raised in the context of the 
assessment of a vertical distribution agreement and unilateral practices related to 
sales of smart mobile phones. As for the assessment of the relevant market, the 
Commission underlined that there is a need to assess whether products exist which 
are interchangeable or substitutable with the product assessed in the case. As for the 
assessment of a dominant position in the market, the Commission referred to the 
case-law of the EU courts. In this opinion, the Commission addressed elements 
which are relevant for the assessment of an abusive practice in a form of "refusal to 
supply". Finally, as for an abuse of dominance in a form of discrimination, the 
Commission suggested that in this case the court should examine whether different 
treatment by a dominant undertaking of certain partners distorts competition in the 
retail market and harms consumers. 
403. The Commission also replied on 29 March 2010 to a request for an opinion by the 
Juzgado de lo Mercantil nº4 of Madrid in the context of litigation following the 
acquisition of Dalphi Metal España's (DME) car airbag and steering wheel business 
by TRW Automotive (TRW), a US automotive component manufacturer. The 
questions raised were the same as those raised in the framework of litigation in 2009 
before the Juzgado de lo Mercantil nº1 de Madrid and which were already responded 
to, as summarised in paragraphs 504 and 505 of the Annual Competition Report 
2009. The Commission received confirmation that the Juzgado nº4 obtained the 
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Opinion issued on that occasion from the Juzgado nº1, and that it accordingly closed 
the matter. 
2.2. Amicus curiae interventions under Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 
404. Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that where the coherent application of 
Articles 101 or 102 TFEU so requires, the Commission, on its own initiative, may 
submit written observations to courts of the Member States, and may also make oral 
observations with the permission of the court in question. In 2010, the Commission 
submitted such written observations in three cases: before the High Court of Ireland, 
before the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic and before the Dutch Supreme 
Court. 
405. In its written observations lodged before the High Court of Ireland366 on 30 March 
2010, the Commission discussed the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU with a 
particular focus on capacity-reducing restructuring agreements relying on both the 
jurisprudence of the EU Courts and the principles underlying the Commission's 2004 
Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU367. In January 2011, the Beef 
Industry Development Society (BIDS) withdrew its claims that the agreement by its 
members that some would leave the beef processing industry in return for payment 
could be justified on efficiency grounds under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
406. The Commission submitted written observations before the Slovak Supreme Court 
relating to the application of the concepts of economic continuity of undertakings 
and the effectiveness of fines. The case involved the review of a judgment by the 
Regional Court of Bratislava annulling a decision by the Slovak NCA. 
407. The Commission observed that economic continuity is a concept of EU competition 
law which should be applied in a consistent manner throughout the EU. The 
application of economic continuity must guarantee that a successor company can be 
held liable for the behaviour of its predecessor. The aim is to avoid the effectiveness 
of EU competition rules being compromised by changes in the legal structure of 
undertakings. Its application must guarantee that the successor company can be held 
fully liable for the conduct of its predecessor and, thus, bear all the consequences 
resulting from such liability, including the fines. Moreover, the fact that the 
successor has to bear a fine for the infringement committed by the predecessor is not 
a factor that can be regarded as a mitigating circumstance per se. Therefore, any 
reduction of the fine imposed on the successor company solely on the ground that the 
infringement was committed by its predecessor can be contrary to the concept of 
economic continuity under EU law. The Commission furthermore stressed that the 
aim of the fine consists of both punishment and prevention and that these two 
functions cannot be separated. The effectiveness of a fine imposed for breach of the 
competition rules would be reduced if this dual function is disconnected by focusing 
only on the punitive function (specific deterrence) of the fine. 
408. The Slovak Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 26 October 2010 annulling the 
decision of the Regional Court and confirming the decision of the Slovak NCA 
                                                 
366 Case the Competition Authority v the Beef Industry Development Society Limited and Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meats Limited, 2003 No. 7764P.  
367 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97-118) 
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which held that the economic successor was to be held liable. In its judgment the 
Supreme Court largely took over the arguments presented by the Commission. 
409. In a case concerning the tax deductibility of Commission competition fines, the 
Commission also decided to follow up its first written observations in 2007 before 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals with new written observations before the Dutch 
Supreme Court. The Dutch Supreme Court is dealing in last instance with the appeal 
against the judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals which had decided that the 
Commission's fines are not deductable from taxes, in line with the essence of the 
Commission's first written observations. 
Other matters before national courts 
410. In one case, the Commission appeared as a defendant in proceedings where an 
undertaking seeks declaratory relief from the High Court of England and Wales that 
it is not liable for an infringement as the economic successor of the undertaking that 
originally participated in the infringement368. The proceedings have been brought as 
a reaction to requests for information to the undertaking for the purpose of 
investigating its possible liability as an economic successor of an addressee of the 
Commission's decision in the Fittings case369, it apparently being the intention of the 
applicant undertaking to pre-empt the outcome of the Commission's investigation by 
seeking a ruling from the Court of Justice on the issue of whether it can be liable as 
an economic successor, before the outcome of the Commission's investigation. 
Although it is clear that a ruling by a national court cannot bind the Commission in 
taking a decision applying the competition rules, the Commission has appeared in the 
case in order to assist the national court in relation to the jurisdictional questions 
raised by the proceedings. 
2.3. Financing the training of national judges in EU competition law  
411. Continuous availability of training programmes for national judges in EU 
competition law contributes to the effective and coherent application of those rules. 
In 2010, 14 grant agreements were concluded for training of judges' programmes in 
various Member States. 
IV – International activities 
1. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 
1.1. International Competition Network (ICN) 
412. The Commission continued to play a leading role in the ICN. More specifically, 
DG Competition is a member of the Steering Group, the co-chair of the Cartels 
Working Group and an active member of the other Working Groups on unilateral 
conduct, merger, agency effectiveness and advocacy. The 2010 ICN Annual 
                                                 
368 Conex Banninger v European Commission [2010] EWHC 1978 (Ch) 
369 Commission decision of 20 September 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38121 Fittings) 
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Conference took place in Istanbul (Turkey) from 26 to 29 April 2010. DG 
Competition has also been closely involved in the ICN Steering Group's so-called 
"Second Decade Project" reflecting on the ICN's future and making sure that it can 
remain as successful as it has been over the past ten years. 
413. The Cartels Working Group continued its work on the Anti-Cartel Enforcement 
Manual, in particular on digital evidence gathering and case initiation. The 2010 ICN 
Cartels workshop was held in Yokohama (Japan) from 5 to 7 October 2010. 
414. The Unilateral Conduct Working Group presented a report on refusal to deal at the 
conference. It also started preparations for a work book on unilateral conduct (abuse 
of dominance) issues and organised webinars on remedies and the pharmaceutical 
sector. On 2-3 December 2010, DG Competition hosted the ICN "Workshop on 
Unilateral Conduct" in Brussels. 162 participants from 50 different countries 
participated, most of them senior case handlers and policy officers responsible for 
conducting investigations and developing policy. 
415. The Merger Working Group presented Recommended Practices on market definition 
and failing firms at the ICN Annual Conference. The Agency Effectiveness Working 
Group continued its work on the Competition Agency Practice Manual and organized 
a workshop for heads of agencies in London on 12-13 July 2010 where issues of 
organisational culture, people and knowledge management, and leadership and 
succession were discussed in more depth. The Advocacy Working Group for its part 
continued its work on the Competition Advocacy Toolkit.  
1.2. OECD 
416. The Commission contributed actively to the work of the OECD Competition 
Committee and participated in each of the three sessions held in 2010. It submitted 
contributions to most roundtables on competition policy, including on procedural 
fairness, standard setting, credit rating agencies, exit strategies, exchange of 
information between competitors, emission trading schemes, horizontal agreements 
in the environmental sector, green growth and competition and sports370. The Vice-
President for Competition made a speech on state aid issues during the February 
2010 session of the OECD Global Forum on Competition371. 
1.3. UNCTAD 
417. The Commission participated to the Sixth Review Conference of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. It submitted contributions to most 
roundtable discussions, such as on the role of competition policy in promoting 
economic development and on the sanctions and remedies available under EU 
competition law. 
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2. BILATERAL COOPERATION 
418. The Commission cooperates with numerous competition authorities on a bilateral 
basis, in particular with the authorities of the EU major trading partners. The EU has 
already entered into dedicated cooperation agreements in competition matters with 
the United States, Canada, Japan and South Korea. 
2.1. Agreements with the USA, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland 
419. As in previous years, cooperation with the US was intensive. Based on two dedicated 
competition cooperation agreements372, contacts between DG Competition and the 
Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) were frequent. These contacts ranged from cooperation in 
individual cases to more general matters related to competition policy. The Vice-
President for Competition met his US counterparts, Chairman Jon Leibowitz of the 
FTC and Christine Varney, the Assistant Attorney General, at several occasions. The 
annual bilateral EU/US meeting in which the heads of the three agencies participated 
took place on 12 July 2010 in Washington. Numerous other meetings and exchanges 
took place to coordinate enforcement activities on investigations into cartels, abuse 
of dominance cases, merger cases or on the application of the competition rules in 
particular sectors, such as pharmaceuticals. 
420. In case-related contacts, case teams regularly updated each other on the state of 
investigations within the limits of the above-mentioned agreements. A number of 
important merger cases investigated in 2010 affected both the EU and US markets. 
Such investigations required good coordination with the DoJ and the FTC, such as in 
the Cisco / Tandberg case373 where the Commission cooperated closely with the DoJ 
in finding a suitable remedy (see Section II.C.2.2.2., point 259) and the Novartis / 
Alcon case374 where the Commission cooperated closely with the FTC (see Section 
II.D.2.1.2., point 292). The 2002 EU-US Best Practices on cooperation in reviewing 
mergers proved to be a useful framework for cooperation on these cases. The 
Commission also collaborated closely with the US Department of Transportation in 
identifying suitable remedies in the Oneworld case375 (see Section II.E.2.1.1., points 
309 to 312). 
421. Cooperation with the Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB) is based on the 
EU/Canada Competition Cooperation Agreement which was signed in 1999376. 
Contacts between the Commission and the Bureau have been frequent and fruitful. 
Case-related contact concerned mainly cartels, including the coordination of 
investigative measures and merger, including the discussion of possible remedies.  
                                                 
372 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America 
regarding the application of their competition laws (OJ L 95, 27.4.1995, p. 47) and Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the application of 
positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws (OJ L 173, 18.6.1998, p. 26). 
373 Case COMP/M.5669 Cisco / Tandberg. See IP/10/377, 29.3.2010. 
374 Case COMP/M.5778 Novartis / Alcon. See IP/10/1042, 9.8.2010. 
375 Case COMP/39596 BA/AA/IB. See IP/10/936 and MEMO/10/330, 14.7.2010. 
376 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the 
application of their competition laws (OJ L 175, 10.7.1999, p. 50) 
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422. Cooperation with the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) is based on the 2003 
Cooperation Agreement377. In addition to contacts on individual cases, the 
Commission and the JFTC continued their ongoing dialogue on general competition 
issues of common concern. 
423. Cooperation with the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is based on the bilateral 
Cooperation Agreement which entered into force on 1 July 2009378. The agreement 
contains provisions on enforcement cooperation, notification, consultation and 
exchange of non-confidential information. The 7th EU-Korea bilateral meeting on 
competition policy, to which the Director-General of DG Competition participated, 
took place on 14 September 2010. 
424. In December 2010, the Council gave a mandate to the Commission to negotiate an 
agreement on cooperation in competition matters with the Swiss Confederation. This 
agreement should be based on the agreements concluded so far with the United 
States, Canada, Japan and Korea. It is also intended that this agreement would 
include provisions on the exchange of confidential information (so called "second 
generation" agreement). 
2.2. Cooperation with other countries and regions 
425. Early 2010, the EU concluded negotiations for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 
the Andean Countries (Colombia and Peru) as well as with Central America. In both 
cases, the FTAs contain a competition chapter which includes a commitment to 
establish or maintain comprehensive competition legislation and effective authority 
as well as provisions on State enterprises and enterprises with special rights. In 
addition, both FTAs include provisions on subsidies in the transparency chapter: 
notification rules for subsidies to goods in line with existing WTO obligations and, 
for the first time, a provision allowing for information to be exchanged upon request 
on subsidies to services.  
426. Cooperation with China remained a priority in 2010 with several contacts between 
DG Competition and the Chinese administration. In addition to discussions 
concerning the anti-monopoly law and the implementing legislation which is being 
elaborated, issues relating to concrete cases were discussed during high-level visits in 
Beijing and Brussels respectively. The Commission approved a follow-up 
programme to the EU-China Trade Programme (EU-China Trade Project 2004-
2009). The new EUCTP II programme (2010-2015) will provide the necessary 
funding for the continuation of cooperation activities between DG Competition and 
the Chinese competition authorities in the years ahead. DG Competition is 
furthermore actively negotiating a competition chapter to be part of the 1985 upgrade 
agreement/Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
427. After India's appointment of seven Commissioners for the Competition Commission 
of India (CCI) and the notification of the operative parts of the 2002 Competition Act 
in 2009, close technical cooperation between DG Competition and the CCI continued 
                                                 
377 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on 
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378 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Republic of Korea 
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in 2010. To assist the CCI when it will start enforcing the Competition Act in the 
fields of restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance and merger control, DG 
Competition organised a five-day course in cartel enforcement in Brussels in May-
June 2010 and a four-day workshop for CCI staff in New Delhi in July 2010. 
428. DG Competition played an active role in the ongoing negotiations on Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) and other bilateral agreements with a large number of individual 
third countries or third country groupings, such as India, Ukraine, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Mercosur, Canada and five groupings of former ACP countries (four in 
Africa and one in the Pacific). DG Competition's main objective in these negotiations 
is to ensure that anti-competitive practices (including State aid) do not erode the 
trade and other economic benefits sought through those agreements. The Foreign 
Affairs Council authorised on 16 September 2010 the signature of the EU-Korea 
Free Trade Agreement which is a key step towards its provisional application by 
1 July 2011. It is the first time that an FTA contains a prohibition on certain types of 
subsidies. 
3. ENLARGEMENT AND NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY 
429. In the context of enlargement, candidate countries must fulfil a number of 
requirements in the field of competition policy as a condition for joining the EU. 
Candidate countries must adopt national legislation compatible with the EU acquis. 
They must also put in place the necessary administrative capacity and demonstrate a 
credible enforcement record. The Commission provides technical assistance and 
support to help the candidate countries fulfil these requirements in the field of 
competition policy and enforcement and is continuously monitoring the extent to 
which the candidate countries are prepared for accession. 
430. During 2010, significant progress was made by both Croatia and Turkey. In June 
2010, the Council decided to open the accession negotiations on the competition 
chapter with Croatia after it concluded that this candidate country fulfilled all the 
opening benchmarks. The Turkish Parliament adopted a State aid law in October 
2010, which is one of the key opening benchmarks of the competition chapter. 
Further progress on the other opening benchmarks (all related to State aid control) is 
needed before the Commission would be able to recommend the opening of the 
competition chapter with Turkey. 
431. In November 2010, the Commission submitted to the Council its opinions on 
Albania's and Montenegro's respective capabilities to assume the responsibilities of 
EU membership. For competition policy, the Commission's opinions for both 
countries were cautiously positive, noting that all legal and administrative structures 
were in place but concluding that Albania as well as Montenegro would have to 
undertake additional efforts in the medium term to align further with the EU acquis. 
Regarding Serbia, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the Serbian government 
which included a comprehensive set of questions on Serbian competition policy. In 
addition, the Commission assisted other Western Balkan countries in further aligning 
their competition rules with EU law. This included, among others, help in reviewing 
draft laws on competition and State aid and advice on setting up the necessary 
institutions to enforce these rules. The Commission continued the preliminary 
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discussions on Iceland's EU membership prospects and completed the screening 
exercise on the competition chapter in December 2010. 
432. In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Commission 
monitored the implementation of the competition-related priorities in the bilateral 
action plans agreed between the EU and ENP countries, which set out an agenda of 
political and economic reforms in the short- and medium-term. It also organised a 
certain number of seminars financed by the Technical Assistance and Information 
Exchange programme on competition-related issues for these countries. 
V – Dialogue with Consumer organisations and other stakeholders 
1. DIALOGUE WITH CONSUMER ORGANISATIONS 
433. The DG Competition's Consumer Liaison Unit's goals are to improve dialogue with 
consumers and consumer organisations, to consult them on policy initiatives, to 
reflect consumer interests more clearly in case handling, to help consumers better 
understand EU competition policy and its outcomes and to become a point of contact 
with the Commission for consumers regarding competition issues. Consumers and 
their representatives are indeed able to bring helpful information to the Commission 
about potential market failure. 
1.1 The European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG) 
434. The ECCG379 competition subgroup consists of one representative per Member 
States' national consumer organisations and one representative from BEUC, the 
European consumer association. It constitutes a discussion forum of competition 
policy issues from the consumer viewpoint and meets biannually in Brussels. 
435. In 2010, the ECCG competition subgroup proved to be a very useful tool for the 
Commission in its effort to inform consumers, to receive valuable feedback from 
them on cases and legislative projects and to establish contacts with the consumers 
throughout the EU in order to facilitate a more effective enforcement of competition 
policy. This year the ECCG subgroup of competition addressed important issues 
such as vertical restrains and remedies. On the basis of a questionnaire prepared by 
DG Competition, the Subgroup also adopted a formal opinion380, endorsed by the 
plenary ECCG, on private enforcement in the EU, describing the legal situation in 
each Member State and the existing obstacles to a genuine mechanism of collective 
damages action for breach of antitrust rules. 
1.2. Training of European consumers' representatives – the TRACE programme 
436. At DG Competition's initiative, a three-day course on competition policy took place 
between the 18 and 20 October 2010 in the framework of the "Training for 
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Consumer Empowerment" initiative381. The course, designed by DG Competition, 
provided an opportunity to present Commission decisions and policy actions in the 
field of competition from a consumer point of view, to promote competition culture 
amongst consumer organisations and to establish links between DG Competition and 
consumer organisations. The course covered a broad area of topics on competition 
policy including the explanation of its different branches, the consumer orientation of 
competition policy, the decision making and the complaint procedure, vertical 
restraints, private damages actions and sector inquiries. 21 participants from 18 
countries took part in the training course, the majority of which with experience of 
competition policy issues, in particular with handling or preparing consumer 
complaints.  
1.3. Interactive consumer corner on Competition website and point of contact with 
consumers 
437. A special consumer corner on DG Competition website has been further developed, 
available in every official language since mid-2010382. The website intends to present 
in a simple language the role of competition policy and the main competition cases. 
2. DIALOGUE WITH STAKEHOLDERS  
438. In 2010, DG Competition conducted a comprehensive stakeholder survey on 
perceptions about competition policy and the perceived quality of actions by DG 
Competition383. The survey was carried out in two parts by two independent market 
research organisations among professional stakeholders and citizens in all EU 
Member States. 
439. According to the results of the quantitative survey384 EU citizens largely shared the 
objectives and values of competition policy. From DG Competition's present priority 
sectors, citizens identified energy with 44%, the pharmaceutical products with 25% 
and telecommunication with 21% as those main sectors where they perceive 
competition problems. The major indication for the lack of competition was that 
prices were felt to be too high. The survey revealed interesting differences across the 
Member States in the level of existing knowledge and general interest towards 
competition policy and across socio-economic groups. This information as well as 
feedback from citizens about what competition policy topics they prefer to be further 
informed, will allow DG Competition together with the EU Member States' national 
competition authorities a better targeted communication policy. 
440. In the qualitative study among professional stakeholders385, feedback was asked on 
the perceived quality of DG Competition's actions in the following fields: (i) the 
                                                 
381 This initiative is 100% funded by the Commission, and is operated by BEUC under the supervision of 
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382 The Consumer corner of DG Competition is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/  
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soundness of the legal and economic analysis, (ii) the integrity and transparency in 
interrelations with stakeholders, (iii) the economic effectiveness and (iv) external 
communication. The qualitative study highlighted significant praise for the 
effectiveness of DG Competition's work and the integrity of its staff. The study also 
provided constructive criticism together with suggestions for improvement386. DG 
Competition will use the results of this survey as an input into its antitrust best 
practices discussions, as well as a basis for internal discussions and for follow-up 
consultations with stakeholders on improving cooperation. 
VI – Inter-institutional cooperation 
441. Following the European Parliament elections in 2009, and the start of the new 
Commission mandate in 2010, the new Framework Agreement between the 
Commission and the European Parliament was adopted in October 2010. The other 
inter-institutional agreements remained unchanged387. 
442. Following the hearings of the Commissioners elect in January 2010, Vice-President 
Almunia took up his duties as Commissioner for Competition in February. 
1. COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
443. In 2010, the Parliament adopted Resolutions on the Report on Competition Policy 
2008, on the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation, on Horizontal 
Agreements, and on the Council decision for State aid for the closure of 
uncompetitive coal mines388. There was also a Plenary debate on the Commission's 
fining policy in October. 
444. The Parliament adopted its Resolution on the Report on Competition Policy 2009 in 
January 2011. This marks the first year of the new timing for adoption of both the 
Commission's Report (in June) and the Parliament's Resolution (the following 
January). This new timing should facilitate inter-institutional discussion, by giving 
the Commission time to reflect on the Parliament's report of the previous year when 
drafting the next Annual Competition Report. 
445. In addition to the regular dialogue between the Commissioner and the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) in June and November 2010, Vice-President 
Almunia took part in ECON Open coordinators meetings on vertical agreements 
(March), on horizontal agreements and on Inability to pay (July). The Vice-President 
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also announced the prolongation of the temporary State aid rules adopted in response 
to the financial and economic crisis to Members of the ECON committee at a 
Hearing on that subject in October. 
446. Vice President Almunia attended the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis 
Committee Open Coordinators meeting in April 2010 where he clarified the role of 
DG Competition in tackling the crisis. He spoke to the Public Services Intergroup on 
SGEI in June. 
447. At the beginning of 2010, the Director-General of DG Competition, and senior 
officials, participated in a cartels workshop in the Parliament (11 January). Senior 
DG Competition officials also participated in debates and seminars organised in 
Parliament on subjects including Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), 
temporary State aid adopted in response to the crisis, cartels and collective redress. 
DG Competition also participated in meetings of other Parliamentary committees: 
the Petitions committee, Internal Market and Consumer Affairs, Industry, Transport, 
Regional Policy and Legal Affairs. Informal bilateral meetings were held with a 
number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on a range of subjects 
throughout the year, including on damages actions, motor vehicle BER, financial 
crisis, SGEI, exit strategy, vertical and horizontal agreements. 
448. The Commission also cooperated closely with both the European Ombudsman and 
MEPs by replying to Parliamentary Questions and Petitions. In 2010, the 
Commission responded to 552 written questions, 50 oral questions and 40 petitions 
involving matters of competition policy. Of these the Commissioner in charge of 
Competition directly responded to 200 written questions, 20 oral questions and 11 
petitions, as chef de file. 
2. COOPERATION WITH THE COUNCIL 
449. The Commission cooperated closely with the Council by informing it of important 
policy initiatives in the field of competition, in particular on the temporary State aid 
measures in the context of the financial and economic crisis. The Commission also 
made contributions regarding competition policy in respect of conclusions adopted in 
the ECOFIN and European Councils (exit strategies for the financial sector) and the 
Competitiveness Council (innovation, industrial policy). 
450. An important file in 2010 was the Council decision on State aid for the closure of 
uncompetitive coal mines. The Commission made a proposal on 20 July 2010. On 
8 December 2010, the Commission discussed the state of play in light of the 
extensive debate in both Parliament and Council, and gave Vice-President Almunia a 
mandate to present a revised position to the Council with a view to reaching an 
agreement. The Council adopted its decision on 10 December 2010. 
3. COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
451. The Commission informed the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
about major policy initiatives, and participated in study group and section meetings. 
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The EESC adopted an opinion on the Report on Competition Policy 2008389 in July 
2010 and contributed to the debates on State aid to coal, and the Motor Vehicle 
Block Exemption Regulation by adopting opinions on these matters.  
                                                 
389 INT/505 Report on competition policy 2008 
